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ABSTRACT
The importance of studying economic growth cannot be overstated. Though it does 
not guarantee a better standard of living, economic growth offers unrivalled potential 
to reduce poverty in developing countries and improve the fortunes of those lucky 
enough to be bom in the developed world. The aim of this thesis is to explore the 
relationship between three ‘open-economy’ factors that are believed to strongly 
influence economic growth: regional integration agreements (RIAs), foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and trade.
We employ the well-known gravity model as the empirical framework in which to 
analyse the interplay between these three factors. We also conduct a case study 
analysis of Mexico; this allows us to further explore some of our empirical findings 
in the context of a developing country that has been heavily influenced by trade, 
investment, and membership of a regional integration agreement.
In addition to evidence that integration agreements stimulate intra-regional investment 
and trade, our empirical analysis is clear that there are also significant and varied 
effects on non-member countries. Such effects should not be overlooked by 
policymakers when assessing the merits of a particular RIA.
We also report results which indicate that outward FDI and exports are complements, 
not substitutes. This suggests that fears that outward investment leads to a loss of 
employment at home are overblown. There is evidence, however, that the strength of 
the complementary relationship depends on the characteristics of the countries 
involved.
The case study ably demonstrates the significant influence that integration agreements 
can have on countries and economies. One of the key impacts o f the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was simply its ability to legitimise and deepen the 
liberalisation policies that Mexico had begun to implement some years before. It is 
also evident, however, that NAFTA has induced serious spatial effects on the 
Mexican economy. Such effects may have contributed to income inequality and again 
highlight that policymakers must be aware that integration agreements can have 
profound, unintended effects on both member and non-member countries.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT
This thesis explores the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and 
regional integration agreements (RIAs) in the context of endogenous growth theory. FDI, 
trade and RIAs are all intimately linked with the process of globalisation - the increasing 
integration of the world’s economies. Between 1970 and 2003, the global stock of FDI 
(as a percentage of world GDP) more than tripled from 1.2% to 4.9%; international trade, 
as a percentage of world GDP, has risen from 26.5% to 47.6%; and the number of RIAs 
has risen from 30 to over 200 (Crawford & Fiorentino, 2005). This expansion in 
international activities has undoubtedly had significant effects on economies across the 
globe, the potential effect on economic growth being of particular interest.
The importance of studying economic growth, trying to determine what drives it, seems 
obvious. Though economic growth does not guarantee a higher standard of living or 
increasing equality, it probably offers unrivalled potential to reduce poverty in developing 
nations and improve the general standard of living for those lucky enough to be bom in 
the developed world. "It fires the imagination that policy might be able to influence 
economic growth..." (Quah, 1996: p .1353). Indeed, what a prize it would be if the result 
of research in this area came up with hard and fast mles that policymakers could 
implement to improve the growth of their economies and hopefully the welfare of their 
citizens.
1
Developing countries the world over, now as much as ever, need to harness the beneficial 
forces of growth. The recent UN Human Development Report 2003 makes sombre 
reading. More than 1.2 billion people survive on less than $1 a day. During the 1990s 
the share of people suffering from extreme poverty fell from 30% to 23%. However, this 
progress was largely due to the huge leaps made by China and India and masks 
significant regional disparities. The number of people living on less than $1 per day 
actually increased in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Arab States, Central and 
Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa. During the 1990s, 54 developing and transition 
countries suffered falling average per capita incomes (Human Development Report, 
2003).
Such reversals in progress were previously rare and are more difficult to tolerate today 
given the scale of global resources and the unprecedented wealth enjoyed by many in 
developed nations. If progress does not improve, of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) only the targets of halving income poverty and halving the proportion of 
people without access to safe water will realistically be met by 2015; and this would be 
largely thanks to Chinese and Indian progress1. At the current pace of progress, Sub- 
Saharan Africa will not reach the Goals for poverty reduction until 2147, and for child 
mortality until 2165.
1 The Millennium Development Goals were agreed at the UN-sponsored Millennium Summit in September 
2000. The eight Goals are: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global 
partnership for development. The Goals fall due in 2015.
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How is it that China and India have made such encouraging progress towards eradicating 
poverty while so many other developing and transition countries have actually gone 
backwards? The answer is simple and yet agonisingly difficult to achieve -  rapid and 
sustained economic growth. Both China and India grew at rates of around 8% to 9% for 
most of the 1990s which, despite fears that rapid growth can be accompanied by 
increasing inequality, enabled them to pull vast numbers of their people out of poverty2. 
This is not to say that economic growth will automatically reduce poverty. Progress in 
China, for example, has been centred on the coastal regions with many inland pockets of 
entrenched poverty remaining. Some countries that have achieved sustainable economic 
growth have simultaneously suffered from increasing poverty. What is required in these 
circumstances is policies to strengthen the links between growth, development and 
poverty reduction, such as government investment in health and education.
Despite concerns that economic growth can be "ruthless", the Human Development 
Report 2003 states that "economic growth is important for achieving all the Millennium 
Development Goals". This is echoed by the Poverty Report from the World Bank (2002) 
which argues that "sustainable economic growth and appropriate social policies are keys 
to fighting poverty" (p.6). Economic growth is vital because it both directly increases the 
incomes of households and increases government revenues. As many investments in 
human development are provided by the state (e.g. health, education, sanitation, 
infrastructure, law and order) it is necessary that the public sector has sufficient resources 
for investment.
2 It is estimated that China lifted 150 million people out of poverty during the 1990s (Human Development 
Report, 2003).
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There seems to be a general consensus that economic growth is a critical ingredient to aid 
development and tackle poverty. It is clear, however, that there are substantial challenges 
in trying to harness growth for development and ensure that the benefits are equitably 
dispersed. What insight does economic growth theory provide in this regard?
Modem growth theory can be broadly categorised into the following three groups: early 
post-Keynesian models that emphasised the role of savings and investment in fostering 
growth (e.g. the Harrod-Domar model); neoclassical models that cast exogenous 
technological progress as the catalyst of growth; and endogenous models (or new growth 
theory) that typically emphasise the role of R&D, human capital and externalities in 
endogenising the rate of economic growth.
The evolution of economic growth theory, from the Harrod-Domar model to new growth 
theory, is discussed in greater detail in section 1 of Chapter 2. The important point to 
note here is that early models of growth (as progressive and insightful as they were at the 
time) were somewhat lacking in terms of policy proposals3. Endogenous growth models, 
or new growth theory, were bom as a direct result of this. These models seek to 
endogenise the rate of growth (i.e. identify and incorporate the key drivers) and so 
contribute to ongoing policy debates.
3 Although the Harrod-Domar and neoclassical models both highlight the importance of savings in fostering 
economic growth, they offer little in the way of practical (or micro) policy advice. For instance, they say 
nothing about labour market regulations, tax concessions, immigration policies etc.
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Early endogenous growth models (e.g. Romer, 1986, 1994; Lucas, 1988) emphasised the 
role of R&D and human capital accumulation in fostering economic growth (by 
permitting non-decreasing returns to investment). More recently, endogenous models 
have been developed which reintroduce convergence due to open-economy effects such 
as international trade and investment. The logic of these models is straightforward. In 
updating their technology, poor countries have the potential to make large productivity 
gains by employing the superior technology that is in use by rich countries (Abramovitz, 
1986)4. Various models have been proposed that formalise the channels through which 
international technological diffusion is believed to operate. For example, Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) develop an endogenous model in which technology is embodied in 
capital goods. Countries therefore have an opportunity to enjoy technological progress 
simply by importing capital goods from technologically superior nations.
FDI is another channel that has received much attention in the literature. The opposition 
that existed to FDI in many LDCs in the 1950s and 1960s has long since been supplanted 
by governments that often actively compete to attract FDI. This competition has arisen 
from the belief that FDI is a "composite bundle of capital, know-how, and technology" 
(Balasubramanyam et al., 2001: p.234) that can be exploited by the host nation to not 
only allow them to produce at a point nearer to their production possibility frontier (PPF), 
but to actually shift the PPF outwards. This seems very encouraging for developing 
nations. However, Abramovitz (1986) argues that a country's ability to exploit the 
potential gains from inward FDI is limited by its 'social capability' to assimilate foreign
4 Therefore, whilst the neoclassical model predicts (conditional) convergence due to diminishing marginal 
returns to capital, open-economy endogenous growth models predict convergence due to gains from 
technological diffusion.
technology and knowledge. It is easy to imagine a whole host of factors that might affect 
a country's 'social capability', not least human capital5.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
There are clearly a wide range of factors that can affect the rate of economic growth. As 
mentioned, we have chosen to concentrate on regional integration agreements, foreign 
direct investment and trade. These factors are of particular interest given the 
phenomenon known as globalisation.
Despite lacking a precise definition, the term globalisation is typically used as a reference 
to the increasing integration of the world’s economies, both driven and symbolised by 
rapid increases in international trade and FDI during the last three decades. Since 1970 
the global stock of FDI (as a percentage of world GDP) has more than tripled, while 
international trade has nearly doubled. Globalisation is effectively making the world a 
smaller place, with distance becoming less of an obstacle to cross-border interaction.
However, the increases in FDI and trade have not been even across the board, with
developed and developing countries undergoing markedly different experiences. Figure 1
shows global FDI inflows for the years 1970 to 2003. It is clear that there has been a
significant change in trend during this time. In the first half of the period, 1970 to 1985,
5 As it happens, think of a factor that might reasonably be expected to influence ‘social capability’ and you 
will almost undoubtedly find that there is already an empirical study of its effect on growth. For example, 
Hermes and Lensink (2000) find that “a more developed financial system positively contributes to the 
process of technological diffusion associated with FDI” (abstract). Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) report 
evidence that FDI is more beneficial in an exporting-promoting (EP) than an import-substituting (IS) 
regime. Huang and Xu (1999) investigate the importance of institutions and innovation for growth.
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world FDI inflows grew from $13 billion to $58 billion, equivalent to an annual growth 
rate of 10.5%. By 2000 world inflows had risen to $1,388 billion, an implied annual 
growth rate since 1985 of 23.5%. Since the peak in 2000, world inflows have fallen 
dramatically (back to $560 billion in 2003). UNCTAD argues that this reversal in FDI is 
a temporary reaction to short-term economic weakness, particularly in the three major 
economies of the US, Europe and Japan (World Investment Report, 2002).
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Figure 1.1 also highlights the large inequality in FDI inflows between developed and 
developing countries. In 1970, inflows to developed countries totalled $9.5 billion, 
roughly 2.7 times the $3.5 billion received by developing countries. Figure 1.2 illustrates 
how this ratio has varied over the period under consideration. The ratio has fluctuated 
considerably (between values of 1.2 and 5.5) over time, seemingly in a fairly regular 
pattern. For instance, from a low of 1.2 in 1982, the ratio has increased (with the 
exception of a slight decrease between 1987 and 1988) to a peak of 5.5 in 1989; the ratio 
then fell steadily over the next five years to a value of 1.3 in 1994, before increasing 
rapidly again from 1997. As the world economy moved into recession (and the internet 
bubble burst) in the early years of the new century, developed countries bore the brunt of 
the downturn in FDI.
To a large extent, discrepancies between inflows to developed and developing countries 
can be attributed to merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. These transactions, which 
can account for a significant proportion of annual FDI flows, typically take place between 
firms located in developed countries. Their importance was well illustrated by the 
downturn in 2000 and 2001. M&A activity fell from around $1,000 billion in 2000 to 
$504 billion in 2001 with a consequent fall in FDI to developed countries of 59% 
compared with only a 14% reduction in FDI to developing countries. Conversely, in 
periods when the world economy is performing strongly and multinationals are enjoying 
rising profits, M&A activity is typically buoyant, and this manifests itself primarily as 
FDI flows between developed countries6.
6 “John Dunning agreed that FDI flows during the early 1990s increased but this was mostly due to M&As 
between firms of developed countries, the developing countries did not experience all that much of an
9
Figure 1.3 combines the FDI ratio shown in Figure 1.2 with an overlay of periods of US 
recession . A falling FDI ratio appears to be accompanied (or recently preceded) by a 
recessionary period (represented by the vertical bars). Expansionary phases of the 
business cycle (periods between the bars), however, seem to be associated with a rising 
FDI ratio. This suggests that during periods of strong world economic growth, FDI to 
developed countries tends to grow at a greater rate than that to developing countries. 
During periods of world recession however, FDI inflows to developing countries are less 
likely to fluctuate than those to developed countries because of a decline in merger and 
acquisition activity (which accounts for a much greater proportion of FDI to developed 
countries than to developing countries).
Let us now compare this with the pattern of international trade in recent times. Figure 1.4 
shows international exports and imports for the years 1970 to 2004. It is clear that 
exports-from- and imports-to- developed countries far exceed those to-and-from- 
developing countries. Despite this, developing countries have enjoyed rapid growth in 
trade since 1970.
increase in FDI flows. It is interesting that in 2001 FDI fell dramatically because there was a dramatic fall 
in M&A activity. And the share of FDI going to developing countries increased, and some countries such 
as China have maintained this growth in inflows of FDI.” (Balasubramanyam and Wei, 2004: p. 131).
7 Given the size of the US economy, periods of US recession are typically synonymous with global 
recessionary periods.
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Figure 1.3 Ratio of Developed to Developing Country FDI Inflows and US Recessionary 
Periods, 1970 to 2003
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Source: US recession period  data from  Factset; F D I data from  UNCTAD online database.
Figure 1.4 World Trade Flows, 1970 to 2004
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The similarity in magnitude of exports and imports within the developed-country and 
developing-country groups is striking -  although perhaps unremarkable given that 
divergences between exports and imports result in trade imbalances which are difficult to
o
sustain over the long term .
It is interesting to note the fall in trade between 2000 and 2001 (for both developed and 
developing countries). This effect was seen for FDI with respect to developed nations. 
The slowdown in FDI and trade during the recent global recession highlights the 
endogeneity that exists between these factors and economic growth. In addition to being 
determinants of economic growth, FDI and trade are themselves influenced by short-term 
changes in the pace of growth.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the interplay between international trade, FDI and 
regional integration in a number of discrete, but related, chapters. The intention is that 
each chapter will contribute to an aspect of the debate regarding the merits of 
globalisation, and taken as a whole the thesis will further shed light on the role of FDI, 
trade and regional integration in fostering economic growth. Accordingly, we examine 
the impact of regional integration agreements on FDI and exports, the relationship 
between FDI and exports, and the interplay between all three forces in the context of a 
country case study. A more in depth discussion of these chapters and of the thesis 
structure is given below.
8 Obviously the US has proved an exception to this rule, using capital inflows to fund large, persistent 
current account deficits in recent years (with resulting pressure on the US exchange rate).
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1.3 STRUCTURE
In Chapter 2 we address a number of issues that are pertinent to the empirical analyses of 
the later Chapters. We develop a simple endogenous growth model in section 2.1 to 
illustrate how FDI may contribute to economic growth. Although individual firms face 
constant returns to scale with respect to the reproducible factors of production, economy- 
wide accumulation of FDI offers the opportunity for increasing returns overall. 
Permitting FDI to have spillover effects is consistent with the view that FDI, in addition 
to being a provider of capital, embodies knowledge and technology.
The role of the multinational enterprise (MNE) in international trade and investment 
theory is reviewed in section 2.2 of Chapter 2. Early theories of international trade, such 
as comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, made no allowance for the 
existence of MNEs. As the growing importance of FDI became increasingly evident 
during the 1960s, it became clear that the MNE warranted inclusion in international trade 
theory9. In an influential paper, Vernon (1966) sought to address this omission by 
“putting less emphasis upon comparative cost doctrine and more upon the timing of 
innovation, the effects of scale economies, and the role of ignorance and uncertainty in 
influencing trade patterns” (p. 190).
Although largely qualitative, it is clear that ideas from Vernon’s work have informed 
more recent, formal models of multinational activity. These include the vertical,
9 According to the US Tariff Commission (1973: p.322), in 1970 multinationals accounted for 62% of US 
exports and 34% of US imports.
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horizontal and knowledge-capital models10. Vertical models attribute multinational 
activity to a desire by firms to locate production globally in the lowest cost location (e.g. 
resource and efficiency-seeking FDI). Horizontal models posit that FDI is the result of a 
proximity-concentration trade-off which involves firms weighing the cost of exporting 
against the cost of producing in the local market (e.g. market-seeking and tariff-jumping 
FDI). The knowledge-capital model is an attempt to combine elements from both vertical 
and horizontal models. In Chapter 2 we discuss these different rationales for FDI and 
explore their implications for international trade and investment activity.
Section 2.3 of Chapter 2 outlines the growing popularity of regional integration 
agreements in recent years. According to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), of the 
194 agreements notified at the beginning of 1999, 87 have been notified since 1990. 
Most industrial and developing countries are now members of an RIA, and many belong 
to more than one (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005).
The structure of RIAs has also evolved substantially in recent years. Early RIAs 
normally focussed on reducing barriers to trade between member countries. 
Acknowledging the perceived importance of FDI, RIAs formed today will often include 
explicit investment provisions aimed at reducing barriers to the flow of investment 
between members. It is likely, therefore, that RIAs will have a marked effect on FDI 
flows, both between member countries and between insiders and outsiders11.
10 For an exposition of the vertical, horizontal and knowledge-capital models see Helpman (1984), 
Markusen (1984) and Markusen (1997) respectively.
11 Even in the absence of such provisions, RIAs are expected to have a considerable impact on FDI flows 
because of the interplay between trade and investment.
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Particular attention is paid to two of the world’s most prominent integration agreements -  
the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement. The regionalism 
versus multilateralism debate is also discussed.
To complete Chapter 2 we introduce the gravity model, an empirical device that has 
proved popular in the analysis of trade and investment flows. We discuss the origins of 
the model and the potential empirical problems that arise when it is applied to FDI flows.
As FDI is thought to be beneficial in fostering economic growth, it is important that we 
understand the potential influence of RIAs. In Chapter 3 we conduct an empirical 
investigation into the effects of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on FDI flows (both between members and between insiders 
and outsiders).
Despite a vast number of RIAs being in existence today, we choose to focus our 
investigation solely on the effects of the EU and NAFTA for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, RIAs vary considerably in scope and depth and it would be misleading to imply 
that all such agreements are homogenous. By explicitly examining the EU and NAFTA 
we are able to draw useful conclusions that apply to specific agreements. Furthermore, 
the members of NAFTA and the EU together accounted for 61% of world FDI inflows 
and 84% of world FDI outflows in 2003. Concentrating on these agreements therefore 
allows clarity in empirical implementation while encompassing the majority of global 
FDI activity. In addition, the EU and NAFTA are the most advanced RIAs in existence
(in terms of breadth and depth of integration), and so it is reasonable to expect that they 
are the most likely to have a detectable impact on FDI flows.
In order to test whether the EU or NAFTA have an impact on insider or outsider FDI 
flows we apply the gravity model to a panel data set covering the period 1992 to 2003. 
The gravity model accounts for the main determinants of FDI flows, which allows an 
integration dummy variable to be introduced to capture any possible RIA-effect on FDI. 
A positive and statistically significant integration dummy provides evidence to support 
the hypothesis that RIAs encourage FDI flows. A range of dummy variables are used to 
test for the impact of the EU and NAFTA separately and to ensure that potential insider 
and outsider effects are properly analysed.
In Chapter 4 we apply the gravity model to international export flows, testing whether the 
existence of the EU and NAFTA does in fact result in an increase in trade flows between 
members. We also investigate possible trade-diversion effects by considering the impact 
of trade flows between insiders and outsiders.
This analysis is important because trade and investment are inextricably linked. 
Furthermore, it affords us a greater understanding of our application of the gravity model 
and permits comparison with a vast literature employing the gravity model to 
international trade flows. We compare the results from Chapters 3 and 4 to examine 
whether certain factors are more influential in determining investment flows than they are 
in determining trade flows.
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As in Chapter 3, we include a range of integration dummy variables to allow the impact 
of the EU and NAFTA to be separately estimated and to explore possible trade creation 
and diversion effects.
In recent decades there has been a “new-found enthusiasm for FDI on the part of most 
developing countries” (Balasubramanyam, Salisu and Sapsford, 1996). This is 
encouraging given the belief that FDI is an important contributor to economic growth. It 
is therefore unfortunate that there remains considerable opposition across the world to 
globalisation (and the growth in integration, international trade and investment that 
accompanies it).
The formation of a new RIA will often be accompanied by considerable concern that it 
will lead to a loss of jobs (a fear not restricted to any single group). For example, plans to 
implement the European Single Market program gave rise to vehement protests from 
outsiders convinced that ‘Fortress Europe’ would drastically curtail their access to these 
markets; during NAFTA negotiations, US and Canadian special interest groups (i.e. 
insiders) voiced fears that domestic firms would relocate thousands of jobs to Mexico to 
take advantage of cheap and abundant labour.
Often, concern as to the perceived costs of globalisation will be voiced only by the 
minority, with the majority comfortable that the benefits will outweigh the costs. 
However, to the extent that the minority can exert significant political influence, they may 
be able to derail the progress of globalisation (e.g. by forcing new RIAs to be less open 
than they might otherwise have been). This is obviously of great concern if we believe
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that globalisation, through the mechanisms of international investment and international 
free trade, confers benefits across the globe.
In Chapter 5 we investigate the common concern that outward FDI can result in a loss of 
employment (and in extreme cases deindustrialisation) in the source economy due to the 
displacement of exports. This argument hinges on the relationship between FDI and 
exports. If they are substitutes then an increase in outward FDI will result in a fall in 
exports which may harm domestic employment. However, if they are complements 
outward FDI will be accompanied by an increase in exports.
As the relationship between FDI and exports is inconclusive from a theoretical 
standpoint, we are encouraged to try to resolve the issue by empirical analysis. 
Fortunately, the gravity model proves a convenient empirical tool for analysing the 
relationship. In addition to estimating the relationship in an aggregate sense, we explore 
whether the relationship varies depending on the types of country (e.g. developed or 
developing) involved.
In Chapter 6 we conduct a case study of FDI in Mexico. This allows us to explore some 
of the themes we have investigated throughout the thesis in the context of the experience 
of a developing country. Mexico provides an interesting case study of the effect of 
inward FDI because, like many developing countries, it has progressed from a highly 
protectionist regime focused on import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) to an open 
regime actively seeking to attract FDI. Furthermore, its proximity to the world’s most
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‘powerful’ nation is interesting and should make it easier to detect any beneficial (or 
negative) effects of FDI12.
Examining the experience of Mexico also affords closer scrutiny of the influence of a 
regional integration agreement. Anecdotal evidence suggests that NAFTA has had a 
marked effect on the Mexican economy since its implementation in 1994, and it will be 
interesting to explore these potential effects in greater detail.
The availability of comprehensive data from the US Bureau of Economic Activity 
(covering US FDI into Mexico) also allows a time series analysis of the growth effects of 
FDI in Mexico to be undertaken.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes, summarising the discussion and analyses of the previous 
chapters and drawing together the main conclusions regarding the interplay between 
regional integration, foreign direct investment and trade. Implications for policy, 
particularly with respect to developing countries, and possible directions for future 
research are discussed.
12 Over the last two decades the US has consistently been the source of over half of Mexico’s inward FDI. 
Given that US FDI, on average, is likely to embody a high degree of technology and know-how, Mexico 
should be in an excellent position to reap the benefits.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter is designed to address a number of issues that are pertinent to the empirical 
analysis that we intend to undertake in subsequent chapters. It is divided into five 
sections. The first section discusses the mechanisms through which foreign direct 
investment may contribute to economic growth. Section two reviews the theory behind 
international trade and investment, with particular reference to attempts made to include 
the role of multinational enterprises. The third section discusses regionalism and FDI, 
including a brief history of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European 
Union. Section four offers a critique of the gravity model, an empirical model commonly 
used to estimate trade and investment flows. Section five concludes.
2.1 GROWTH EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Over the last half-century nations have become amazingly more receptive to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Back in the 1960s and 1970s FDI was blamed for all manner of 
ills that beset countries, from local firm closures to national unrest. Nations looked to the 
example of Japan, whose refusal to permit FDI seemed to give rise to a remarkable 
success story. However, rapid growth in world trade, the liberalisation of many 
economies (e.g. China post-1991) and national industries (e.g. telecommunications), and 
Japan’s 1990s decline foreshadowed a remarkable change in attitude towards FDI. 
Whilst multinational enterprises clamoured to invest to penetrate new markets and exploit 
previously inaccessible resources, nations began to appreciate the potential benefits of 
FDI and were soon fiercely competing to attract it.
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FDI has become closely associated with the phenomenon known as ‘globalisation’. For 
all the rhetoric, globalisation lacks an exact definition and means different things to 
different people. It is probably best used as a term to describe the increasing integration 
of national markets and the worldwide division of production (which has caused 
geographical separation of the value-added chain). The main drivers of globalisation are 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) that strive to access new markets and minimise 
production costs through international investments (i.e. FDI). Despite the now widely- 
held view that FDI is beneficial for the host economy, there are those who consider 
globalisation to be a capitalist tool designed to exploit developing countries. In one 
sense, the close link between FDI and globalisation has been beneficial, because the 
furore over globalisation has heaped enormous attention on FDI, both in academic 
journals and the popular press. However, it has also meant that they are frequently 
‘thrown in the same boat’ and consequently many erroneous statements and claims as to 
the benefits or otherwise of FDI have been made. In order to ensure that the same 
mistake is not made here, we begin by grounding our analysis in economic theory.
The neoclassical growth model is typically expressed as a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with two inputs, capital (K) and labour (L):
Y = K a(A L f-a [2.1]
‘A ’ represents technological progress (which is assumed to grow at the constant,
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exogenous rate ‘g ’) and ‘AU  can be thought of as units of effective labour (which 
incorporates both the quantity and productivity of labour as goyemed by the level of 
available technology). We assume constant returns to scale (CRS), but diminishing 
returns to individual factors. Under this specification, FDI inflows are modelled simply 
as contributions to capital (K) and, therefore, there is no distinction between foreign and 
domestic investment. As the model assumes CRS with diminishing returns to capital 
accumulation, increases in national output will diminish as the stock of inward FDI (and 
domestic investment) accumulates, if not matched by proportionate increments of AL. In 
this manner, the neoclassical model predicts that economies will converge towards a 
steady-state equilibrium1. The level of the steady state is determined by the positive 
influences of FDI and the domestic saving rate and the negative effect of population 
growth. However, the growth rate of the economy at its steady state is governed purely 
by the exogenous rate of technological progress, ‘g \ Therefore, the neoclassical model 
permits FDI only a short-run effect on growth (the length of which is determined by the 
economy’s transitional dynamics to its steady state).
Obviously the neoclassical model is completely inadequate for analysing the potential 
growth effects of FDI. Its narrow specification constrains FDI to having the same 
characteristics as domestic investment. As Graham & Krugman (1991) observe, domestic 
firms will surely have superior knowledge and access to domestic markets. If a foreign 
firm is to enter these markets it must counter these advantages with some of its own. It is 
quite plausible that these advantages may be embodied (at least to some extent) in the
1 Steady-state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which each variable is either constant or growing at a 
constant rate.
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firm’s FDI and may therefore spillover to the host nation. As such we require a growth 
model which will permit FDI to have differing characteristics and effects from domestic 
investment.
Fortunately, such a class of growth models was developed during the 1980s as a response 
to the inadequacies of the neoclassical growth model. Many questioned the power of the 
neoclassical model, which they saw as unable to explain the causes of long-run growth 
itself. What they sought was a model that could illuminate the causes and determinants of 
technological progress. As Romer (1994: pp.20/21) writes:
“if we make use of all of the available evidence, economists can move beyond these 
[neoclassical] models and begin once again to make progress toward a complete 
understanding of the determinants of long-run economic success. Ultimately, this will put 
us in a position to offer policy-makers something more insightful that the standard 
neoclassical prescription -  more saving and more schooling. We will be able to rejoin the 
ongoing debates about tax subsidies for private research, antitrust exemptions for research 
joint ventures, the activities of multinational firms, the effects of government 
procurement, the feedback between trade policy and innovation...”
...and so the list goes on. These attempts to make use of all of the available evidence and 
ensure that relevant variables were determined within the model led to the creation of 
endogenous growth theory.
The origins of endogenous growth theory are usually cited as Romer’s (1986) paper,
23
“Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth”, published in the Journal o f Political 
Economy and Lucas’ (1988) paper, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, in 
the Journal o f Monetary Economics. Endogenous growth theory encompasses a number 
of different models whose common characteristic is that they endogenise one or more 
factors which neoclassical theory takes as exogenous. Significantly, they also allow non­
diminishing returns to capital. This is normally due to externalities arising from industry­
wide or economy-wide accumulation of human capital (Romer [1986], Lucas [1988]). 
However, we can develop a simple endogenous growth model that permits increasing 
returns to capital due to FDI inflows:
Yj = K a djK11 f j Hz j (A L K ftc [2.2]
where 7 ’ is a firm subscript and Kfe e is economy-wide accumulation of FDI (with the ‘e’ 
term capturing the externality or spillover effect on the output of firm j). Each firm faces 
constant returns to scale in its reproducible factors (domestic capital, foreign capital, 
human capital, and effective labour) but due to positive externalities from Kfe 6 enjoys 
increasing returns overall. Therefore, whilst the simple neoclassical model regards FDI 
simply as a direct substitute for domestic investment, endogenous growth models (as 
illustrated above) acknowledge that FDI is crucially different from domestic investment 
and that it can benefit the host economy by means of transferring technological, 
managerial and organisational know-how.
Another interesting feature of endogenous growth models is that they typically do not
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predict convergence (in the per capita incomes of countries) because of their allowance 
for increasing returns2. In terms of the endogenous model we developed above, despite a 
single firm experiencing diminishing returns to domestic (Kdj) and foreign investment 
(Kjj), the economy-wide accumulation of FDI (Kfe) results in positive spillovers for the 
firm which permits it to enjoy increasing returns overall. If we assume that it is possible 
to aggregate this result across all firms in the economy, then that economy may be able to 
enjoy unbounded growth (subject to sufficient inflows of FDI).
Does our model therefore predict that the United States, which has consistently been the 
largest recipient of FDI in recent years (with the exception of 2004 - see Figure 1.1), will 
experience the fastest growth rate in the world (at least while it maintains its dominance 
in attracting FDI)? Not exactly, for we have neglected to discuss the importance of the 
externality capturing term (e). Whilst economy-wide accumulation of FDI offers nations 
the potential to benefit from spillovers, their ability to exploit this potential is limited by 
their ability to absorb and utilise it3. Paying respect to the work of Moses Abramovitz 
(1986, 1995) we may call this ability a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’. Many factors are 
likely to influence a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’, but the most important ones are 
likely to be the level of human capital, the state of technology and infrastructure, 
government policies, and the sophistication of financial institutions and markets. 
Therefore, a country that is lacking in these factors may have a low ‘absorptive capacity’
2 However, Paul Romer (1994) regrets the influence convergence has had on the development of 
endogenous growth theory: “This paper [1987 NBER Macroeconomics Annual] contributed to the 
convergence controversy and to an emphasis on the exponents on capital and labor in aggregate production.
I am now critical of this work, and I accept part of the blame.” (p.20).
3 As Chamarbagwala (2000) states: “It appears that attributes such as skills and technical knowledge are 
abundant in Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea. Consequently, these attributes allow the labour force 
in these countries to utililize technologically superior foreign machinery and equipment more efficiently 
and productively [than Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India]” (p.396).
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and may consequently prove largely ineffectual at exploiting the potential benefits from 
any inward FDI that it receives.
In the case of the US we would expect a high ‘absorptive capacity’ as it has a 
considerable stock of human capital, advanced technology and infrastructure, stable and 
transparent government policies, and well-developed financial institutions and markets. 
Our simple endogenous model would therefore seem to suggest that the US should have 
been enjoying the highest per-capita growth rates in the world until very recently.
Table 2.1 FDI Inflows by Host Region / Economy (US$m)
Host 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
World 1,092,396 1,511,180 806,328 699,032 572,774
EMU* 336,370 631,803 290,363 350,870 280,824
US 289,443 321,274 167,020 72,410 39,889
UK 89,535 122,157 53,842 25,532 20,696
China 38,753 38,399 44,241 49,308 53,505
India 2,169 2,496 3,768 3,700 4,269
* EMU represents the twelve members o f the single European currency.
Source: World Investment Report 1999
How do we reconcile this prediction with the observation that the US does not in fact 
enjoy the highest growth rate? There are a number of factors that our simple model 
obviously does not capture. For instance, we have argued that one failing of the 
neoclassical model is that it cannot distinguish between domestic and foreign investment. 
We attempted to remedy this in [2.2] by allowing (economy-wide) accumulation of
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foreign capital to proffer positive spillover effects on individual firms. Whilst this may 
not be too unrealistic for a country like India, it is unlikely to be a fair representation for 
the US economy. This is because the US is at the technological-leading edge, and so its 
domestic investment may be imbued with many of the characteristics of FDI (such as 
high levels of technological and process know-how). Therefore, the US may be limited in 
the gains it can make from FDI, not because it has a poor ‘absorptive capacity’, but rather 
because it is too near the technological-leading edge to make significant advances in the 
short run.
The idea that potential growth may depend on how close a nation is to the technological 
frontier has frequently been employed to support the concept of convergence. As we 
discussed above, by permitting increasing returns to one of the factors of production (i.e. 
foreign capital in [2.2]) endogenous growth models generally conclude that convergence 
will not occur. However, Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995) suggest that the zero convergence 
prediction of endogenous models “is a substantial failing...because conditional 
convergence appears to be an empirical regularity” (p.40). With this in mind the authors 
(1992, 1995) employ a typical endogenous growth model in which technology diffuses 
gradually from rich (high-technology) economies to poor (low-technology) economies. 
This diffusion results in the narrowing of the so-called ‘technology gap’ or ‘ideas gap’. 
Therefore, when it comes to replenishing the stock of capital, a low-technology economy 
can make a much larger jump in the level of technology employed than can a high- 
technology economy. This is because the rich country will always face a substantial 
‘stock pile’ of technological knowledge that it has yet to employ.
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We are arguing that FDI is one such conduit for the worldwide dissemination of 
technological, managerial, and organisational know-how. Furthermore, a nation’s ability 
to benefit from FDI is negatively correlated with how developed and technologically 
mature it is. Therefore, FDI may not only bring absolute benefits to the host economy, 
but may also be a force encouraging the worldwide convergence in per capita income 
levels.
2.2 INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT AND THE MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE
In this chapter we discuss the evolution of international trade theory in relation to 
attempts to incorporate the role of the multinational enterprise. We also review the 
empirical literature, focusing on studies that have sought to discriminate between 
alternative theories of the multinational enterprise.
2.2.1 Classical Trade Theory
Following the seminal work “A Treatise on Political Economy and Taxation” by David 
Ricardo in 1811, international trade theory was dominated by the theory of comparative 
advantage (or comparative cost). Ricardo demonstrated (using Portugal and England as 
examples) that even if one country has an absolute advantage in producing both goods, 
countries will still specialise and trade in that good in which they have a comparative 
advantage. Under Ricardian Theory, comparative advantage is determined by the shape 
of the production function and hence the factor-output ratio of each good.
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The other major theory that has dominated the thinking on comparative advantage is the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory, developed by Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933), and 
Samuelson (1948)4. The H -0 model is a significant departure from the analytical 
framework employed by Ricardo. Whereas Ricardian Theory assumes only one factor of 
production (and hence, in conjunction with the assumption of constant returns to scale, 
makes factor endowments irrelevant in determining the pattern of trade), the H-0 theory 
assumes two factors and makes international differences in factor endowments the driver 
of comparative advantage and therefore the determinant of the pattern of trade. Stated 
formally, the H-0 theorem posits that a country’s exports use intensively the country’s 
abundant factor.
2.2.2 The Leontief Paradox
It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the economics profession began 
seriously to look beyond these models in explaining the pattern of international trade. 
Although this renewed ‘search’ was probably the culmination of a number of disparate 
factors, we discuss two which are of particular interest. One was the empirical work by 
Leontief (known famously as the ‘Leontief paradox’), and the other was the growing 
realisation of the importance of foreign direct investment and the role of multinational 
enterprises.
4 Writing in 1964, Bhagwati notes that the theory “owes much to the work of Samuelson...[and] in its 
current form it has discarded so many of the variables which Ohlin explicitly listed as significant that it is 
almost certainly liable to be rejected by Ohlin as an adequate version of his original analysis” (p. 17). 
Indeed, today it is often referred to as the H-O-S model.
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Leontief set out to empirically test the H-0 theory by ascertaining the factor-intensities of 
the average exports and ‘competitive imports’ of the US. As we will recall, the H-0 
theory states that a country will export the good whose production is intensive in that 
country’s abundant factor. As the US is capital intensive, H-0 theory predicts US exports 
to be capital intensive and imports labour intensive. As is well known, Leontief actually 
found US exports to be labour intensive, and imports to be capital intensive. Despite 
objections to Leontief s empirical approach, subsequent studies were unable to refute the 
paradox.
2.2.3 The Product Life-Cycle Theory
Around the same time, the growing importance of FDI was becoming evident. According 
to the US Tariff Commission (1973: p.322), in 1970 multinationals accounted for 62% of 
US exports ($22 billion from a total of $35 billion) and 34% of imports ($10.5 billion 
from a total of $31 billion). A theory of international trade in which the multinational 
played no role therefore no longer squared well with reality. In an influential paper, 
Vernon (1966) sought to address this omission by putting “less emphasis upon 
comparative cost doctrine and more upon the timing of innovation, the effects of scale 
economies, and the role of ignorance and uncertainty in influencing trade patterns” 
(p. 190).
Vernon began with the assumption that enterprises in any one of the advanced countries 
are not distinguishably different from those in any other advanced country, in terms of
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their ability to access and comprehend scientific knowledge. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that all enterprises have the same capacity to exploit scientific 
knowledge in the generation of new products. Vernon considered there to be a large gap 
between the knowledge of a scientific principle and the embodiment of that principle in a 
marketable product, and that entrepreneurs were required to shoulder the risks involved in 
testing whether the gap could be bridged. Furthermore, Vernon posited that “the 
entrepreneur’s consciousness of and responsiveness to opportunity are a function of ease 
of communication; and further, that ease of communication is a function of geographical 
proximity” (p. 192). Therefore, Vernon abandoned the simplifying assumption of 
knowledge as a universal free good and instead introduced it as a determinant in the 
decision to trade or to invest.
Given the assumption that domestic producers have greater knowledge about their home 
market (the opportunities it offers as well as the risks involved) than do foreign 
producers, Vernon considered US firms to hold a number of advantages over their foreign 
rivals. At the time of writing, the US enjoyed GDP per capita that was considerably 
higher than any of its rivals (twice as high as that of Western Europe), and was also 
characterised by high unit labour costs and relatively unrationed capital compared with 
other markets. Vernon therefore concluded that whenever there was a chance to develop 
a new product that was either responsive to wants at high levels of income, or addressed 
the need to conserve labour, this opportunity would first be apparent to US firms (as they 
were in the best position to observe the US market).
Having deduced that US entrepreneurs will be the first to become aware of opportunities
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for new products, Vernon further assumes that “the evidence of an unfilled need and the 
hope of some kind of monopoly windfall for the early starter both are sufficiently strong 
to justify the initial investment that is usually involved in converting an abstract idea into 
a marketable product” (p. 193). We therefore arrive at the prediction that US firms will 
spend more on ‘product development’ than their foreign rivals5.
However, Vernon’s theory goes far beyond the prediction of higher product-development 
investment, to make inferences about the location of production during a product’s life6. 
Vernon identified three distinct stages: new product; maturing product; and standardised 
product. During the new product stage, producers are concerned with the degree of 
freedom they have in modifying their factor inputs, and the need for swift and effective 
communication between producer, customer, and supplier (and even competitor). As the 
first-mover, a firm will enjoy some degree of monopoly power and therefore face a low 
price elasticity of demand. Taken together, these considerations should encourage the 
firm to opt for domestic production during the new product stage7. To the extent that 
there is overseas demand for the new product, the firm will supply via exports at this 
early stage.
As the product matures and demand grows (both at home and abroad), a certain degree of 
standardisation takes place. Vernon is at pains to point out that this does not mean that
5 Vernon notes that this prediction is consistent with the “pioneer appearance” in the US of products such as 
the sewing machine, typewriter, and tractor etc.
/r
Hence the name given to his theory, the ‘product life-cycle’.
7 In other words: “the producer who sees a market for some new product in the United States may be led to 
select a United States location for production on the basis of national locational considerations which 
extend well beyond simple factor cost analysis plus transport considerations” (Vemon, 1966: p. 196).
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product differentiation ceases to occur (on the contrary, differentiation may intensify as 
rival firms attempt to gain some degree of market power), but rather that industry (and 
consumer) acceptance of certain general standards (and features) is likely. This has 
implications for the location of production, as producers become less concerned about 
input flexibility and market communication, and more concerned with production cost 
and market share. Vernon seems to envision an evolution in the mode of foreign market 
supply (overseas production replacing exports) during this stage, although he is less than 
clear about the timing, or specific determinants, of such a transition. He observes that “as 
long as the marginal production cost plus the transport cost of the goods exported from 
the United States is lower than the average cost of prospective production in the market of 
import, United States producers will presumably prefer to avoid an [overseas] 
investment” (p. 197). However, he notes that this calculation will be subject to 
considerable uncertainty (particularly with respect to the prospective overseas-production 
cost), and that firms will often be motivated by other factors, such as the threat of new 
competition in the foreign market, the anticipation of future tariff levels, or the prevailing 
political situation. Furthermore, he argues that a threat is a stronger motivator than an 
opportunity, with firms often quick to react when they perceive that the status quo is 
under threat.
Finally, we enter the standardised product phase in which the specification of the product 
is well defined and demand has become more geographically dispersed (so that US 
domestic demand is not as important as it was in the earlier stages). It is interesting that a 
reading of the product life-cycle from a modem textbook will typically tell you that this is 
the stage at which production moves almost completely overseas and US demand is met
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by imports from overseas affiliates. However, Vernon actually centres discussion of this 
stage around the possibility of production moving to less-developed countries (LDCs). 
The main thrust of his argument is that if LDCs were to be involved in export-led 
production, standardised products would be the most suitable, given that they are well- 
defined, have a well-established market, and tend to sell on the basis of price8. While this 
argument may be logical, it fails to convince. As a product becomes highly standardised 
it seems likely that production and market access costs will become increasingly 
important, with other factors such as first-mover advantages and market power from 
product differentiation becoming less so. Firms are therefore looking for the least cost 
location overall, and while this may certainly be a less-developed country is some cases, 
more often than not it will be one of the industrialised nations.
We have discussed the work of Vernon in some detail because it heralded the introduction 
of the multinational enterprise in international trade theory and the beginning of a move 
away from classical comparative advantage trade theory. Perhaps because it was in some 
respects a ‘ground-breaking’ paper, and also being typical of the style of academic papers 
of that time, the paper lacks rigour and is perhaps overly descriptive. Also, as Vernon is 
quick to observe, the discussion relates only to innovation in certain kinds of products, 
and consequently the theory says nothing about industrial innovation in general. 
Regardless of this, the paper introduces a number of important new ideas, many of which 
have gone on to be applied more generally by other authors. Indeed, we go on to discuss 
more recent, formal models of international trade and the multinational enterprise, the
Vernon also suggests that “industries which produce a standardized product are in the best position to 
avoid the problem [of significant local supply chain requirements], by producing on a vertically-integrated 
self-sustaining basis.” Such industries should prove most suitable for less-developed countries.
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seed of which can clearly be found in Vernon’s work.
2.2.4 OLI Theory
Offering a more formalised theory of multinational activity, Dunning (1977) introduced 
the OLI theory (also known as the ‘eclectic paradigm’). This posits that the three main 
elements in the production decision process for a multinational firm concern the 
possession of ownership advantages, the ability to internalise operations, and access to 
locational advantages overseas. Ownership advantages are the rent yielding assets a firm 
possesses -  these may range from proprietary technology and intellectual property to 
brand names. A firm may exploit such assets in foreign markets through exports of the 
products that embody these advantages, licensing the technology to others in return for a 
fee, or franchising the rights to manufacture and sell the product. However, if markets are 
imperfect in the sense that information flows are incomplete, transaction costs are 
excessive, or there are risks of the ownership advantages accruing to other through 
imitation, then the firm may prefer to internalise operations. In other words, it undertakes 
FDI and retains complete control over operations.
Despite being a more rigorous model than that offered by Vernon, the eclectic paradigm 
is primarily focussed at the micro level, examining the potential behaviour of individual 
firms. In order to seek to understand FDI behaviour at a more macro level, we are forced 
to turn to alternative models.
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2.2.5 The ‘Vertical’ Model
One such model was developed by Helpman (1984). Building on the standard model of 
international trade in differentiated products, he introduced a general purpose input (H) 
which could both be used to produce the homogenous product, and could be adapted at a 
cost to produce a given variety of differentiated product. Inputs that fit this description 
include management, distribution, and product-specific R&D (or ‘product development’ 
as Vernon would have it). Once adapted, input H  becomes a firm-specific asset that is 
tied to the entrepreneurial unit but, crucially, can be used to serve multiple plants 
simultaneously and need not be present in a plant to serve its product line9. Firms look to 
maximise profits, and therefore choose cost-minimising production locations based on 
differing factor rewards. Relative factor rewards are based solely on differences in 
relative factor endowments across countries. In order to clarify the theory Helpman 
makes a number of simplifying assumptions. Transport costs and tariffs are assumed 
equal to zero, so production facilities are not established in order to reduce shipping or to 
produce behind tariff walls. Other possible reasons for multinationals, such as tax 
treatment, are also not considered.
Let us briefly describe Helpman’s model. In a competitive equilibrium the price of the 
homogenous product (y), which is taken as the numeraire, equals unit costs:
1 = c Y( w L, w H) p.3]
9 In particular, it can serve multiple plants located in different countries.
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where Cy is the cost function for product ‘y \  Wi is unit labour costs and Wh is the unit 
cost of the general purpose input.
The production of differentiated products is more complicated. Following the function 
/(x, hx), 7 ’ units of labour are required to produce ‘jc ’ units of a differentiated product in a 
single plant when hx units of ‘H ’ have been adapted for use. Helpman suggests the 
following as a possible form for 7', where f p>0 and gi(x,hx)  is positively linear 
homogenous:
1= f P + g \ { x , h x ) |-2 4]
HerejJ results in a plant-specific fixed cost and the variable component exhibits constant 
returns to scale. More generally, Helpman assumes that l = f p + gi(x,hx) is the inverse of 
an increasing-retums-to-scale production function in which hx is essential for production. 
In addition to 7 ' units of labour, a differentiated product must also incur the cost of 
adapting H, given by g(wi,Wh,hx) ,  which is associated with a no decreasing-retums-to- 
scale production function. Combining these, the firm’s single plant cost function for 
producing a variety of differentiated product becomes:
C x ( w L, w H , x )  = min [ w Ll { x , h x ) +  g ( w L, w H , h x ) + w Hhx )
The function, [2.5], has the standard properties of cost functions associated with 
increasing-retums-to-scale production functions. What is important to note is that the
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firm has fixed costs that are corporation specific but not plant specific (i.e. the cost of 
adapting H), it has plant-specific fixed costs, and it has plant-specific variable costs. By 
assuming that / = fp + gi(x,hx)  is the inverse of an increasing-retums-to-scale production 
function, in the absence of transportation costs or differences in product prices across 
locations, production will invariably be located in a single location.
It is assumed that there is Chamberlain-type monopolistic competition in the 
differentiated product sector. This implies that firms equate marginal revenue with 
marginal product and free entry competes away any abnormal profits. Combined with 
[2.5], these formal conditions are those applied to existing models of trade in 
differentiated products. The novelty in Helpman’s exposition derives from factor H, with 
firm-specific asset hx permitting production to take place in countries in which hx is not 
physically present. Note that “the specificity of hx implied that arm’s-length trade in its 
services is an inferior organizational form to an integrated firm” (p.455). This is the 
feature that allows the emergence of multinational corporations.
Let us now consider the model’s predictions regarding the pattern of trade. In the case of 
factor-price-equalisation across countries, the model predicts that the inter-sectoral 
pattern of trade will be the same as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, in this 
model intra-industry trade in differentiated products also occurs. There is no 
multinational activity as the optimal location decision is to locate all production at home 
and export where necessary.
Now consider the case where factor prices are not equal across countries, with H  being
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cheaper in country A and / being cheaper in country B. Firms will clearly have an 
incentive to locate their (^-producing) headquarters in country A and their (x-producing) 
plant in country B. This will increase demand for H  in country A and reduce it in country 
B, and increase demand for / in country B and reduce it in country A. Equilibrium will be 
obtained either when factor prices are equalised, or when country A becomes the home 
for the headquarters of all corporations. This results in country A importing the 
homogenous (/-intensive) product, and intra-industry trade in differentiated products, with 
some of this trade being undertaken by multinationals10. The amount of trade that will be 
undertaken by multinationals (and the determinant of whether country A will be a net 
exporter, or net importer, of the differentiated product) is determined by the initial 
difference in factor prices and how quickly they become equalised. The model therefore 
demonstrates that factor endowment differences can result in the existence of 
multinational enterprises, and that this will have an impact on the pattern of international 
trade.
In his conclusion, Helpman notes that “despite the relative richness of the theory it needs 
further extensions and elaborations in order to deal with the wide range of problems that 
are at the head of international economics” (p.470). Indeed, Helpman (1985) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) elaborate and extend the theory. Helpman’s model, and 
those that have since been developed in its likeness, are commonly known as ‘vertical’ 
models, because they describe multinational activity in terms of fragmentation of the 
production process between different geographical locations (i.e. headquarter activities
10 Intra-firm trade will also exist as headquarters export intangible “//-services” to their overseas 
subsidiaries.
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are based in the parent country, and production is based overseas). Alternatively, they are 
known as ‘factor-proportions’ models (following Brainard, 1993), because this is what 
generates multinational activity.
2.2.6 The ‘Horizontal’ model
As is often the case in economics, at the same time as one model is being proposed, an 
alternative approach is being independently developed. Markusen (1984) explains the 
existence of multinationals by assuming the existence of firm-level scale economies (i.e. 
two-plant firms have fixed costs that are less than double those of a single-plant firm). 
Multinationals are defined as firms that produce the same product in multiple plants, 
serving local markets by local production. This model, and others in the same vein, is 
therefore known as ‘horizontal’ models. Extensions of Markusen’s early model can be 
found in Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 1992) and Brainard (1993). Markusen and 
Venables (1998, 2000) develop general-equilibrium extensions that permit more direct 
comparison to be made between the vertical and horizontal models.
Brainard (1993, 1997) uses the term ‘proximity-concentration hypothesis’ to describe 
horizontal models, emphasising that multinational production-location decisions can be 
explained by a trade-off between maximising proximity to customers and concentrating 
production to achieve scale economies. Whereas the early horizontal model of Markusen 
relies on firm-level economies of scale to generate multinational activity, Brainard’s 
version introduces transport costs so that firms have an incentive to locate close to 
customers. This incentive is tempered by the extent of plant-level economies of scale
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relative to firm-level economies of scale.
If we briefly review a typical version of the horizontal model, we can see many 
similarities to the vertical model in terms of its construction and assumptions. Brainard 
(1997) describes a model with two factors, two countries, and two sectors. One sector 
produces a homogenous good using constant-retums-to scale technology, and the other 
sector produces differentiated goods using increasing-retums-to-scale technology. 
Simplifying assumptions are made, which include symmetry in factor endowments and 
consumer preferences, homothetic preferences across the two aggregate goods, and 
demand characterised by constant elasticity of substitution among different varieties of 
the differentiated product11. Technology in the differentiated sector is assumed to be 
“characterized by increasing returns at the firm level due to some corporate activity 
unique to the firm, such as R&D, which can be spread among any number of production 
facilities with undiminished value” (p.521). Furthermore, the invention of each variety of 
differentiated good will require a fixed cost, which is a function of the local wage. 
Technology so defined is akin to the firm-specific input produced by adapting factor H  in 
Markusen’s vertical model.
As in the model of Markusen, Brainard assumes Chamberlain monopolistic competition 
in the differentiated sector, with firms equating marginal revenue to marginal cost, and 
free entry ensuring no abnormal profits. Unlike Markusen, however, it is assumed that 
exporting incurs a transaction cost because of transport costs and trade barriers. These
11 Note that the assumption of symmetry in factor endowments means that ‘vertical’ multinational activity 
will not take place.
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costs are modelled according to an ‘iceberg’ methodology, so that the amount of product 
that survives shipment is decreasing in the distance between the two markets.
The model provides for three possible equilibria: one in which all firms operate as 
multinationals with plants at home and abroad; another in which all firms operate as 
national firms with headquarters and plant located in the same country and the foreign 
markets served purely by exports; and a mixed equilibrium in which some firms are 
multinationals and others are national firms. The pure multinational equilibrium is most 
likely to occur when the transaction costs involved in exporting are very high and the 
fixed costs of establishing a plant are low (or plant-level economies are low relative to 
firm-level economies). The pure trade equilibrium becomes more probable under 
opposite conditions.
Under a reasonable set of model parameters the mixed equilibrium is the most likely
outcome (as we would expect from casual observation of the real world). In this situation
12there is both two-way multinational production, and two-way trade in final goods . For a 
given ‘world’ output, the model predicts that multinational production will account for a 
growing share as transaction costs rise and plant-level economies of scale (relative to 
firm-level economies) fall.
Our review of the standard models of ‘vertical’ (or ‘factor-proportions’) and ‘horizontal’ 
(or ‘proximity-concentration’) multinational activity hopefully highlighted the
12 As in the vertical model, there is also intra-firm trade in terms of multinationals supplying ‘corporate 
services’ to their overseas plants.
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commonality in model construction. Although the models share a number of common 
assumptions, parting company in relation to just one or two of the assumptions has 
significant implications in terms of the predictions for the pattern of multinational activity 
and international trade. To summarise, the ‘vertical model’ attributes the existence of 
multinationals to differences in factor proportions, with differences in factor proportions 
and country size stimulating multinational activity. The ‘horizontal model’ predicts 
multinationals will exist when the benefits of proximity outweigh the benefits of 
concentration.
2.2.7 The ‘Knowledge-Capital’ Model
Not surprisingly (given their inherent similarities) attempts have been made to combine 
the models into a single theory (Markusen et. al. (1996), Markusen (1997)). This has 
become known as the ‘knowledge-capital’ model of the multinational enterprise. By 
incorporating horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI the model makes three key 
assumptions. Firstly, ‘corporate services’ (such as product development, process 
innovations etc) can be geographically separated from production and supplied at low 
cost. Secondly, these ‘corporate services’ are skilled-labour-intensive relative to 
production. Thirdly, ‘corporate services’ have some degree of joint-input characteristic, 
meaning they can be utilised simultaneously by multiple production facilities without 
degrading their productivity. These assumptions should be familiar from our preceding 
discussion of the antecedent models. The first two assumptions provide for vertical 
motivations for FDI, encouraging firms to locate headquarters (i.e. ‘corporate services’ 
production) in the skilled-labour-intensive country and production in the unskilled-
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labour-intensive country. The third assumption permits firm-level economies of scale and 
provides the horizontal motivation to locate production close to the target market.
More formally, the ‘knowledge-capital’ model can be described as follows. Assume two 
countries {a and b), two homogeneous goods (X  and Y), and two homogeneous factors 
(skilled and unskilled labour) that are both internationally immobile. Good Y is unskilled- 
labour-intensive and produced under constant returns to scale in a competitive industry. 
Good X  is skilled-labour-intensive, subject to increasing returns to scale in an industry 
under Cournot competition with free entry and exit. As mentioned, within a firm 
‘corporate services’ can be geographically separated from production, and a firm may 
have plants in one or both countries.
This model results in six possible firm types: horizontal multinationals that locate 
headquarters in country a and have plants in both countries (Ha); horizontal multinational 
headquartered in country b with plants in both countries (Hb); national firms with 
headquarters and a single plant in country a (Na); national firms with headquarters and a 
single plant in country b (Nb); vertical multinationals with headquarters in country a and 
a single plant in country b (Va); vertical multinationals headquartered in country b with a 
single plant in country a (Vb). Types Na, Nb, Va, and Vb may or may not export to the 
other country.
The types and number of firms that will exist in equilibrium depends on country and 
industry characteristics. It is typical to use simulation analysis to generate possible 
outcome scenarios, but for our purposes a discussion of the relevant factors and their
potential outcome will suffice. Type Ha firms are most likely to exist when both 
countries are large and have similar factor endowments (this is equally true of type Hb 
firms). If both countries are small however, national firms (type Na and Nb) may be more 
likely to emerge as aggregate trade costs will be lower (due to smaller foreign markets) 
and will therefore provide less incentive to establish overseas production facilities. The 
probability of vertical-type firms (Va and Vb) emerging is greatest when the countries are 
very different in relative factor endowments (with Va firms prevailing when country a is 
heavily endowed with skilled labour and country b with unskilled labour, and the inverse 
for Vb firms).
Here we conclude our review of the theory relating to multinational enterprises and 
international trade. We have seen how theory has moved away from the classical model 
based on comparative advantage to embrace the activities of multinational enterprises and 
their effect on the pattern of international trade. Modem theory also incorporates a range 
of other factors (which casual observation of the real world tells us are evidently 
important), such as imperfect competition, transport costs and trade barriers.
2.2.8 Empirical Literature Review of Studies Seeking to Discriminate Between 
Alternative Models of Multinational Activity
Given the range of extant models, attempting to discriminate between them empirically 
has become a popular research topic. In this section we will consider the results of a 
number of such studies.
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Brainard (1997) provides an empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration trade­
off between multinational sales and trade (also known as the ‘horizontal model’). The 
first point to note is that the term itself used by Brainard to describe the model, i.e. 
proximity-concentration trade-off, implies that FDI and exports are substitutes (and, 
indeed, in the confines of this particular model they are just that). However, as we will 
discuss in detail later, while FDI and exports may well be substitutes with respect to 
transport costs and trade barriers, this does not preclude a complementary relationship 
from prevailing overall.
Brainard confines the analysis to bilateral US relationships in order to exploit the superior 
data collected by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The focus is on 1989 
cross-section data disaggregated by industry and country13. In order to avoid simultaneity 
between trade flows and multinational sales, she used the share of total trade accounted 
for by exports as the dependent variable. Brainard also notes that hers is the first paper to 
employ a direct product- and country-specific measure of transport costs, as well as 
disaggregated data, and variables measuring concentration advantages14.
The following regression equation estimated by Brainard is derived directly from the
13 Countries were chosen to maximise diversity in geographical coverage, income, production structure, and 
data coverage. Twenty-seven countries were chosen in total (it is unclear why Brainard has not included all 
countries for which sufficient data exists). Data on bilateral imports and exports at the three-digit SIC level 
were obtained from the US Bureau of the Census. Data on affiliate sales were compiled at the lowest 
available level of aggregation (between the two- and three-digit SIC levels). Industries for which services 
account for over half of total revenues have been excluded (e.g. finance and utilities), leaving 63 
manufacturing and primary industries.
14 The measure of transport costs is derived from the data on freight and insurance charges reported by 
importers to the US Bureau of the Census. Measures for tariffs come from a 1988/89 GATT database and 
are a simple average of ad valorem tariff rates. Concentration advantages are measured in terms of plant- 
level scale economies and firm-level scale economies. Plant-level economies are proxied by the number of 
production employees in the median US plant ranked by value added. Firm-level economies are proxied by 
the number of non-production workers in the average US-based firm in each industry.
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‘proximity-concentration’ hypothesis:
X {  = a Q + ^ F R E IG H T / + a 2 TARIFF/ + a^PW G D Pj +  a /sTAXi +  a 5TRADEi 
+cc6F D Ii + a 1PSCALEj  + cc%CSCALEj  +  f i (
The dependent variable, X{, is the natural log of the export share of total US sales 
(exports plus affiliate sales) of good j  in country i. FREIGHT is the log of the transport 
cost measure for good j  transported between the US and country i. TARIFF is the log of 
the tariff measure of imports of good j  in country i. PWGDP is the log of the absolute 
value of the differential in per-worker GDP between the US and country i. TAX is the log 
of the average effective corporate tax rate in country i. TRADE and FDI are the logs of 
survey-measures of a country’s openness to trade and foreign direct investment 
respectively. PSCALE and CSCALE are the logs of plant scale economies and firm scale 
economies in industry j , respectively.
The proximity-concentration hypothesis implies negative coefficients on FREIGHT, 
TARIFF, FDI and CSCALE, and positive coefficients on TAX, TRADE, and PSCALE. 
The per-worker income differential has been included to control for factor-proportions 
differences. Brainard notes that it is not as straightforward to predict the expected sign on 
this coefficient as it is for the other independent variables, but does suggest that it may be 
positive if affiliate sales are relatively better explained by the Linder hypothesis than are 
exports15.
15 Linder (1961) proposed a possible solution to the Leontief Paradox by developing a demand-based theory 
of trade that was consistent with Leontief s empirical findings. Linder hypothesised that countries with
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The estimated equation for Brainard’s OLS regression is16 17:
x f  = -4.73 -  0.27FREIGHT^ + -0.:37TARIFF-* + 0.30PWGDPj -  0.51TAXi 
+1.66TRADE- -  0.83FDIj + 0.UPSCALE j  -  0.21 CSCALEJ
The results lead Brainard to conclude that “the proximity-concentration hypothesis 
appears to be fairly robust in explaining the share of total sales accounted for by trade as 
opposed to affiliate sales” (p.539/540). The share of affiliate sales is increasing in tariff 
rates, freight costs, openness to FDI, and firm-level scale economies. The only result that 
does not accord with a priori expectations is the negative coefficient on the TAX variable. 
Brainard suggests that this may be because the TAX variable is correlated with other 
macroeconomic variables, such as public investment and income, that would be expected 
to encourage affiliate production.
In a short empirical paper, Ekholm (1998) sets out to challenge the standard measures of 
revealed factor abundance. Recall from our earlier discussion that the famous Leontief 
paradox refers to the finding that US exports are relatively labour intensive. This is at 
odds with classical trade theory (which predicts that US exports should be capital 
intensive) and, according to Ekholm, is one of the reasons for the widespread
similar demand preferences would develop similar industries; these countries would then trade with one 
another in similar, but differentiated, goods.
16 Brainard includes some additional variables derived from managerial research that we do not report here. 
Neither do we report the results from the random-effects and fixed-effects models as they do not alter the 
findings.
17 The t-ratios, in the order listed in the regression equation, are: (-2.04), (-4.58), (-7.45), (3.75), (-1.80), 
(6.31), (-1.81), (2.73), (-4.66).
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discontentment with traditional trade theory as an explanation of the determinants of 
trade. Ekholm suggests that the poor empirical performance of the classical model may 
be due to a misspecification of the standard measures of revealed factor abundance, 
specifically that trade in intangible ‘corporate’ or ‘headquarter services’ is not being 
captured. In our theory review, we saw the key role that such services play in both 
horizontal and vertical models.
Ekholm estimates measures of revealed factor abundance (both standard measures and 
her modified measure which takes account of trade in ‘headquarter services’) based on 
factor requirements for the years 1967 and 1987. The standard measures reveal that the 
United States was most abundant in agricultural workers in both 1967 and 1987. This 
finding is consistent with other studies on factor content (e.g. Bowen et al., 1987). The 
standard measures also reveal aggregate labour to be more abundant than capital and 
hence the Leontief paradox prevails in this data.
The modified measures, which take ‘headquarter services’ into account, have limited 
effect on the results. Agricultural workers remain the most abundant factor, and the 
Leontief paradox continues to hold. In fact, the modified measures actually lead to a 
downward revision of the US’s revealed abundance of physical capital. Ekholm 
concludes that “the recalculation of RFA here does not seem to be able to reverse, or even 
mitigate, the result that the United States appears to be relatively well endowed with 
labour, and relatively poorly endowed with physical capital” (p.552).
In a recent paper Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) turn their attention to an empirical
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estimation of the ‘knowledge-capital model’ of the multinational enterprise. As we 
discussed in the theory review above, this model combines elements from the vertical and 
horizontal models, allowing multinational activity to be motivated both by factor- 
proportions considerations and a proximity-concentration trade-off. The authors begin by 
running simulations to generate predictions on the relationship between affiliate sales and 
country characteristics. They are then able to use these predictions to condition their 
econometric specification as follows:
MOFAsales = p 0 + PJ^GDP + P2(GDPi -  G D P jf + foSkiUDiff + /34[(GDPi -  GDPj)2 * (SkillDiff)]
+P^FDICost j  + P^TradeCost j  + p^TradeCost ■ * SkillDiff2 ] + PfTradeCost^ + P^Dist
The dependent variable, MOFAsales, is the real volume of sales by majority-owned 
manufacturing affiliates in each host country. The first independent variable is the sum of 
GDPs of the source (z) and host (j) countries. The expected sign on fa is positive 
(although a stricter hypothesis is that the elasticity of affiliate sales with respect to the 
sum of GDPs should be greater than one). The second independent variable is the GDP 
difference between source and host countries squared, which is expected to be negative. 
Third is the difference between countries in a measure of skilled labour abundance, 
expected to be positive. Fourth is the product of differences in economic size and skill 
endowments (the product of the second and third independent variables). The sign on this 
interaction term is predicted to be negative. The fifth variable is a measure of the cost of 
investing in the host country, obviously anticipated to have a negative coefficient. The 
sixth is a measure of the cost of exporting to the host country, predicted to be negative.
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The seventh explanatory variable is the product of the trade cost measure and the 
difference in skilled labour endowments, included to try to capture the hypothesis that 
trade costs may encourage horizontal, but not vertical, investment and that horizontal FDI 
is most important when source and host have similar relative endowments. The 
coefficient is therefore expected to be negative. The penultimate variable is a measure of 
the cost of exporting to the source country, intended to capture disincentives to 
establishing foreign affiliates for the purpose of exporting back to the parent country (and 
therefore expected to be negative). The final variable is a simple measure of geographic 
distance between the source and host countries. It is unclear what the a priori expectation 
for this variable is as distance is a factor in the cost of both exporting and foreign 
investment (including monitoring of affiliates).
The authors estimate the regression equation detailed above using a panel of cross­
country observations for the years 1986 to 199418. Data on affiliate sales is from the US 
Department of Commerce, with the Unites States being either the source or host country 
in every bilateral observation. There are 36 countries in addition to the US (as there are 
not an equal number of observations for each the panel is unbalanced). The following 
shows the results for the regression equation estimated by OLS:
MOFAsales = 16,630 + 10.81 GDP -  0.0012 {GDP -  GDP-)2 + 33,1 A3 SkillDiff -  6.34[(GDP- -  GDP-)2 * (SkillDiff)
i J
-5\6.6FDICostj +1 \9.ITradeCostj + 605,2[TradeCostj * SkillDiff2 ] -  93.ITradeCost^ -1  ,S2Dist
18 The authors emphasise that the theoretical results apply equally well to both time-series and cross-section 
processes: “theory should correctly characterize both the time-path of the interactions between two 
countries and the interactions among countries in a single year.”
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We can see that the signs are as predicted for all coefficients (except for TradeCostj * 
SkillD iff, which is not statistically significant)19. Furthermore, the majority of the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 % level, the exceptions being TradeCostj 
and TradeCosti (in addition to the interaction term mentioned previously)20. The lack of 
significance of the trade cost variables immediately suggests two possibilities: that the
survey measures used by the authors to estimate trade costs are providing a poor proxy;
21that affiliate sales and trade are not as closely linked as is commonly thought .
The regression equation is also estimated with Weighted Least Squares (WLS) and Tobit 
procedures. The WLS results are very similar to those for OLS, with the exception that 
TradeCostj * SkillDiff becomes ‘correctly’ signed (-569.9), although still lacks statistical 
significance. The Tobit specification has an interesting effect on the variables involving 
skill differences, magnifying their absolute value considerably relative to the OLS and 
WLS results. Given the additional observations that were included in the Tobit procedure 
(119 observations for poor, generally small, countries were included with the missing 
value for affiliate sales assumed equal to zero), the authors argue that this finding makes 
intuitive sense as excluding these observations from the OLS and WLS regressions is 
liable to have downward-biased the role of skilled labour.
Next the authors discuss the magnitude of the coefficients and four partial derivatives,
19 The t-ratios, in the order listed in the regression equation, are: (1.08), (7.01), (-6.89), (3.77), (-2.62), (- 
3.79), (1.16), (0.36), (-0.99), (-7.75).
20 GDP Difference * Skill Difference is statistically significant at the 10% level.
21 This might be the case, for example, if  a significant volume of foreign investment was driven by 
competitive rivalry between multinationals in an oligopolistic market.
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and from this they derive their five ‘results’22. Their first result is that an increase in trade 
costs of the host country will raise production by foreign affiliates. The authors do not 
attempt any calculation of the magnitude of this effect, but simply note the implication 
that inward trade costs induce a substitution of local production for exports.
Their second result states that a bilateral increase in parent and host-country trade costs 
decreases affiliate production, “so trade and investment are complements” (p.705). 
Furthermore, the increase in trade costs decreases affiliate production when the non-US 
country is a developing country (‘complements’) but increases affiliate production when 
the non-US country is another high-income country (‘substitutes’). Note that this finding 
accords well with theory which says that investment between two high-income countries 
(i.e. small skill difference) will be predominately horizontal (and therefore trade costs 
will discourage exports but encourage investment), whereas investment between the US 
and a developing country (i.e. large skill difference) will be predominately vertical 
(which should discourage exports and investment). It is important to highlight that this 
method of categorising exports and investment as either complements or substitutes (i.e. if 
higher bilateral trade costs reduce (increase) affiliate production they are complements 
(substitutes)) is extremely tautological, and perhaps unfairly misleading. We will shortly 
come to discuss how exports and investment may be ‘substitutes’ with respect to trade 
costs and yet be ‘overall’ or ‘natural’ complements.
For their third result the authors state that “convergence in income (GDP) between the
22 The four partial derivatives are calculated to give an idea of the potential impact on affiliate sales of host- 
country trade costs (9Sales/ 9 TradeCostj), bilateral trade costs (9Sales/ 9TradeCost(i+j)), difference in GDP 
(9Sales/ 9GDP difference), and difference in skill endowments (9Sales/ 9SkillDiff).
53
United States and any host country (holding the sum of their incomes constant) increases 
affiliate sales in both directions” (p.705). Note that in the dataset used the US has the 
highest GDP of all countries in all time periods.
To arrive at their fourth finding, Carr et al. consider the effect of changes in the 
abundance of skilled labour. They find that an increase in host country skilled-labour 
abundance relative to the parent country (i.e. a reduction in the SkillDiff variable) may 
increase inward investment if the host is small relative to the parent. For example, in the 
case of the US an increase in /zas^-country skilled-labour abundance increases US-affiliate 
production in the host country. When the US is the host, an increase in parent-country 
skilled-labour abundance is required to increase the parent-country’s affiliate production 
in the US. This result seems to accord well with the horizontal motivation for FDI as 
both examples given above imply a convergence in relative factor endowments.
Finally, the effect of an increase in the sum of bilateral income is investigated. Recall 
from our discussion of the independent variables that a strict hypothesis for the sum of 
GDP variables predicts an elasticity greater than one. The authors calculate the implied 
elasticity of total affiliate sales with respect to bilateral GDP and find the elasticity to be 
1.35 (for mean values of the [GDPr GDPf2 and SkillDiff variables). Not only is this 
broadly consistent with the work of Eaton and Tamura (1994) who report the elasticity of 
US FDI with respect to host-country per capita income to be between 1.2 to 1.6, but it 
also accords well with the reality that for the last three decades global FDI growth has
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outpaced world GDP growth23.
To summarise, the authors derive a testable empirical specification for affiliate sales from 
the ‘knowledge-capital’ model of the multinational enterprise. This model accommodates 
both horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI, and also endogenises trade flows. 
According to their findings, affiliate sales are increasing in the sum of bilateral GDPs, 
similarity in country size, skilled-labour abundance of the parent, and the interaction 
between size and relative endowment differences. It is notable that these findings are 
consistent with earlier studies, particularly the work of Brainard (1997) and Ekholm 
(1997). Of particular interest is the statement that “bilateral increases in trade costs 
produce results that suggest that trade and investment are ‘complements’ but may be 
‘substitutes’ for similar countries” (p.707). In conclusion, the authors find strong 
empirical support for the knowledge capital model and are optimistic that it will prove 
useful for future policy analysis.
In a comment on the Carr et al. paper, Blonigen, Davies and Head (2002) argue that 
rather than offering direct support for the ‘knowledge-capital’ model, the dataset used by 
Carr et al. cannot reject the ‘horizontal’ model in favour of the ‘knowledge-capital’ 
model. Blonigen et al. note that the ‘knowledge-capital’ and ‘horizontal’ models are 
distinguished empirically by the estimate of the effect of skill differences on the level of 
affiliate activity. They argue that Carr et al. mis-specified the skill difference term in 
their empirical framework, and use a ‘corrected’ measure to show that the same dataset
23 It does perhaps beg the question of what was happening to the world economy prior to the 1970s, during 
the period when FDI growth was not outstripping income growth -  were the current models of the 
multinational enterprise and international trade not applicable then?
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cannot reject the ‘horizontal’ model in favour of the ‘knowledge-capital’ model24.
Although to my knowledge there has been no formal response by Carr et al. to the 
comment by Blonigen et al., two of the authors of the original paper have published 
further empirical work seeking to discriminate amongst the ‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and 
‘knowledge-capital’ models (Markusen and Maskus, 2002). Although they use the same 
dataset as the two papers discussed previously, they employ a different estimating 
equation . Their results support both the ‘horizontal’ and ‘knowledge-capital’ models, 
with it proving impossible to choose a preferred model. The ‘vertical’ model performs 
poorly, however, with the authors suggesting that it “is a poor characterization of the 
overall pattern of world FDI activity” (p.706).
2.2.9 Literature Review of Studies Investigating the Relationship Between Trade and 
Investment
As we have seen, many of the empirical studies discussed above make inferences 
(implicitly if not explicitly) regarding the nature of the relationship between trade and 
investment. There is also a rich literature that examines this relationship in its own right.
Some of the earliest empirical studies on this topic were a direct result of official concern 
in both the US and UK during the late 1960s as to the impact of outward FDI on the
24 Using their ‘corrected’ measure of skill difference, Blonigen at al. find that absolute skill differences 
reduce affiliate sales in the host country. Carr et al. found that increases in the parent’s relative skill 
endowment raise affiliate sales in the host so long as the parent is small (and this effect of skill differences 
is decreasing in the parent-host GDP difference).
25 Markusen and Maskus (2002) nest a ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ model within a hybrid (unrestricted) 
‘knowledge-capital’ model.
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balance of payments. Integral to this was the issue of whether foreign investment results 
in decreased exports. To address this concern, two studies were sanctioned: “Effects of 
UK Direct Investment Overseas” by Reddaway (1968); and “Overseas Manufacturing 
Investment and the Balance of Payments” by Hufbauer and Adler (1968).
Despite using different methodologies and data, both studies came to the similar 
conclusion that outward FDI contributes positively to the balance of payments in the long 
run. With specific regard to the relationship between FDI and exports, both studies 
concluded that “outward FDI tended to stimulate exports (mostly of capital and 
intermediate goods) without stimulating imports in equal magnitude” (Graham, 1995).
Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon (1967) followed Vernon’s product life-cycle theory in their 
approach, viewing foreign investment and exports as separate stages in the dynamic 
process by which US firms expand abroad. The theory begins from “the observation that 
entrepreneurs in the United States are surrounded by a structure of domestic demand for 
producer and consumer goods that is in some respects a forerunner of what will later be 
found in other countries” (p.21). During the early stages of the product’s life-cycle, when 
the majority of demand is domestically located, the US firm favours domestic production 
to ensure flexibility of inputs and ease of communication with the market. To the extent 
that there is foreign market demand at this stage it may be serviced by exports. However, 
as the product matures, cost considerations become more important and foreign firms 
become more able to replicate the product of the US firm. During this stage the US firm 
becomes more likely to undertake FDI, both to reduce the cost of servicing foreign 
markets, and to establish marketing, service and production facilities in foreign markets.
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As the product becomes highly standardised, production in the US may actually cease 
with the US market being supplied by imports from the overseas subsidiaries of the US 
parent. The authors therefore view foreign investment as the successor to exporting in the 
life-cycle of a product.
The authors examine basic statistics on trade, investment, affiliate sales and R&D 
expenditures by the US for the years 1958 to 1962 to try and find evidence to support the 
product-life cycle theory. Remembering that their techniques are not very sophisticated 
(resulting from the combination of a relatively informal model and the sophistication of 
econometrics at that time), they show that the five US industries with the greatest 
“research effort” are also the five industries with the most favourable trade position. 
Also, they report that in the European area the sales of US subsidiaries are more 
important in relation to US exports than in non-European areas. They interpret these 
findings as consistent with the expectations of their theory
Horst (1972) elaborates on the work of Gruber et al, by considering how static effects 
(such as technological knowledge, tariff rates, market size, factor costs) might influence 
the dynamic investment process of firms. He assumes that US firms have a technological 
advantage that they are able to exploit either by exporting or making available to a 
Canadian subsidiary. It is interesting to note that there is no discussion in the paper as to 
the direction of the relationship between FDI and exports, rather it is taken for granted 
that exporting and investing abroad are substitutes owing to the equal applicability of 
technology in both markets and the ability to exploit it by either entry mode.
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His empirical analysis focuses on the sales of US manufacturing firms to the Canadian 
market in 1963 for eighteen two-digit SIC manufacturing industries. Horst regresses the 
shares of US exports, subsidiary sales, and the sum of the two, in world exports to Canada 
plus total Canadian production, against parent firm R&D expenditures as a share of 
domestic sales26. For all three equations he finds a positive coefficient on R&D 
expenditure, with 5.47 for the exports equation, 14.65 for the affiliate production 
equation, and 20.69 for the combined share of exports and affiliate sales. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Horst suggests that these results provide “strong, if indirect, support for the 
hypothesis that exporting and foreign investing represent alternative methods by which 
US firms exploit the same technological advantages over their Canadian competitors” 
(p.40). This seems an overly bold assertion, and it may be safer to conclude that Horst’s 
results are merely an indication that firms spending more on R&D are more inclined and 
better able to expand into Canada, regardless of the entry mode chosen.
In further regressions, Horst regresses the share of US exports in total sales (exports plus 
affiliate production) against measures of the nominal and effective rates of protection in 
Canadian industries. He finds that a higher rate of protection lowers the share of exports 
in total sales, all else equal27. He finds similar results for comparable regressions for US 
exports to the UK and (what was) the Common Market (albeit with data limited to seven 
industries).
26 R&D expenditures are taken as a proxy for the technological advantage of US firms over their Canadian 
counterparts.
27 As an interesting aside, Horst finds that the effective rate of protection performs no better than the 
nominal rate.
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In an influential paper, Lipsey and Weiss (1981) examine exports to a cross-section of 44 
foreign destinations, for the year 1970, from the US and a group of thirteen other major 
exporting nations. They relate exports to a measure of affiliate activity and to 
characteristics of the destination countries28. These characteristics include GDP, 
membership of the EEC, and distance from the US and from Germany. Essentially the 
authors have taken the elements of a crude trade model and added some measures of 
direct investment by the US and the group of thirteen major exporters. Whereas earlier 
studies compared foreign investment and exports across industries, Lipsey and Weiss use 
data within industries and are therefore able to avoid some of the bias that might result 
from the operation of industry comparative advantages that promote both FDI and 
exports.
The authors explicitly note one of the major potential pitfalls with empirical work on this 
topic, stating that there may be factors which simultaneously affect investment and trade
29and therefore give a spurious appearance of a relationship between them . Earlier papers 
have perhaps been guilty of not paying this due regard. Lipsey and Weiss suspect the 
most important missing variable from their work to be host country trade policy (such as 
tariffs or exchange controls that discourage imports), so warn that their results may be 
biased towards indicating FDI and exports are substitutes. Their theoretical approach is 
quite different to that of Gruber, Mehta and Vernon (1967) and Horst (1972), who saw 
FDI and exports as alternative (if not competing) modes of foreign market penetration.
28 The affiliate activity variables are measures of the output of US-owned manufacturing and non­
manufacturing affiliates and of the number of foreign-owned manufacturing facilities in each country.
29 They offer size of the destination country as an example of such a factor, noting that its omission from 
empirical work would give the impression of a complementary relationship between investment and trade.
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Lipsey and Weiss assume that “goals other than the promotion of exports or replacement 
of exports are the main considerations in investment decisions” (p.489). While the earlier 
papers seemed to make an a priori assumption that exports and investment were 
substitutes, Lipsey and Weiss are open to the possibility that they may in fact be 
complements once other factors (such as trade policy) have been taken into account.
Lipsey and Weiss run their regressions for fourteen industries for exports to developed 
countries and eleven industries for less developed countries. For US exports to developed 
countries they find the coefficient on affiliate sales to be significant at the 5% level for ten 
industries, and for less developed countries they find significant coefficients for nine 
industries - all of these significant coefficients are positive30. The authors conclude that 
“if there is any tendency for overseas production to substitute for exports from the United 
States, it appears from these equations to be offset by influences that tend to increase US 
exports” (pp.489/490). Furthermore, the variation in size of the coefficients suggests that 
the role of FDI in promoting intra-firm trade in intermediate products may be important, 
and also that the complementary relationship between FDI and exports is stronger for 
trade with less developed countries than for trade with other developed nations.
The authors also run the same regressions with exports from a group of 13 developed 
countries as the dependent variable to determine the effect of US affiliate sales on the 
exports of foreign rivals. They expect to find that US affiliate production competes with 
exports from foreign countries, especially when the host nation is a less developed
30 The significant coefficients are somewhat higher for the metals and machinery industries, and 
significantly higher for the equations for less developed countries.
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country and hence competition from domestic firms is not so important.
The results for the less developed country regressions provide strong support for their 
theory, with negative coefficients on affiliate sales for all six industries that are significant 
at the 5% level. Furthermore, the coefficients are economically significant, implying that 
a dollar of net sales by a US-owned affiliate displaces foreign exports from the group of 
13 countries by amounts ranging from 12 cents to $1.66. Given the size of the 
coefficients compared with those for US exports, the negative impact of US affiliate 
production on 13-country exports seems to be larger than the positive impact on US 
exports. The results for the developed country regressions are less conclusive, with only
31four industries returning significant coefficients, and one of these being positive .
In order to try to find further support for their results, the authors run similar regressions 
for foreign affiliates. Unfortunately, while they had data on sales of US affiliates, only 
data on the number of foreign affiliates is available. However, data for the US 
pharmaceutical industry (for which the authors have data on number, size, and activity for 
US affiliates) indicates that the two variables (sales and numbers) yield similar results. 
Although the results are not as convincing, they do suggest that foreign-owned affiliates 
are associated with increased foreign exports and reduced US exports to host countries.
Finally, the authors briefly discuss the results for the other explanatory variables (GDP,
31 The positive coefficient is for the office machinery and computer industry. The authors suggest that the 
positive coefficient may be resulting from the fact that much of the production in this industry in the 13 
developed countries is itself controlled by US parents, and “it would not be surprising to find that 
production in a country by US-owned affiliates increases exports by foreign countries in which the same US 
parents have other affiliates” (p.491).
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distance, and EEC membership), concluding that they are broadly as expected and that 
this gives credibility to the results reported for affiliate activity. To reiterate, the key 
finding by Lipsey and Weiss (1981) is that they “find no evidence that on net balance a 
country’s production in overseas markets substitutes for its own domestic production and 
employment” (p.494).
Having investigated the relationship between FDI and exports within industries, but 
across firms, in their 1981 paper, Lipsey and Weiss (1984) exploit individual firm data 
from a 1970 US Bureau of Economic Analysis survey in a subsequent paper. Once again, 
the authors run their regressions for 14 industries, relating US firm level exports to parent 
company size, host country GDP, and affiliate sales in five developed-country areas . In 
concordance with the results from their previous study, they find that higher levels of 
affiliate output go along with higher exports by the parent company (six of the fourteen 
industries show statistically significant results, all have positive coefficients for the 
affiliate output variable).
The authors also run additional regressions with parent exports to their foreign affiliates 
(as opposed to total exports to the area) as the dependent variable (for final goods, 
intermediate goods, and both combined). They find that, in general, there is some effect 
of foreign production in raising parent exports of intermediate goods in most industries, 
whilst there was either no net effect, or a positive effect, for parent exports of final goods
32 Surprisingly distance is not included as an explanatory variable, with the authors noting (by way of 
explanation) that three of the five destination areas for which they have data are at about the same distance 
from the US. The five destinations are Canada, UK, EEC (six), other Europe, and the group Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
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to their own affiliates.
Lipsey and Weiss also take advantage of more comprehensive data for the pharmaceutical 
industry to include two less developed areas in the destination list. Dividing their sample 
into the five developed areas, and the two less developed areas, they find coefficients for 
affiliate net sales of 0.06 and 0.21 respectively (the coefficient for all seven areas taken 
together is 0.27). Although the coefficient of 0.21 for the less developed areas is not 
statistically significant (those for the ‘world’ and five developed areas are significant at 
the 5% level), the authors interpret the relative sizes of the three coefficients has 
suggesting “that much of the relation [of FDI] to worldwide parent exports may involve 
exports to the less developed areas” (p.306).
Blomstrom, Lipsey and Kulchyck (1988) studied the offshore production of Swedish 
affiliates. They found that increases in offshore production were positively related to 
increases in exports for the seven industrial categories examined. They also found that 
there was no tendency for this relationship to change as offshore production expanded.
Pearce (1990) examines the foreign production and exports of 458 of the world’s largest 
multinational corporations for the year 1982. He finds evidence that increases in foreign 
production are correlated with increases in exports, and highlights the importance intra­
firm trade plays in this relationship.
In a wide-ranging paper Grubert and Mutti (1991) investigate the effects of taxes, tariffs 
and transfer pricing on multinational decision making. One of the questions they ask is
“are US exports displaced or promoted by greater foreign direct investment?” (p.285) 
They argue that the “Horst-Lipsey-Weiss” approach has shortcomings and so depart from 
that methodology and instead use exogenous indicators of the relative attractiveness of 
operating abroad (e.g. the effect of host country tax treatment on investment)33. They 
employ data for a cross section of 33 countries, for the year 1982, covering US exports 
and imports, US affiliate sales abroad, and the sales of US-based foreign affiliates. They 
find that US multinationals allocate a disproportionate amount of foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing to low-tax countries. Furthermore, they find that US parents 
export more to their foreign affiliates in low-tax countries. From this they conclude that 
US exports are promoted by greater foreign direct investment.
As Graham (1995) notes, much of the empirical literature cited above can be criticised for 
failing to account of the possible effects of simultaneous determination of FDI and 
exports. If both FDI and exports are commonly correlated by one or more independent 
variables (e.g. both positively correlated with income per capita or both negatively 
correlated with political corruptness in the host economy), then simply demonstrating that 
greater exports are associated with markets that also receive greater FDI does not prove 
that FDI and exports are themselves correlated. Therefore, previous studies which 
neglect to control for such possible common causal factors may in fact be detecting a 
spurious correlation between FDI and exports as opposed to actual complementarity.
33 These shortcomings relate to the possibility that “unobserved variations in tastes and technology, 
comparative advantage and government policy can create positive correlation between exports and foreign 
direct investment even though an increase in affiliate sales, due to lower costs of production abroad for 
instance, will not cause a complementary increase in exports” (p.291).
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To avoid this pitfall, Graham (1995) examines the relationship between FDI and exports 
after removing those factors that might simultaneously determine exports and FDI. In 
order to do this he employs a two stage procedure. Step one involves using the gravity 
model to estimate separate regressions for FDI and exports. Host economy per capita 
income, host population, and distance are selected as the independent variables (these are 
deemed to be the factors most likely to determine both FDI and exports). Step two 
involves regressing the residuals from the two regressions performed in step one upon 
one another. By employing this methodology, Graham is making the presumption “that if 
gravity models have succeeded in removing simultaneity bias, then any correlation of the 
residuals would reflect some other causal relationship between FDI and exports -  such as 
that due to sourcing substitution or complementarities in production or distribution and 
marketing” (p. 10). A positive correlation coefficient in step two would suggest
complementarity; a negative coefficient substitutability.
Graham applied this methodology to test the relationship between FDI and exports for 
two home countries, the US and Japan. For the US, the sample included 40 individual 
countries that were destinations for both US FDI and US exports; for Japan, the sample 
comprised 36 destination countries. In both cases the sample was also divided into three 
additional subsets: only those countries located in Europe; only those countries located in 
the western hemisphere; only those countries located in East Asia. The two-stage process 
was repeated for three separate years (1983, 1988 and 1991) with roughly consistent 
results (Graham therefore chooses only to report and discuss the results pertaining to the 
1991 data).
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East Asia 0.524 0.228




Table 2.2 above recreates Graham’s second-stage results for the US. The positive 
coefficient for the world sample implies that US outward FDI and US exports are global 
complements (the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level). A similar finding 
is reported for the Europe and East Asia subsamples. However, a statistically significant 
negative coefficient is reported for the Western Hemisphere subsample34.
We will discuss Graham’s findings and his further work on this topic in greater depth in 
chapter 5 when we conduct our own analysis on the relationship between FDI and 
exports.
2.3 REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS
The latter part of the twentieth century witnessed strong growth in the number and 
coverage of regional integration agreements (RIAs)35. According to a recent WTO paper 
(Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005), since its inception in 1948, the WTO (or its predecessor 
GATT) has been notified of 312 RIAs. Of these, 170 are still in force today. During the 
GATT years (1948 - 1995) 124 RIAs were notified, with 38 remaining in force today. 
Since January 1995, 196 new RIAs have been notified to the WTO, and 132 are currently 
in force. Despite part of the increase in notifications being due to increased WTO
34 Graham suggests that the legacy of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) policies adopted in many 
Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s may be responsible for the negative coefficient.
Under these policies multinationals were induced to establish local production facilities which operated 
behind protectionist walls. Graham argues that this type of FDI is more likely to substitute for exports than 
the type of investment undertaken by US multinationals in countries located in Europe and East Asia.
'X ^
We use the term regional integration agreements (RIAs) to cover a variety of preferential trading 
arrangements, whether or not they are confined to a specific region. Such agreements include, free trade 
agreements, customs unions, common markets and economic unions.
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membership and new notification procedures, there has undoubtedly been a proliferation 
of trade agreements in recent years. Furthermore, with 20 RIAs awaiting ratification and 
70 under negotiation, it is clear that regionalism is set to continue. The expansion of the 
European Union (EU) in May 2004, to include an additional ten members, is the most 
high profile (if not the most recent) example of this growing popularity.
Although trade preferences constitute the basis for most RIAs, loosening of controls on 
factor flows between members and common rules and regulations governing economic 
activity are also features of many agreements, and are becoming more standard. There is 
a rich literature on the welfare implications of RIAs. Unfortunately, most of it considers 
the effects of RIAs on trade in isolation. Trade and FDI are undeniably linked, and to 
understand the true effects of RIAs, we need to consider the impact they have on both. In 
the remainder of this chapter we examine the effect of RIAs on FDI flows.
2.3.1 Regionalism versus Multilateralism
There has long been considerable debate regarding the merits of regionalism versus 
mutilateralism as mechanisms for increasing global free trade. Following the First World 
War, a wave of regionalism was largely blamed (particularly by the United States) for 
significantly reducing international trade and contributing to the Great Depression. The 
US, in particular, subsequently strove to promote mutilateralism in favour of regionalism.
Following the Second World War there was a strong desire amongst the international 
community to promote freer trade for all. In concert with the creation of the two Bretton
Woods institutions (the World Bank and the IMF), countries sought to establish an 
International Trade Organisation that would be the overseer of world trade and 
responsible for coordinating the mulitlateralist movement. Even as negotiations for the 
ITO Charter continued, 23 countries agreed to 45,000 tariff concessions affecting 
approximately $10 billion of trade (about a fifth of the world’s total at that time). These 
countries became the founding members (“contracting partners”) of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in January 1948.
Although the formation of the ITO was eventually agreed at the UN Conference on Trade 
and Employment in Havana in March 1948, national ratification was to prove 
problematic. The most serious opposition came from the US Congress (which was ironic 
given the favourable stance of the US Executive). In 1950, the US Government was 
forced to announce that it would not seek national ratification of the Havana Charter and 
the ITO was effectively finished.
Though provisional, GATT remained the only multilateral instrument governing 
international trade from 1948 until the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
in 1995. Early GATT rounds concentrated on further tariff reductions. The Kennedy 
Round in the mid-sixties then introduced sections on anti-dumping and development. 
The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to tackle non-tariff 
barriers. The eighth, the Uruguay Round from 1984 - 1986, was the last and most 
extensive, and led to the creation of the WTO and a new set of agreements.
It is commonly held that, despite prevailing international support for multilateralism, the
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desire to rebuild Europe following World War II, and to ensure that further such conflicts 
did not occur, led to the approval of Article XXIV of GATT which allows for the creation 
of preferential trade agreements.
This Article has been a source of heated debate since the treaty’s inception in 1947. It 
exempts free trade areas and customs unions from the requirement to accord most- 
favoured nation (MFN) treatment in international trade. Bhagwati (1993) argues that 
Article XXIV is “full of holes” (p.44) and suggests that it needs to be redrafted so as to be 
much more robust on the requirements of regional trade agreements. One of the principal 
problems with the Article is the manner in which it has been implemented. Clause 7 
requires that each free trade area or customs union notified to GATT “make 
available...such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them 
[the contracting parties] to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties 
as they may deem appropriate.” However, during GATT’s existence (1948 -  1994) only 
one working party determined that a regional trading agreement had satisfied Article 
XXIV, and yet none were found to be incompatible with the Article (Chase, 2005: p.l). 
The Uruguay Round produced a ‘’Memorandum of Understanding on Article XXIV” 
which established a Committee on Regional Trade Agreements to conduct reviews on 
behalf of the WTO36. Unfortunately, a lack of consensus within the working parties has 
meant that the WTO has so far failed to adopt a single report on Article XXIV 
compliance (Chase, 2005: p.2).
36 See Clause 7 of the “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994”.
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In an illuminating paper, Chase (2005) questions the conventional wisdom regarding the 
origins of Article XXIV. Drawing on records from the US National Archives, he 
provides convincing support for the argument that the controversial provisions of Article 
XXIV were in fact prompted by the desire of US policymakers to accommodate a trade 
treaty they had secretly been negotiating with Canada37. Specifically, this desire led to 
free trade areas and interim agreements being included in the Article, whereas previous 
drafts made provision only for customs unions to be excluded from MFN obligations38.
Analogous to Article XXIV, Article XI of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) provides for economic integration agreements in services. Regional agreements 
between developing countries are catered for under a different section of GATT, the 
‘Enabling Clause’.
Proponents of regionalism argue that they help foster global free trade by locking in 
unilateral liberalisation, creating larger groups that can negotiate more forcefully and 
efficiently, and encouraging export industries that contribute to domestic political 
momentum in favour of free trade. Opponents counter that RIAs are subject to 
manipulation by special interest groups, use scarce negotiating resources, and can lead to 
a political impasse. In a review of RIAs between 1970 and 1992, Frankel (1997) 
tentatively concludes that regionalism has been consistent with more general 
liberalisation. A report from the Council of Economic Advisors (1995) considers
37 Ironically, the proposed trade agreement with Canada never materialised due to a change of heart on the 
part of the Canadian executive.
38 US policymakers required free trade areas to be included in Article XXIV because the proposed 
integration agreement with Canada could not meet the requirements of a customs union due to Canada’s 
commitments to the Commonwealth regarding external tariffs; the language pertaining to interim 
agreements was necessary to allow tariffs on US and Canadian trade to be reduced over a number of years.
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arguments for-and-against- free-trade agreements as either “building blocks” or 
“stumbling blocks” towards multilateralisation, concluding that they will further 
multilateral liberalisation. However, Bhagwati (1992) argues that several of the 
arguments typically voiced in favour of preferential agreements are of dubious merit, and 
Levy (1997) “demonstrates that bilateral free-trade agreements can undermine political 
support for further multilateral trade liberalization” {abstract).
In discussing regionalism, it is imperative to note that the level of integration (both 
achieved and aimed for) varies considerably from one agreement to another. According 
to the WTO, 84% of RIAs in force today are free trade agreements (FTAs). FTAs 
mandate an equal reduction in trade barriers between members, but allow individual 
members to maintain their own trade barriers with non-members. However, there are a 
number of RIAs in force today that have resulted in a deeper level of integration amongst 
member states39. Chief amongst these are the EU and NAFTA. These two groups, in 
particular, have negotiated rules and commitments that go beyond what has been agreed 
multilaterally during Development Rounds.
2.3.2 The North American Free Trade Agreement
The seeds of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were sown over a 
decade before the actual agreement came into force on 1 January 1994. As mentioned 
previously, the US had historically been a proponent of multilateralism, accepting
For instance, the “Singapore Issues” (relating to trade facilitation, investment government procurement, 
and competition) that were rejected at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in 2004 have been 
implemented in a number of RTAs.
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European regionalism for the sake of global economic and political stability. In response 
to further European regionalism, the US had typically sought to initiate a new round of 
multilateral developments via the GATT. However, at a GATT ministerial conference in 
Geneva in 1992, US Trade Representative William Brock encountered European 
resistance to further multilateral liberalisation. From this point on, the US made it known 
that it would entertain approaches regarding potential RTAs. In 1990, Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari sought to form a free trade area with the US (effectively ending 
Mexico’s prolonged attempt at import-substituting industrialisation, which had been the 
prevailing policy since Cardenas in the late 1940s).
Canada was initially reluctant to participate in the agreement, content that its interests 
were already well served by the Canada US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) signed in 
198840. However, as it became evident in September 1990 that the US and Mexico 
intended to proceed with or without Canada, the Canadian government decided that it had 
more to gain from joining the talks than from abstaining41. The three member countries 
concluded negotiations in 1992, and ratified the treaty in 1993.
Ratification of the treaty in the US was not straightforward, facing opposition both from 
those who outright objected the notion of a free trade area, and from those who argued 
that the treaty did not go far enough in its proposed plans for integration. In the end, a 
number of side agreements were added to the treaty to ensure that it gained sufficient
40 CUSFTA set out a schedule for the elimination of all tariffs on trade (goods and services) between 
Canada and the US by 1st January 1998. It also established the necessary institutional procedures required 
to ensure that trade disputes could be adequately managed.
41 “Involvement allowed the government to minimize the risks to Canada of US-Mexico free trade and 
offered an opportunity to extract new commercial concessions from the United States.” (Hufbauer and 
Schott, 2005: p. 4)
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votes to be approved by both the US House and Senate42. The side agreements included 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), a $90m transitional adjustment 
assistance program (NAFTA-TAA), and the creation of the North American 
Development Bank (NADBank) to finance infrastructure projects on both sides of the 
US-Mexico border.
NAFTA was the first North-South agreement of its kind in the Western hemisphere. In 
addition to significant trade liberalisation policies, the agreement mandated the creation 
of institutions to settle trade and investment disputes (both investor-state and state-state 
disputes)43. It also boasts one of the most comprehensive frameworks of investment 
provisions.
Most merchandise trade was liberated between 1994 and 1998, with intra-regional trade 
facing an average tariff of 0.2%. This compares very favourably with the average MFN 
tariff of each country - 16.5% for Mexico (2001), 7.7% for Canada (1998), and 5.5% for 
the US (2000).
Investment provisions, laid out in Chapter 11 of the Agreement, grant national treatment 
for the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale of 
investments. Furthermore, investors are guaranteed free transfer of funds across borders
42 The House passed the treaty by 234 votes to 200 and the Senate passed it by 61 to 38.
43 Although state-state dispute resolution mechanisms are fairly common, the investor-state mechanism was
rather progressive. The first decade of NAFTA saw a number of investor-state cases - 10 against Mexico, 8 
against Canada, and 9 against the US. Canada and Mexico both lost 2 of their cases (with Canada paying 
out CDN$27 million and Mexico paying US$18.2 million). The US lost none.
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and protection from expropriation and nationalisation. Although in principle they apply 
to all sectors, in practice each partner excludes some sectors it deems to be of national 
importance. Mexico excludes the petroleum sector and all state-owned sectors. Canada 
excludes cultural industries, health and social services, and aboriginal affairs. The US 
also excludes health and social services, as well as maritime activities being highly 
restrictive.
2.3.3 The European Union
The European Union is undoubtedly the world’s foremost example of successful regional 
integration. Numbering 27 member states today, it boats an aggregate population in 
excess of 450 million and produces around a quarter of the world’s gross national 
product. Its wide-ranging policies and varied supranational institutions evidence the 
breadth and depth of integration it has achieved.
The impetus for the EU lay in the two world wars which devastated the continent in the 
first half of the twentieth century. By the late 1940s, leaders in Europe and the US 
believed that France and Germany must be united, both economically and politically, if 
future conflicts were to be avoided. The first step towards this goal was to integrate the 
coal and steel industries of Western Europe: the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was formed in 1951 between France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Italy and the Netherlands45. By linking the coal and steel industries of Europe,
45 Under the ECSC, the power to take decisions regarding the coal and steel industries in these six countries 
was placed in the hands of an independent, supranational body (the “High Authority”).
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Germany’s defence industry was effectively tied to that of its neighbours.
Encouraged by the success of the ECSC, the six members pursued further integration in 
both the political and military spheres. However, when these efforts failed, European 
leaders decided to focus on the economic front alone. At a meeting in Messina, Italy, in 
June 1955, negotiations began on two new treaties. The first sought to establish a 
European Economic Community (EEC) that would integrate the economies of the six 
member states and provide for the free movement of goods, services, people and capital 
(the “four freedoms”). The second aimed to further the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes through the formation of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM). The treaties were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 and came into force 
in January 195846. In 1967 the institutions of the three Communities were merged, 
creating the European Parliament, Council of Ministers and European Commission.
In 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) came into force to facilitate the creation of a 
single internal market. The SEA also engendered institutional reform and expanded the 
powers of the European Community with respect to research and development, the 
environment, and common foreign policy.
The Treaty of European Union was signed in Maastricht and came into force in 
November 199347. It constituted a major overhaul of the preceding treaties and provided 
the foundation for achieving Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The treaty created
46 They are commonly referred to as the “Treaties of Rome”.
47 The Treaty of European Union is commonly known as the “Maastricht Treaty”.
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the “three pillars” of the European Union that endure today. The first pillar incorporates 
the three founding treaties that were combined in 1967 into the “European Community” 
(the ECSC, EEC and EURATOM). The second pillar established the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) that allows the EU to take a coordinated approach with regard 
to foreign and security affairs. The third pillar contains the Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) policy which deals with asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in criminal and 
civil matters, and customs and police cooperation to fight terrorism, drug trafficking, and 
fraud. The Maastricht Treaty also created European citizenship and strengthened the role 
of the European Parliament in certain legislative areas.
2.3.3.1 Governance and Institutions
The European Union is governed through a combination of supranational and 
intergovernmental organisation. Much of the supranational organisation takes effect 
under pillar one, with member states relinquishing aspects of their national sovereignty 
and allowing EU institutions to implement legislation and the rule of law. Pillars two and 
three are, to a greater extent, subject to intergovernmental organisation, with member 
states working in cooperation to determine a joint approach on foreign and security policy 
and criminal matters.
The principal institutions of the EU are the European Commission, Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament. The European Commission essentiality 
operates as the executive branch of the EU, with responsibility for: proposing legislation 
to Parliament and the Council; managing and implementing EU policies and the budget;
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enforcing European law (jointly with the European Court of Justice); and representing the 
EU in the international arena (e.g. negotiating agreements between the EU and third 
parties). The members of the Commission are appointed as opposed to being elected 
directly by the citizens of the EU. Every five years the member state governments agree 
on a new Commission President-designate, who in turn (in consultation with member 
state governments) chooses one Commissioner from each member state. The European 
Parliament interviews every Commissioner and then presents its opinion on the 
Commission as a whole. The Commission remains accountable to, and may be dismissed 
by, Parliament. Individual Commissioners must resign if asked to do so by the 
Commission President.
The Council of the European Union (often called the “Council of Ministers”) is 
comprised of one minister from each of the EU members’ national governments, with 
each minister having responsibility for a different policy area and having the power to 
speak for their whole government. The Council has the following key responsibilities: 
adopting European laws (jointly with the European Parliament in many instances); 
coordinating the broad economic policies of the member states; approving the budget of 
the EU (again, in conjunction with the European Parliament); developing the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy; coordinating action between national courts and police 
forces in respect of criminal matters; and concluding international agreements between 
the EU and third parties. On the majority of issues, the Council is empowered to make 
decisions based on qualified majority voting (QMV). This means that decisions made by 
the majority are imposed on countries even when they have voted in opposition. In some 
areas (such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy) unanimity is required,
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essentially giving each member the power of veto.
The European Parliament, based in Strasbourg, is responsible for passing European laws 
(jointly with the Council of the European Union), exercising democratic supervision over 
other EU institutions (particularly the European Commission), and approving or rejecting 
the EU budget. Since 1979, the members of Parliament have been elected directly by the 
citizens of the EU under a system of population-based proportional representation. The 
current Parliament was elected in June 2004 and has 732 members (the next election will 
be in 2009).
In addition to the Commission, Parliament and Council, a number of additional 
institutions are vital to the process of governing the EU. For instance, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) ensures that EU legislation is interpreted and applied uniformly 
across all member states48. It is empowered to settle legal disputes between member 
states, EU institutions, corporations and citizens. Its rulings are binding and cannot be 
overturned by the courts of individual member states. Other important institutions 
include the European Court of Auditors (responsible for monitoring EU funds), the 
European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee (advisory body 
representing employers, trade unions, and consumers), and the Committee of the Regions 
(advisory body representing local authorities).
48 To assist the ECJ with its large workload, the Court of First Instance (CFI) was created in 1989. The CFI 
tends to hear cases relating to citizens and corporations (as well as cases pertaining to competition law).
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2.3.3.2 The Single Market
The creation of an enlarged single market with over 450 million consumers is at the heart 
of the European Union. The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1987, but the 
work towards implementing the single market began in 1985 and lasted for some seven 
years. Although the central tenets of the single market are the free movement of people, 
capital goods and services, a raft of supporting policies were required to tackle the 
regulatory, legal, bureaucratic and cultural barriers present between members49.
Although the single market was officially completed by the end of 1992, work continues 
today on furthering the process. In particular, the internal market for services requires 
further harmonisation (with the creation of a single market for financial services proving 
particularly problematic given the complexity and longevity of many of the services and 
the need to coordinate the policies of national regulators).
The European Commission estimates that the single market has created 2.5 million new 
jobs and generated in excess of €800 billion in additional wealth since 1993. It also 
offers consumers far greater choice and lower prices than they would otherwise face. 
Firms benefit from the enlarged market which translates into greater effective demand for 
their products. The single market also leads to greater economics of scale, permits more 
efficient resource allocation and forces firms to minimise x-inefficiencies in the face of 
greater competitive forces. All of these factors help EU firms to compete on the global 
stage.
49 For example, the EU’s antitrust policy prevents monopolies from dominating industries.
2.3.3.3 The Single Currency
As part of the move towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 1992 Treaty of 
the European Union (“Maastricht Treaty”) mandated the creation of a single currency. 
Currently, 12 of the 25 EU members have adopted the single currency (the “Euro”), with 
the ten most recent EY members, as part of their accession agreement, having pledged to 
join the Eurozone at some point in the future50. Denmark, Sweden and the UK have all 
opted out of the single currency and currently have no definite plans to join.
The single currency was first introduced in non-physical form at midnight on 1st January 
1999. From that point, the national currencies of the 12 ‘Eurozone’ members were fixed 
against the Euro and one another. Physical Euro currency notes and coins were 
introduced on 1st January 2002 (with a phase-out period for national currencies of 
approximately two months).
The implications for adopting the single currency are significant, requiring members to 
surrender control over interest and exchange rates. For the Eurozone, interest rates are 
independently determined by the European Central Bank51. This means that the members 
of the Eurozone are unable to use monetary policy to influence the economic situation in 
their domestic economies, potentially limiting their ability to adequately respond to
50 The Euro is also legal currency in the overseas territories of French Guiana and national regulators 
coordinate their policies at the EU level., Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Reunion and Saint-Pierre et 
Miquelon. Furthermore, by virtue of a number of bilateral agreements, the European microstates Monaco, 
San Marino and Vatican City are able to mint their own Euro coins on behalf of the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Andorra, Montenegro and Kosovo have adopted the Euro has the legal currency for capital flows.
51 The ECB controls the interest rate with the sole regard of maintaining a low and stable rate on inflation in 
the Eurozone area. Neither the national governments of member states, nor other EU institutions, have any 
control over the setting of the interest rate.
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economic shocks.
The theory of optimal currency areas argues that four factors are important in alleviating 
the potential impact of asymmetric shocks in currency unions. These are labour and 
capital mobility, product diversification, openness and fiscal transfers. The EU scores 
quite highly on these criteria, although the movement of people within the EU and the use 
of fiscal transfers are limited (especially in comparison with the Unites States, which 
could be thought of as a currency union of the 50 States)52.
Given the potential hazards of adopting the single currency, the Eurozone members 
obviously expect to reap a number of offsetting benefits. The most obvious benefit is the 
removal of transaction costs and exchange rate risks. Rose (2004) finds that the adoption
53of a single currency increases trade by 300% . A single currency should also lead to 
greater price transparency (and hence price parity) between members.
Another key benefit of adopting the Euro was the anticipation that it would result in lower 
and more stable inflation in the member countries. The German Bundesbank has 
historically been very successful in controlling inflation, and it was thought that by 
modelling the European Central Bank on the Bundesbank it would de facto inherit its
52 Although the EU mandates free labour mobility within the Union, in practice the movement of people is 
limited (due largely to cultural differences, such as language). Furthermore, labour mobility is generally 
lower amongst the less affluent, and these are the workers whose movement at the margin is perhaps most 
likely to combat the effects of an asymmetric shock.
53 The adoption of a single currency is more effective in alleviating exchange rate risk that simply tying one 
currency to another because it gives firms and consumers more confidence that the exchange rate will 
remain fixed in the future.
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reputation for being aggressive on inflation54. The independence of the ECB also creates 
confidence that monetary policy will not be influenced by political agenda.
2.3.3.4 Enlargement
In addition to broadening and deepening integration between members, the EU has also 
experienced a process of continued enlargement. Membership of the European Union is 
open to any European country that upholds “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Article 6 of the Treaty 
of European Union)55. In practice the accession process is complicated and may take a 
number of years56. Having applied for membership, countries typically become 
“candidate countries” before being granted full membership -  this is especially true of the 
more recent members from central and eastern Europe that tend to be considerably less
57economically advanced than their western European colleagues .
The first enlargement of the EU (still, at that time, the “European Community”) occurred 
in 1973 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Greece was the next country 
to join in 1981. To those ten members were added Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, 
Finland and Sweden became members in 1995. With all of the developed countries of
54 Inflation expectations are key here -  the expectation that inflation will be kept low and stable become 
somewhat self-fulfilling as workers see less need to demand wage increases and firms feel under less 
pressure to raise prices.
The membership requirements are more formally defined by the “Copenhagen Criteria” as: democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressures; the ability to apply the EU’s rules and policies.
56 For example, despite having applied for full membership of the EU in 1987, Turkey was only granted the 
right to begin accession negotiations in December 2004.
57 As a “candidate country”, a potential member will benefit from strategic advice and discussions with the 
EU aimed at fostering the appropriate economic and political environment to facilitate integration.
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western Europe desired membership having joined, the EU remained a fifteen-member 
union for a number of years. The next enlargement occurred nine years later and was on 
a scale unprecedented. On 1 May 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia became EU Member 
States. On purely logistical grounds, the 2004 enlargement is remarkable. It is 
considerably more impressive, however, given the economic and political disparities 
between the ten new CEEC members and the previous fifteen members. Necessary 
adjustments (both at the EU level and within individual countries) to accommodate this 
enlargement explains why the process of accession can become very protracted.
Even as the EU comes to terms with the prospect of managing an economic and political 
union spanning 25 partner countries, it continues to court new members. Bulgaria and 
Romania signed accession treaties in April 2005 with full membership expected in 2007, 
and Turkey has been in membership negotiation since October 2005.
2.3.3.5 The European Constitution
As the EU has become larger and increasingly more complex, attempts have been made 
to simplify the raft of treaties, institutions and governing processes. In October 2004, 
Heads of State and Foreign Ministers signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. This new treaty aims to institute internal reforms to allow the enlarged EU to 
function more effectively and transparently, and with more direct involvement from 
European citizens. Some of the more significant changes proposed in the Treaty include 
strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, simplifying the EU voting
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procedures, abolishing the rotating European Council presidency (in favour of appointing 
a single individual for a five year term), and creating the post of Foreign Minister and a 
Foreign Service.
However, despite being signed in 2004, the Treaty requires ratification by all EU 
members before it can become operational. While it has been ratified by 12 Member 
States, it failed to be approved by Referenda in France and the Netherlands58. Following 
its rejection by these two members, the European Council called for a period of reflection 
and debate so as to adequately address the concerns raised. Although the Constitution 
remains in limbo, it has no effect on the current functioning of the European Union.
2.3.3.6 Contrasting the EU and NAFTA
It is clear from the foregoing discussions on the EU and NAFTA that there are both 
considerable similarities and differences between the two. Although the EU currently 
encompasses 25 members to NAFTA’s three, they are of a similar size in terms of 
population and gross national production. Furthermore, both comprise industrial 
economies and less-developed countries (although this is only true of the EU since the 
latest enlargement to include the ten CEEC countries)59. Although the primary aim of 
both agreements is to create free trade between member countries, they also include 
provisions to facilitate foreign direct investment and other capital flows (e.g. portfolio
58 As part o f their accession treaties, the ten new EU members had to agree to the Treaty on the Constitution 
o f Europe.
59 Given the time period (1992 to 2003) of the data to be analysed in later chapters, we are only afforded the 
opportunity to analyse the EU during a period when its membership comprised solely industrial countries of 
western Europe.
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investment). In addition, both have created institutions (or procedures) to address other 
areas of mutual interest to member states (e.g. labour markets and the environment).
In terms of depth of integration, however, the EU is undoubtedly far more advanced than 
NAFTA. Whereas NAFTA is a free trade area in which each member maintains its own 
external tariff structures, the EU is a customs union (and for some members a monetary 
union) with a common external tariff. The EU has also gone much further than NAFTA 
in terms of establishing supranational institutions which take precedent over national 
governments in many economic, political and legal areas.
The free movement of people mandated by the EU is also a significant departure from the 
approach taken by NAFTA. While people are generally allowed to travel between 
Canada and the US without the need for prior notification or approval, immigration from 
Mexico to the US is strictly controlled.
A further difference of note is the distribution of power within the two integration 
agreements. NAFTA is obviously strongly dominated by the US, which accounts for 
over half of the total population of the NAFTA members and produces over 80% of the 
total output. Conversely, the EU is not dominated by any one member, especially 
following the latest enlargement that has taken it to a total of 25 members60.
60 Given their status as original members (and due to their respective economic size), Germany and France
have historically exercised significant influence over the EU.
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2.3.4 The Trade and Investment Effects of RIAs
As we have discussed, regional trade agreements are typically analysed in terms of their 
impact on trade. Following Viner (1958), the standard measure for estimating the welfare 
implications of RTAs is whether they lead to net trade creation or net trade diversion. 
Trade creation is said to occur when the formation of a trade agreement creates trade that 
would not otherwise have existed62. Trade diversion occurs when an RIA results in the 
diversion of trade away from non-RIA countries to less efficient RIA partners. If it is 
estimated that a particular RIA leads to net trade creation then it is normally taken as 
evidence that it is on the whole welfare enhancing (with net diversion indicating the 
opposite). However, trade creation / diversion is only a static measure and ignores the 
dynamic effects or RIAs. Dynamic effects include domestic firms being subject to 
increased competitive pressure and discipline, and any global trade enhancing effects that 
the RIA may encourage.
It is becoming increasingly common for investment provisions to be included in 
agreements - an explicit acknowledgement both that RIAs can have a profound effect on
63investment flows, and that investment can have significant welfare implications . We 
now turn to a consideration of the potential investment effects of regional trade 
agreements.
62 For example, due to the tariff reduction of an RTA, overall economic welfare will increase if one of the 
partner countries ceases producing a certain good and instead imports it from its RTA partner that is able to 
produce the good more cheaply.
63 Investment provisions are clauses or rules that refer specifically to the treatment of foreign investment 
within the RIA.
Recall the discussion of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm in section 2.2. From OLI theory it 
is possible to derive various motivations for firms to undertake overseas investment. For 
example, a firm possessing a computer hardware patent (Ownership advantage) may 
decide to establish its own manufacturing facility abroad to secure the cheapest 
production location (Location advantage) because it is unwilling to license the technology 
from fear of theft (Internalisation). Another firm may have established a valuable brand 
(Ownership) that it wishes to exploit in overseas markets (Location), favouring direct 
investment in foreign outlets as opposed to franchising or licensing (Internalisation).
Obviously, the formation of a RIA will have a direct impact on the ‘Location’ decision 
faced by multinationals. Besides affecting the size of the ‘internal’ market within the 
RIA, the agreement will influence member countries’ attitudes and policies towards 
issues such as expropriation and nationalisation, corporate taxation, profit repatriation, 
and local content requirements, all of which will impact on the location decision. 
Therefore, to the extent that RIAs improve the investment conditions in members’ 
countries (and this is increasingly becoming an explicit objective) we would expect them 
to stimulate FDI, both between member countries, and from external parties64.
However, it is feasible that the creation of a RIA could result in multinationals that have 
investments in multiple member countries consolidating their investments in just one
64 It is interesting to note that not all trade agreements have led to a liberalising of investment conditions 
between members. Willem te Velde & Fahnbulleh (2003) examine the investment related provisions in 
regional trade agreements and find that at its outset the Andean Community actually created a more 
restrictive environment in relation to investment than existed previously. Decision 24, passed in 1970, 
sought to create international legal obligations with respect to investment. In practice it created several new 
restrictions, including a disinvestment scheme for foreign investments to become semi-nationally-owned 
companies after a period of time, limitation on profit repatriation, exclusion of certain sectors from foreign 
investment, and an investment screening mechanism with exacting standards for foreign entry.
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member state (that which offers the most favourable location). In this sense, it is possible 
that the RIA may lead to an overall reduction in the total volume of FDI in the region - 
although not necessarily its efficiency.
Important as the ’location effect’ of the RIA may be, the greatest influence on FDI will 
almost certainly be due to the influence on the ‘internalisation’ decision that 
multinationals face. In the presence of market imperfections, such as incomplete 
information and transaction costs, firms may find it preferable to internalise operations by 
undertaking FDI in favour of other means of servicing foreign markets (such as exporting 
or licensing). To the extent that RIAs improve information flows and reduce transaction 
costs (i.e. tariff and non-tariff barriers) we would probably expect MNEs to have less 
reason to internalise, as the cost of exporting has fallen relative to direct investment. Of 
course, things are never so straightforward.
Firstly, in addition to a reduction in the costs associated with exporting, the costs of 
foreign investment are also likely to fall, due both to explicit investment provisions and 
indirect effects. It is the relative cost of exporting versus direct investment that is of 
importance in the internalisation decision, not the absolute cost. This will obviously vary 
across member states, industries, and individual firms. While we may be able to say that 
following a RIA the cost of exporting between members has fallen relative to the cost of 
FDI on average, it is highly unlikely that this will be true for all firms in all member 
states.
Secondly, the impact of any trade and investment provisions implemented by the RIA
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will depend on the pre-agreement environment. For instance, the complete abolition of 
tariffs will have a much greater impact in an RIA that had high pre-RIA tariffs compared 
with a RIA where the MFN tariff was already very low. So the ex ante situation is 
extremely important.
Finally, the specific operations that firms are involved in, and hence the type of 
investment they are looking to undertake, will have significant bearing. For example, a 
firm looking to sell a homogenous product across a range of national markets will be 
concerned with accessing these markets at the minimal cost possible (subject, of course, 
to other considerations such as ensuring control of proprietary technology etc). Prior to a 
RIA this firm may have been servicing it in various foreign markets from a subsidiary in 
each country (perhaps because trade barriers meant costs of exporting were high relative 
to costs of FDI). Following the RIA and a reduction in tariffs it may now become more 
cost effective to consolidate production in one country and export to all member markets. 
In this case the creation of the RIA will have resulted in disinvestment and an increase in 
trade.
Contrast this with the example of a firm that wishes only to supply to its home market. 
Prior to the RIA it is a purely national firm, with no overseas operations or exports. 
Following the RIA it realises that it is now more cost effective to locate part of the 
manufacturing process in a low-cost member state and export the intermediate product 
back to its home country for final assembly and distribution. In this case the creation of 
the RIA will have resulted in an increase in both FDI and trade.
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These types of issues are captured by models of horizontal (or ‘market-seeking’) FDI and 
vertical (or ‘resource / efficiency seeking’) FDI that analyse the trade-off between 
transport costs, firm-level fixed costs, and plant-level fixed costs. However, as we 
discussed in section 2.2, to date it has not proven possible to favour one model above all 
others. In the following three chapters we will conduct an analysis of the impact of 
regional integration agreements on FDI and exports. This builds on the framework 
employed by Graham (1995) and will culminate in an examination of the relationship 
between FDI and exports.
2.4 THE GRAVITY MODEL
In the 17 century Isaac Newton revolutionised Physics by deriving his Law of Gravity. 
This Law states that the gravitational force of attraction between any two objects is the 
product of their masses and the inverse of the square of the distance between them 
(multiplied by a gravitational constant, ‘G ’):
fs = g M ^ l
d [2.6]
Though by no means as revolutionary, the economics profession adopted its own gravity 
model in the second half of the Twentieth century. This model takes a similar form to 
Newton’s, but has been applied to a wide variety of goods and factors flowing over 
regional and national boundaries. By far its most common and successful usage has been
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in modelling international trade flows, leading Anderson (1979) to comment that 
“probably the most successful trade device of the last twenty-five years is the gravity 
equation” (p. 106). Ironically, until Anderson (1979) there had been no formal attempt to 
derive the gravity equation from theory. Rather, it was a purely empirical device that 
owed its origin as much to Newton as it did to hard economic theory.
Timbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) were the first authors to apply the gravity model 
to international trade flows. Tinbergen’s aim was to use the gravity model to determine 
the normal (or base-line) level of international trade that would prevail in the absence of 
discriminating trade impediments. If actual trade flows then differed from the expected 
flows (as calculated by the ‘normal’ model) it would suggest that additional impediments 
(actual < normal) or inducements (actual > normal) existed between that pair of countries. 
Tinbergen reasoned that the quantity of exports a country is able to supply depends on its 
economic size (i.e. GDP); that the quantity that can be sold to a particular economy 
depends on the size of that country’s market (also GDP); and that the volume of trade will 
vary with transportation costs (proxied by the geographical distance between the two 
trading economies). This gave rise to the following basic trade flow equation:
X ^ a J f 'Y p D ?  [2.7]
where Xy is exports from country i to country j ,  Yi and Yj are the GDPs of country i and 
country j  respectively, and Dy is the distance between countries i and j.
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Tinbergen estimated this equation (with 42 countries for 1959) by least squares regression 
in log-linear form to obtain estimates of the coefficients on the independent variables (i.e. 
the alphas):
In X fJ = a 0 + In cq Yi + In a2Yj + In azDy [2.8]
The coefficients were all found to be statistically significant and of the expected sign, aj 
was estimated to be around 0.7, a,2 around 0.65, and a 3 around -0.6. Therefore, a 1% 
increase in source country income is expected to lead to a 0.7% increase in exports 
between economies i and j. A 1% increase in host country income should increase 
exports by 0.65%, and a 1% increase in distance is predicted to decrease exports by 0.6%.
Although Linemann extended Timbergen’s work as part of his doctoral thesis (1966), the 
gravity model continued to lack a sound theoretical basis. Anderson (1979) made the first 
attempt to formally derive the gravity equation using the properties of expenditure 
systems. This was followed by Bergstrand (1985, 1989) who explored the derivation of 
the gravity model in terms of monopolistic competition models. More recently, Deardoff 
(1995) has shown that the gravity model is also consistent with the H-0 model of trade 
and therefore warns that “because the gravity equation appears to characterize a large 
class of models, its use for empirical tests of any of them is suspect” (p.25/6)., However, 
more recently, Rose et al. (1998) argue that the different theories that give rise to the 
gravity model have different testable implications. They use a ‘reciprocal dumping’ 
model of trade in homogenous goods and find that domestic income export elasticities are
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substantially higher for differentiated goods than for homogenous goods. This implies 
that trade in differentiated goods arises due to increasing returns, whereas trade in 
homogenous goods still accords with the gravity equation.
Whilst the gravity model was acquiring a sounder theoretical footing, papers were 
appearing which questioned its proper econometric specification. Polak (1996) argued 
that the gravity model so far estimated produced a downward bias for far-away countries 
and an upward bias for close-in countries. It was this bias that had led other authors to 
argue that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was a ‘natural trading bloc’ 
and that the EU was not65. Polak proposed two methods “to salvage the gravity model” 
(p.544), both of which essentially amounted to modifying the distance variable by 
dividing the simple geographical distance between trading partners by the weighted 
average of all of the host country’s bilateral distances. This gives the following 
‘corrected’ gravity model, which Polak employed to show that APEC in not in fact a 
‘natural trading bloc’:
M t = G N If'G N P ^P O P ^P O P f'd*  D ‘~s
where My is the imports of country i from country j\ GNPt and GNPj are the gross 
national products of country i and country j  respectively; POPi and POPj are the 
populations of countries i and j; dy is the distance between countries i and j\  and A  is the
average trade-weighted distance of country i from all of its trading partners.
65 APEC is a forum for facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific 
region. APEC was established in 1989 and now represents 21 member states, who collectively account for 
approximately 40% of the world’s population, 56% of global GDP, and 48% of world trade.
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Matyas (1997, 1998) also demonstrated that the gravity model was misspecified, arguing 
that the correct solution required the inclusion of proper source (export) country, host 
(import) country, and time specific effects. In the first instance, Matyas (1997) assumed 
that these effects were observable from the data and so adopted a fixed effects model. 
However, he later (1998) noted that in some cases (such as when the number of countries 
in the data set is large) this is not a parsimonious approach and a random effects model 
may be superior.
The relative merits of a fixed effect model and a random effects model are discussed by 
Egger (2000). He notes that country effects are widely predetermined due to 
geographical, historical and political factors, and (based on the results of the Hausman % 
-test) argues that “the proper econometric specification of a gravity model in most 
applications would be one of fixed effects” (p.29). In addition, he comments that whilst 
the majority of empirical work using the gravity equation has been on cross-section data 
(e.g. Timbergen (1962), Linnemann (1966)), a panel framework is advantageous because 
it allows country-specific and time-specific effects to be disentangled.
Cheng and Wall (2001) were motivated by the need to allow for country-pair 
heterogeneity to also employ a fixed effects model with pooled time-series / cross-section 
data. They note that incorporating fixed effects captures those factors which are constant 
over the span of the data, but which are correlated with the volume of bilateral trade (such 
as a common border, common language, colonial ties etc.). This also dispenses with the 
question of how to measure distance (as its influence is incorporated into the fixed
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effects). Noting that “the gravity model has become the ‘workhorse’ of empirical work 
on the effects of integration” (p.23) the authors test their model in this application and 
find that it is important to accommodate heterogeneity.
In addition to estimating the effects of integration on international trade, the gravity 
model has recently been employed to try to estimate the effects on international trade of 
various other factors. The common approach of such studies is to augment the ‘gravity 
variables’ (incomes and distance) with variables or dummies of interest. For example, 
Rose (1999) includes a dummy variable for whether or not the trading countries share a 
common currency. Though he advises caution in the literal interpretation of his results, 
he finds that trade between a pair of countries will be over three times greater if they 
share a common currency than if they do not. This finding obviously has important 
implications for the EU and the adoption of the single currency and so it is unsurprising 
that it has been so hotly debated.
Portes and Rey (1999) utilise the model to estimate the determinants of cross-border 
equity flows (i.e. portfolio investment). In this instance, the dependent variable is no 
longer international trade, but rather equity flows. The authors find that an ‘augmented’ 
gravity model accounts for almost 70% of the variance in transaction flows, and suggest 
that inclusion of their information transmission variables (in addition to the inclusion of
distance) would also substantially improve the explanatory power of the standard gravity
66equation for trade in goods .
66 Information transmission variables are intended to capture some of the transaction costs involved in 
portfolio investment (e.g. telecommunications cost).
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Brenton et al. (1999) use the gravity model to investigate the effects of regional economic 
integration on FDI flows. This application involves using FDI as the dependent variable 
and including various dummy variables to account for different regional integration 
agreements (RIAs). Brenton et al. use time series data to avoid some of the specification 
problems highlighted by Polak and Matyas. They find that the stock of FDI in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries diverges little from the ‘normal pattern’. 
Interestingly, they also find evidence of a complementary relationship between FDI and 
trade.
Di Mauro (2000) also seeks to estimate the impact of integration on FDI, but instead of 
using dummy variables has taken exchange rate variability (ERV) to be a measure of the 
level of integration between two countries. She finds the ERV variable to have no 
significant influence on FDI flows, but a significant negative impact on exports.
Balasubramanyam et al. (2001) also investigate the impact of RIAs on FDI flows. The 
authors use cross-section data for 1995 consisting of 14 investor and 41 host countries. 
Integration is accounted for by use of a dummy variable and the ‘gravity variables’ are 
augmented to include the Economic Freedom Index (EFI)67. They find that “the presence 
of a RIA results in an autonomous increase in FDI flows between member countries, but 
that this is offset by an enhancement in the magnitude of the dampening effect of 
distance, such that the RIA results in a decrease in FDI flows between countries whose
67 The EFI is an index of ‘economic freedom’ compiled by the Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal on 
an annual basis (available since 1995). Economic freedom is defined as the “absence of government 
coercion or constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the 
extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself’ ('www.heritage.org).
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capital cities are located more than 3,300 kilometres apart” (p. 17).
The gravity model has proved a highly successful empirical tool for modelling 
international trade flows. More recent work appears to show that its application to 
investment flows is also extremely promising. In future studies it would be interesting to 
experiment with a number of modifications to the model and its application. For instance, 
the potential advantages of using panel data as opposed simply to time series or cross 
section data warrant further investigation.
Efforts should also be made to better proxy for the costs of exporting and undertaking 
foreign investment. Whilst distance is an extremely convenient measure, the iceberg 
assumption of trade costs is overly simplistic and completely fails to take into account 
transaction costs that are not associated with shipping (e.g. red-tape costs at borders, the 
costs of complying with safety regulations and local content requirements). Although 
trade-weighted distance measures may mitigate some of the problems, explicit measures 
of the different transaction costs associated with exporting to different countries would be 
preferable. Unfortuantely, the construction of such a measure is not just enormously time 
and resource consuming, but may introduce its own biases in terms of the quality and 
availability of data.
The applicability of distance as a measure of the costs of undertaking FDI in different 
locations is also obviously questionable. Of more relevance may be the existence of a 
common language, similarity in culture and institutions between investor and host, and 
the existence or not of other foreign investors from the same source country. Fortunately,
communication and cultural similarities can be accounted for (at least to some extent) by 
including a common language dummy variable. To attempt to incorporate other factors
of relevance it would be interesting to try to include some measure of communication
68costs . Including the information transmission variables proposed by Portes and Rey 
(1999) and the public infrastructure variables used by Bougheas et al. (1999) may also 
prove informative.
Interestingly, given the crudity of the distance variable, the gravity model may be more 
suitable for considering global rather than regional issues. Greater variability of distance 
within a global dataset is likely to allow more efficient estimation of the distance 
coefficient than would be possible in a regional dataset.
68 This would also acknowledge that a high proportion of the cost involved in undertaking FDI will arise 
from ongoing monitoring costs, as opposed to up front costs.
2.5 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss a number of issues that are relevant to the 
analysis to be undertaken in subsequent chapters. To begin, we explored potential 
mechanisms through which foreign direct investment might contribute to economic 
growth. Although early growth models (such as the Harrod-Domar and neoclassical 
models) did not make a distinction between foreign and domestic investment, endogenous 
growth models allow this inadequacy to be corrected. It therefore becomes possible to 
capture the characteristics of FDI that are thought to stimulate growth in excess of 
domestic investment (i.e. embedded managerial, technological and organisational 
knowledge) in a formal model of economic growth. Furthermore, we saw that FDI could 
be included in endogenous models in a range of formulations leading to different 
predictions. For example, the inclusion of FDI could be modelled in such a way that it 
allows countries to close the ‘ideas’ or ‘technology gap’ (implying conditional 
convergence, in the per capita incomes, of the world’s economies), or it could be 
modelled to permit increasing returns to scale (potentially resulting in the absence of 
conditional convergence).
We also discussed the theory behind international trade and investment, with particular 
reference to the role of the multinational enterprise. Modem theory presents alternative 
models based on the differing motivations of national and multinational firms. The 
vertical model, building on the standard model of international trade in differentiated 
products, posits that multinational firms locate their headquarters in one country and their 
production facilities in one or more other countries. This is consonant with resource-
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seeking and efficiency-seeking motivations for foreign investment. The horizontal 
model, on the other hand, assumes that the decision to undertake FDI is the outcome of a 
‘proximity-concentration trade-off; firms will undertake direct investment when the 
proximity advantages of local production outweigh the concentration advantages of 
exporting from a single domestic facility. This model resonates closely with market- 
seeking and tariff-jumping motivations for FDI. Empirical studies have found it difficult 
to discriminate between these alternative theories, although the majority of FDI today is 
of the horizontal variety, undertaken between developed countries.
We also discussed the relationship between FDI and exports. There are factors that 
suggest that the two should be substitutes, such as tariff-jumping FDI. However, there 
are also factors favouring complementarity (such as intra-firm trade). Unfortunately, 
theory offers no decisive direction as to the true relationship either way and we are left to 
turn to empirical methods to try to answer the question. As we have seen, the majority of 
the empirical literature finds in favour of complementarity. However, most of this 
literature can be criticised for failing to account for the possible spurious correlation 
between FDI and exports. Graham (1995) attempts to mitigate this problem by adopting 
a two-stage approach: the first stage involves using the gravity model to run separate 
regressions for FDI and exports; the second-stage regresses the residuals from the first- 
stage regression against one another. The intention is to try to remove all factors that 
might determine both FDI and exports in the first stage, so that any remaining correlation 
reported in the second stage will be unbiased evidence of either complementarity or 
substitutability.
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The main body of this thesis (i.e. chapters 3, 4 and 5) is dedicated to conducting an 
empirical analysis building on Graham’s approach. In chapter 3 we will run the first- 
stage regression for FDI flows, using a panel dataset we have constructed for the period 
1992 to 2003. As well as simply obtaining the necessary residuals for the second-stage 
regression, we will explore the impact of regional integration agreements on FDI flows.
Regionalism has grown enormously in popularity in recent years, not just in terms of the 
number of agreements, but also in terms of the depth of integration. However, the merits 
of regionalism versus multilateralism are still the subject of debate. Our discussion of the 
possible trade and investment effects of RIAs emphasised how difficult it is to predict the 
impact of such agreements, with much depending on the conditions that are prevailing 
before the agreement comes into force. Despite this, the increasing adoption of 
investment provisions (in addition to trade provisions) in integration agreements is likely 
to stimulate intra-RIA investment. The analysis we conduct in chapter 3 will allow us to 
form an opinion as to whether integration agreements do, or do not, have a positive effect 
on FDI flows.
Our first-stage regression analysis for exports is conducted in chapter 4. We utilise the 
same panel dataset as we used for FDI flows and also employ the same gravity model 
approach. Once again, in addition to simply capturing the residuals for use in the second- 
stage analysis, we investigate the impact of regional integration agreements on exports. 
By also examining the impact of RIAs on exports to-and-from- ‘outsiders’, it is possible 
to from an idea of the trade creation or trade diversion effects of a RIA. A comparison of 
the integration effects on FDI and exports is also possible and informative.
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The second-stage analysis of residuals on residuals is performed in chapter 5. As 
discussed, we follow the approach favoured by Graham (1995). However, whereas 
Graham used data relating to a single year, our panel dataset should afford more accurate 
and efficient estimation by allowing the temporal variability in exports and FDI to be 
taken into account (in addition to simply the cross-section variability). It will also permit 
the relationship between FDI and exports to be analysed over time to assess whether a 
trend exists. We also build on the work of Graham by disaggregating our dataset into 
separate subsamples in order to investigate whether the relationship between FDI and 
exports is dependent on the nature of the two countries involved (i.e. the investor and host 
countries).
In order to complement our empirical analysis and hopefully add texture to the results, 
chapter 6 is dedicated to a case study of FDI in Mexico. This provides an apt case study 
because Mexico is a member of NAFTA (one of the integration agreements we assess 
empirically in chapters 3 and 4) and also the recipient of large quantities of FDI from the 
US69. In addition to investigating the impact on inward FDI of its membership of 
NAFTA, we are able to investigate other determinants of FDI flows (i.e. unit labour 
costs) and also assess the potential benefit to economic growth of inward FDI.
69 This has two principal benefits in terms of choosing Mexico for a case study assessment: the US collects 
unparalleled data on the activities of multinationals; given its technological sophistication, FDI from the US 
should be well-endowed with the ‘additional benefits’ (e.g. management know-how) thought to spill-over to 
the host economy.
104
6. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO1
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Mexico provides an interesting case study of the effects of inward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) because, like many other developing countries, it has changed from 
being a highly protectionist regime focused on import-substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) to an open regime which actively attracts foreign investment2. Following the 
onset of industrialisation a decade earlier, Mexico officially endorsed ISI policies 
during the 1940s as the government raised import tariffs, introduced import licenses, 
and imposed export controls in an attempt to encourage its domestic industry. These 
policies proved successful in developing a manufacturing base centred on Mexico 
City3.
Since the announcement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
which came into being in January 1994, considerable attention has been focussed on 
the effects that the dismantling of trade and investment barriers would have on the US 
and Mexican economies (and the Canadian economy to a lesser extent). However, 
this belies the fact that Mexico effectively made the transition from a closed economy 
to an open economy during the 1980s after it announced in 1985 that it intended to
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as a chapter in “Foreign Direct Investment: Six 
Country Case Studies” edited by V.N. Balasubramanyam and Yingqi Wei (2004), co-authored with my 
supervisor at that time, Professor David Sapsford. All of the empirical analysis has been updated in this 
version to include the latest available data, and the discussion has been redrafted to tie it together with 
the analysis conducted in the foregoing chapters.
2 Mexico is a more suitable choice for our purposes than any of the central and eastern European states 
that have recently joined the EU because it has been a member of NAFTA for over 10 years now and 
this affords us considerable data with which to contrast the FDI and export performance of a pre- 
NAFTA Mexico.
3 Between 1930 and 1970 the share of manufacturing in Mexican GDP grew from 12.9% to 23.3%, and 
Mexico City’s share of manufacturing employment grew from 19.0% to 47.3% (Hanson, 1998).
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join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4. Hanson (1998) even 
suggests that given the geographical proximity of Mexico and the US, trade 
liberalisation by Mexico in 1985 constituted the beginning of integration, with 
NAFTA merely finalising the process a decade later.
The proximity of the world’s most powerful nation is another reason why the Mexican 
economy provides such an interesting case study. Over the last two decades the US 
has consistently been the source of over half of Mexico’s inward FDI (see Table 6.1). 
The attraction of FDI is that it is supposedly “a composite bundle of capital, 
technology, and know-how” (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996, p.6) that can be 
harnessed by the host economy to help narrow the ‘ideas gap’ (Romer, 1993) and 
hence increase domestic productivity. The degree to which FDI embodies technology 
and know-how will evidently vary from one investment to another. Given that the 
technological sophistication of the source country is likely to be one important 
determinant, the fact that the majority of Mexico’s FDI comes from the US suggests 
that Mexico may be in an excellent position to benefit from FDI (and is therefore an 
ideal candidate in which to test for possible FDI spillovers).
This Chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 looks at the volume and structure of 
Mexican inward FDI. The determinants of this FDI are discussed in section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 reviews the extant literature on FDI spillovers. The results of a simple
4 In 1985 import licenses covered 92.2% of national production, the average tariff was 23.5%, and 
85.0% of non-petroleum exports were covered by export controls. By 1987 export controls had been 
abolished, import licenses covered only 25.5% of national production, and the average tariff was down 
to 11.8% (Hanson, 1997).
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time series analysis of the growth effects of FDI in Mexico are presented in section 
6.5, and section 6.6 concludes and offers some policy proposals.
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Table 6.1 FDI Participation in Mexico, 1976-1994 (%)
Period US Germany Japan UK Switzerland Spain France
1976-94 62.3 7.3 7.3 3.9 5.1 2.8 3.1
1976-80 68.7 11.6 14.8 3.8 9.0 4.2 0.5
1981-85 63.0 8.7 6.3 3.3 4.1 3.4 3.6
1986-90 58.1 5.2 3.7 9.0 3.7 2.1 5.0
1991-94 58.6 2.9 3.7 7.9 3.4 1.4 4.6
N otes: Table show s the ow nership percen tage o f  the to ta l stock  o f  M exican inw ard FDI. 
Source: L ove and Lage-H idalgo (2000)
Table 6.2 FDI Flows to Mexico post-NAFTA by Country of Origin, 1994-2004 (%)
Year US Germany Japan U K Sw itzerland Spain France Canac
1994 46.7 2.9 5.9 5.6 0.5 1.4 0.8 6.9
1995 65.8 6.6 1.9 2.6 2.4 0.6 1.5 2.0
1996 67.3 2.6 1.8 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.6 6.9
1997 61.1 4.0 2.9 15.2 0.2 2.7 0.5 2.0
1998 65.3 1.6 1.2 2.1 0.6 4.1 1.5 2.6
1999 53.4 5.6 9.2 -1.4 0.9 7.8 1.3 4.6
2000 71.2 2.0 2.4 1.6 0.9 12.3 -14.6 3.9
2001 77.3 -0.5 2.7 0.3 0.5 2.5 1.4 3.6
2002 63.6 3.8 1.0 7.5 2.8 4.3 1.7 1.2
2003 55.0 3.6 1.0 8.3 2.5 13.9 3.5 1.8
2004 42.4 2.1 1.0 0.7 6.6 39.4 0.8 2.2
N otes: Table show s the ow nership percen tage o f  the to ta l annual inflow o f  F D I to M exico fo r  the years  
1994 to 2004.
Source: Secretaria de Econom ia (www.econom ia.gob.m x)
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6.2 VOLUME AND STRUCTURE OF INWARD FDI
Mexico has long been a large recipient of FDI. During the 1980s it accounted for 
approximately 10 percent of all FDI flows to developing countries and roughly a 
quarter of all flows to Latin America (Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000). Though many 
Mexicans once lamented that they were “so far from heaven and so close to the United 
States” (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997, p.21), Mexico’s proximity to the world’s 
largest economy is perhaps its greatest advantage. Table 6.1 illustrates the primacy of 
the US in Mexican inward FDI.
Despite a modest decline in FDI participation in Mexico by the US between 1976 and 
1994, the US remains by far the largest single investor. One of the principal 
advantages of this for Mexico is that the US economy is at the technological frontier 
and it may be expected that US FDI may be managerially and technologically well- 
endowed. The principal advantage for researchers is that the US collects the most 
comprehensive data on the activities of its multinationals abroad, and hence provides 
detailed information pertaining to roughly 60 percent of all FDI inflows into Mexico. 
Few other countries, if  any, offer this wealth of data.
Figure 6.1 shows the stock and flows of FDI from the US to Mexico for the years 
1966 to 2000. As flows in any individual year are heavily influenced by individual 
undertakings, they show a marked volatility in comparison with the stock data. For 
this reason, it is preferable to analyse the FDI trend by consideration of the stock as 
opposed to the flow. Whilst the figure shows a gradual increase in FDI stock from the
outset, there appears to be a dramatic increase in FDI during the nineties5. In fact, 
Graham and Wada (2000) report that there is a trend break in 1989.
It is interesting that the timing of this trend break precedes the implementation of 
NAFTA by some five years. During the negotiations of NAFTA there was 
considerable concern expressed in the US and Canada that the abundant supply of 
cheap labour in Mexico would lead to sizeable negative effects on domestic wages 
and employment6. What these concerns overlooked, however, was that trade and 
investment liberalisation in Mexico had begun in earnest ten years earlier; with 
corresponding adjustments in trade and investment volumes already having taken 
place7. Graham and Wada (2000) report that the earliest indications that NAFTA was 
in the ‘pipeline’ were from ‘leaked’ reports from the Mexican Government in the 
spring of 1990, and so “the trend break cannot be attributed to NAFTA nor even to 
expectations that it would occur” (p.781).
Recognising that FDI typically involves long lead times between the decision of firms 
to invest and the actual investment taking place, Graham and Wada (2000) further 
discount the re-election of the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 
1988 and significant liberalisation of the Law on Foreign Investment (LFI) in 1989 as 
explanations of the trend break.
5 Note that the apparent drop in stock in 1982 is due to a recalibration of the data by the US Department 
of Commerce and not an actual withdrawal of foreign investors (Graham & Wada, 2000).
6 Ross Perot, a former US Presidential Candidate, argued that NAFTA would create a “giant sucking 
sound to the South.”
7 Furthermore, despite the primacy of US activity in the Mexican economy, the relative size of Mexico 
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The true catalyst for the break in trend would seem to be the dramatic policy 
reorientation that Mexico was forced into in the aftermath of its sovereign debt crisis 
in 1982. In 1985 Mexico announced its intention to join the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), began a series of bilateral negotiations to liberalise trade 
and investment with the US, and instituted unilateral policy reform. It is these 
significant changes in Mexico’s policy environment that seem to have generated a 
marked increase of FDI from the US. Despite fears pertaining to the consequences of 
NAFTA, the major structural changes to the Mexican economy and their associated 
effects on trade and investment occurred some years prior. The main impact of 
NAFTA may actually have been to ‘lock in’ Mexico’s policy liberalisation and to 
validate it on the international stage. An increase in the proportion of FDI originating 
from ‘outsiders’ after 1994 would certainly seem to validate this conclusion.
Globerman and Schwindt (1996) provide a framework for determining the potential 
impact o f economic integration. We recreate this framework here as Table 6.2. 
Integration agreements which fall into quadrant 1 (characterised by positive locational 
advantages and strong environmental change) are expected to have the greatest 
impact. Agreements categorised by quadrant 4 (those with negative locational 
advantages and weak environmental change) are predicted to have the least impact. 
Agreements categorised by quadrant 2 (negative locational advantages, strong 
environmental change) and quadrant 3 (positive locational advantages, weak 
environmental change) are predicted to have an impact somewhere between the two 
extremes. Environmental change can be defined as the degree of change in policies, 
practices and institutions brought about as a direct result of the integration agreement8.
8 For example, a customs union (CU) would be expected to result in a greater environmental change 
than a free trade area (FTA) because the CU requires member countries to adopt a common external
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Figure 6.2 Factors Determining the Impact of Economic Integration
Locational Advantages 
( positive to negative —» )
Environmental Change 
(strong to weak -I )
1 2
3 4
Source: G loberm an and Schwindt (1996)
tariff whereas the FTA allows members to maintain their own individual external tariffs. Of course, the 
degree of environmental change wrought by any integration agreement will depend on the situation 
prevailing prior to the agreement coming into force.
261
In a study of the impact of regional integration on FDI, Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) 
suggest that the effect of NAFTA is likely to characterise Mexico as being in quadrant 
1 of Figure 6.2. This region is reserved for those countries upon which the regional 
integration agreement (RIA) has a strong policy impact and which have positive 
locational advantages (such as low unit labour costs, sizeable domestic market etc.). It 
is expected that the potential for positive impacts from the formation of an RIA will 
be greatest for countries described by this combination of characteristics. 
Undoubtedly, low labour costs and proximity to the US market endow Mexico with 
strong locational advantages. However, our preceding discussion suggests that the 
environmental impact of NAFTA may not have been as strong as originally thought 
(or feared , in some cases), indicating that the impact of integration on Mexico may be 
more accurately categorised by quadrant 39. In this region the impact of the RIA on 
inward FDI is still expected to be positive, but not as strong as it would be if the 
country was in quadrant 1.
Let us now turn towards the sectoral distribution of total world FDI in Mexico. Table
6.3 shows the breakdown for the last decade according to the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica. While the service sector received the majority of inward FDI in the early 
nineties, by the close of the century the industrial sector was by far the greatest 
recipient. The wholesale and retail trade sector has also enjoyed rapidly accelerating 
FDI during the decade, firmly establishing itself as the third most important sector. 
Extraction and agriculture receive comparatively little FDI.
9 Figure 2 may more satisfactorily be depicted as a continuum in both environmental change and 
locational advantages, in which case we would argue that Mexico may be more properly located in the 
west of the diagram (as opposed to the north-west as suggested by Blomstrom & Kokko, 1997).
262
Table 6.3 Sectoral Composition of Mexican Inward FDI












1991 964 2,138 388 31 45 3,565(27) (60) (11) (1) (1)
1992 1,101 1,700 751 9 39 3,600(31) (47) (21) (0) (1)
1993
2,321 1,731 760 55 35 4,901



















































































N otes: F igures in parentheses are percen tage shares. * Wholesale & R eta il Trade 
Source: Instituto N acional de Estadistica
263
In order to gain a more detailed insight into the industrial location of Mexican FDI it 
is once again necessary to examine data maintained by the US Department of 
Commerce. As before, this has the disadvantage that it accounts only for US FDI, but 
the advantage that the data is considerably more comprehensive and accurate than that 
available elsewhere10. Table 6.4 shows a detailed decomposition of US FDI flows into 
2-digit SIC Mexican manufacturing industries. It is evident that the three most 
important industries are transport equipment (SIC 37), food (SIC 20), and chemicals 
and allied products (SIC 28). Unfortunately, a number of the investment figures have 
been suppressed to ensure that it is not possible to identify the activities of any 
individual firm. However, by subtracting the available data from the total for all 
manufacturing industries we can be certain that none of the suppressed figures are 
masking significant FDI flows.
10 Concerning accuracy,, it is interesting to note that the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica reports US 
inward FDI for 1999 as US$6635m, whereas the US Department of Commerce reports only 
US$5084m. This discrepancy is likely due to the fact that the Instituto records planned or announced 
FDI, but the Department of Commerce only records FDI that has actually taken place. This example 
serves to emphasise the importance of verifying investment data when and where possible, and offers 
an indication of the potential data problems that plague empirical studies.
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Table 6.4. US FDI Flows in Mexican Manufacturing Industries, 1982-2000 (US$m)
Year Food Chemicals Primary Metals Industrial Electronics Transport Other Total
1982 18 93 37 -3 37 -74 96 203
1983 -58 -21 -42 -141 -56 -59 -51 -427
1984 122 131 32 -279 85 48 -10 129
1985 33 55 6 -52 -18 87 89 200
1986 -45 -52 -29 -111 -2 -83 -29 -351
1987 -91 120 26 -79 48 5 236 264
1988 69 190 32 21 27 163 168 670
1989 281 289 39 60 D 250 D 1,159
1990 393 173 49 53 D 257 D 1,323
1991 281 262 19 -9 -43 619 196 1,325
1992 28 152 D D -92 404 268 720
1993 952 410 D D -95 -628 304 1,023
1994 674 314 D D 158 1,028 281 2,530
1995 360 289 D D -69 687 D 1,785
1996 692 599 52 D 7 -211 D 1,665
1997 1,007 577 D D -14 144 D 2,499
1998 713 107 D D D 1,300 495 2,472
1999 -23 729 80 D D 774 656 2,468
2000 507 483 D D D 726 D 1,710
N otes: ‘D  ’ indicates suppressed data (to p ro tec t the identities o f  individual firm s). 
Source: US D epartm ent o f  Commerce
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Finally, it is important to note that a significant proportion of FDI into Mexico has 
been in in-bond foreign assembly plants (maquiladoras) based overwhelmingly along 
the 3,326 km US-Mexico border11. Although the maquiladora program has proven 
popular with foreign investors since its introduction in the 1960s, relaxation of 
restrictions in the early 1980s saw maquiladora employment increase from 150,867 in 
1983 to 460,293 in 1990 as the share of maquiladora workers in national 
manufacturing employment grew from 5 percent to 19 percent (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1997). Today there are approximately one million workers in nearly four thousand 
maquiladoras.
Gerber (2001) reports that maquila investment has accounted, on average, for 27 
percent of US FDI into Mexico over the period 1994 to 200012. Furthermore, five 
cities located on the US-Mexico border share 50 percent of the firms and 51 percent of 
the workers in US-origin maquilas. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find that in the 
regions where FDI was most concentrated, the growth in maquiladora investment can 
account for over half of the increase in the share of skilled labour in total wages that 
occurred during the late 1980s13. Given this, the authors claim that the “FDI 
boom.. .has resulted in a region-specific shock to labour demand” (p.374).
11 Maquiladoras are subject to tax only on the value added of their activities. They import most of their 
intermediate imports from abroad and export virtually all of their output (until 1988 they were required 
by law to export 100% of their output). The vast majority of maquiladoras produce electronic 
equipment, clothing, plastics, furniture, electrical appliances, or auto parts.
12 In addition, US investment in maquiladoras was 87% of total world FDI in maquiladoras and around 
80% of maquila output is shipped to the US.
13 US investment in maquiladoras is aimed at outsourcing low-skilled production tasks in order to take 
advantage of lower unit labour costs in Mexico. However, these tasks which are viewed as low skilled 
to US firms are in fact relatively highly skilled in terms of the skills and training of the Mexican 
workforce. In this manner, US FDI in Mexico can cause an increase in the relative demand for 
(relatively) skilled labour in both countries simultaneously.
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Hanson (1996, 1998) draws similar conclusions investigating the spatial impact of 
FDI and Mexican-US integration. He argues that the massive US inward FDI 
concentrated in maquiladoras near the Mexican-US border has essentially created 
vertical production networks spanning the border. This has contributed to a 
significant contraction in employment in the Mexico City manufacturing belt, a rapid 
expansion of manufacturing employment in Northern Mexico, and an increase in 
wage inequality.
Interestingly, these studies also suggest that the impact o f NAFTA on the US has 
been understated. Hanson (1996) examines data for US-Mexico border-city pairs 
(e.g. San Diego -  Tijuana), concluding that export manufacturing in maquiladoras 
encourages growth in employment in US border cities.
Early evidence therefore seems to indicate that despite the benefits inward FDI can 
foster in terms of capital and productivity spillovers, it may also lead to rising 
inequality and regional deindustrialisation. The potential costs of such effects are 
well known and it is obvious that the spatial aspects of FDI and integration warrant 
further investigation.
In this section we have argued that Mexico’s sweeping liberalisation and policy 
reform in the mid-eighties was the catalyst to a dramatic acceleration in inward FDI, 
with the implementation of NAFTA nearly a decade later serving to consolidate and 
validate these reforms. Given this, we need to ask what factors explain the attraction 
of the Mexican economy to foreign investors, and what determines the industrial and 
geographical location of FDI in Mexico? These are the questions that we turn to next.
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6.3 DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN MEXICO
The decision process prior to undertaking foreign investment will undoubtedly vary 
from one firm to another. However, there are many considerations (such as 
availability of factor inputs, domestic demand conditions, property rights protection 
etc.) that will be common to all firms. One theory that neatly encapsulates these 
diverse factors is the eclectic paradigm developed by Dunning (1988). This argues 
that FDI will be the appropriate mode of foreign market entry when multinationals 
find it most advantageous to exploit ownership and location advantages through 
internalisation rather than through exporting or licensing.
There are numerous recent empirical studies which seek to test the determinants of 
FDI14. Most of the issues under investigation can be categorised as location 
advantages, but there are also studies which seek to assess the impact of ownership 
advantages and strategic considerations on FDI. Despite the wealth of such studies, 
the number that specifically address Mexican FDI is unfortunately rather small. Two 
authors who seem intent on remedying this are Love and Lage-Hidalgo. In one paper 
(1999a) they test the ownership advantages of US multinational as determinants of 
FDI flows into Mexico, while in other papers (1999b, 2000) they consider a 
derivative of the model employed by Buckley and Casson (1991) which takes the 
principal determinants of FDI to be the scale of demand in the host economy and 
relative factor costs in the capital exporting and importing countries.
14 For example, Lehmann (1999) investigates the role of country risk, Traxler and Woitech (2000) 
consider labour market regimes, Schoeman et al. (2000) analyse fiscal policy, List and Co (2000) study 
environmental policy, Sung and Lapan (2000) assess exchange rate volatility.
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In order to investigate the significance of ownership advantages, Love and Lage- 
Hidalgo (1999b) develop a model which tests the hypothesis that sectoral FDI flows 
from the US to Mexico over a four-year period can be explained by the ownership 
advantages of US multinationals. The authors argue that the firms most likely to 
display the ownership advantages proposed in the literature are the Mexican affiliates 
of US multinationals. They therefore construct a database based on US majority 
owned non-bank foreign affiliates (MOFAs) based in Mexico for the years 1989 to 
1992 inclusive15. The dependent variable is FDI flows (accounted for by MOFAs), 
whilst the independent variables are R&D expenditures, capital expenditures, net 
tangible assets, employee compensation, and total Mexican sales (taken as proxies for 
the ownership advantages of US multinationals). Their analysis reveals that all of the 
explanatory variables (with the exception of R&D expenditure) are positively related 
to FDI flows. They conclude that “direct investment into US MNEs’ affiliates in 
Mexico is driven by benefits derived from embedded human knowledge and from 
technical knowledge embodied in plant and machinery” (p.77). That is, US 
multinationals are encouraged to undertake foreign investment partly because of the 
ownership advantages they possess. Although this goes some way to explaining why 
US multinationals may want to undertake FDI in the first place, it offers little 
explanation as to why Mexico itself is an attractive location for FDI.16
15 MOFAs are those subsidiaries in which the US parent has a stake of 50% or more. As data for these 
firms is considerably more comprehensive than that for all affiliates (and given that the US Department 
of Commerce benchmark studies indicate that MOFAs typically represent approximately two thirds of 
overall US investment in Mexico) the authors opted to focus on these affiliates only.
16 Beyond the implicit assumption that the ownership advantages possessed by US multinationals are 
not also possessed by domestic Mexican firms (and therefore US affiliates in Mexico can exploit such 
ownership advantages to gain a competitive advantage versus domestic rivals), ownership advantages 
tend to offer a “push” explanation for FDI. To incorporate “pull” factors into the discussion we must 
also examine locational advantages.
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In an attempt to address such questions, the authors employ data on US FDI flows to 
Mexico for the period 1967 to 1994. In this instance the independent variables are 
Mexican income per capita (as a proxy for the scale of domestic demand), the 
difference between US and Mexican hourly real wages, and an estimate of the 
difference between the cost of capital between the US and Mexico17. The model was 
able to explain two-thirds of the variation in FDI flows and strongly supported the 
belief that real wage differentials were an important locational determinant. Cost of 
capital differentials, on the other hand, were found to have a weak positive effect on 
FDI. The authors’ suggested explanation for the unexpected sign on capital cost is 
that when the cost of capital increases in the home nation it encourages MNEs to raise 
capital from the host country which ultimately leads to increases in FDI. Mexican 
income per capita was also found to have a strong positive influence on FDI, which is 
interpreted as indicating that the domestic Mexican market is attractive to FDI in its 
own right (and not simply because it offers a plentiful supply of ‘cheap labour’).
One notable shortcoming of these studies (which is readily acknowledged by the 
authors) is their use of wage differentials instead of the more appropriate unit labour 
costs (ULCs), which take into account labour productivity as well as labour 
compensation. Fortunately, the recent provision of ULC measures for Mexico by the 
Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) database enables this to be remedied.
17 The lagged stock of US FDI in Mexico is included as a fourth explanatory variable because "in any 
given period, actual and desired foreign capital stocks are unlikely to be equal as a result of adjustment 
costs and operating lags [so] flows of foreign direct investment will therefore be a lagged function of 
the difference between actual and desired capital stocks in previous periods." (p.209/10)
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We employ a simple gravity model (familiar from previous chapters), augmented 
with the ratio of the unit labour costs in the host and home countries, in an attempt to 
model both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ effects on US FDI flows to Mexico and Canada18. The 
dependent variable is US FDI flows to Mexico or Canada in constant 2000 US$ 
(derived from OECD Direct Investment Statistics online database). The independent 
variables are home (i-subscript) and host (j-subscript) country GDPs and populations 
(from the World Bank World Development Indicators online database). The unit 
labour cost variable is derived from the KILM database which reports labour 
compensation per unit of output in constant 1990 US$ (from KILM)19. Employing a 
log-linear specification, we accordingly estimate the following regression model:
In FDIijt = a  + In GDPit + /?2 In GDPjt + /?3 In nit + /?4 In njt + /?5 \n(ULCj/ULC.)t
[6.1]
Although GDP and population data is readily available, this is unfortunately not the 
case with FDI and unit labour cost data. Data is available on the dependent variable 
for the years 1982 to 2003, inclusive. We have observations for the ULC variable for 
the years 1980 to 2002, inclusive. Obviously we would rather have a more 
comprehensive dataset, but as with many fields in economics we are forced to work 
with the limited data available.
As we have seen in previous chapters, a priori we expect the sign on home and host 
country GDPs to be positive. Although theory is unclear as to the sign on the
18 As the US shares a common border with both Mexico and Canada we exclude the distance variable 
that is typically included in gravity models when applied to a more geographically diverse dataset.
19 The ULC variable is the ratio of host (i.e. Mexico or Canada) ULC against home (i.e. US) ULC in 
any given year.
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population variables, our experience has been that these coefficients are typically 
negatively signed (so that for a given income, a higher population and hence lower 
per capita income both offsets the ‘push’ effect on FDI from the home country and 
the ‘puli’ effect from the host). The coefficient on the ULC variable is expected to be 
negative, reflecting that US FDI is attracted to Canada and Mexico to exploit lower 
unit labour costs than are available domestically.
Table 6.5 presents the results when the dataset is used to estimate the above model 
using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). The first column of results reflects 
estimation of the model specified in [6.1] above. Although the F-statistic implies that 
the explanatory variables are jointly significant, only the coefficient on home GDP is 
statistically significant at the 10% level in its own right. The magnitude of In GDPi is 
much greater than that typically found in gravity models applied to FDI flows - it is 
likely that this variable is picking up other factors that influence FDI flows from the 
US to Canada and Mexico (such as proximity, cultural ties and historical trading 
patterns etc).
The sign on the ULC variable is contrary to our a priori expectations. Were it 
statistically significant it would suggest that higher relative (to the US) unit labour 
costs in Mexico and Canada actually seem to attract FDI from US firms. However, as 
the coefficient is not statistically different from zero, we are forced to say that (based 
on the results of the initial regression) relative unit labour costs appear to exert no 
influence on US FDI to Mexico or Canada. This conclusion goes against our a priori 
expectations and is also at odds with previous work by Griffiths and Sapsford (2002) 
who found that unit labour costs in Mexico and Canada exerted a statistically
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significant (at the 6% level) negative effect on US FDI flows for the period 1980 to 
1996.
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Table 6.5 FDI Flows and Unit Labour Costs in Mexico and Canada





















































































N otes: D ependent variable is the natural logarithm o f  US F D I flow s. F igures in parentheses are  
stan dard  errors.
•  indicates significance a t the 10%  level, ** a t 5%, and *** at 1%.
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As we have discussed previously, there is likely to be a considerable lag between the 
decision to invest and the actual realisation of that investment. Although any firm 
looking to invest overseas will give due regard to its expectations of changes in key 
economic variables going forward (e.g. market growth rates, exchange rates, labour 
costs etc), it will undoubtedly place significant store in the economic situation that 
prevails at the time the decision to invest is being made. As the ULC variable is a 
‘decision variable’ faced by firms, it may be more appropriate to lag this variable (as 
this should more accurately capture the unit labour cost ratio upon which US firms 
were making their foreign investment decisions).
Equation 6.2 of Table 6.5 reports the results when we introduce the unit labour cost 
variable lagged one period. Although the coefficient on the lagged ULC variable is 
less positive (i.e. smaller magnitude) than the current ULC variable in equation 6.1, it 
remains statistically indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
home GDP, which was significant at the 10% level in equation 6.1, is no longer 
statistically significant.
Equation 6.3 reports the results when the ULC variable is lagged two periods.
Although the coefficient on ln(ULCj/ULC)t.2 is negative, it is not statistically
20significant despite a lower standard error than in equations 6.1 and 6.2 .
20 Note that introducing the ULC variable in lagged form increases the number of available 
observations (in comparison to when ULC is included without a lag) because the ULC data is available 
for 1980 to 2002 and the FDI data is available for 1982 to 2003. Therefore, when we include 
ln(ULCj/ULCj)t we have data for the years 1982 to 2002, but with ln(ULC/ULC^t.j we can include 
data for 1982 to 2003.
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Thus far, we have implicitly imposed the restriction that the gravity and ULC 
variables have an identical impact on US FDI to Mexico as they do on US FDI to 
Canada. In order to relax this assumption we add intercept and slope dummy 
variables to our regression specification. Although the slope dummies proved to be 
statistically insignificant, the intercept dummy had a notable effect when introduced 
with the lagged ULC variables. Equation 6.4 of Table 6.5 reports the results when the 
intercept dummy is introduced together with the ULC variable lagged one period21. 
The intercept dummy is statistically significant at the 5% level, with the negative 
coefficient implying that US FDI flows to Mexico are lower than they are to Canada 
(after taking account of the gravity variables and lagged unit labour costs). Given the 
historically close ties between the US and Canada it is not surprising that Canada 
receives more US FDI than Mexico even after accounting for GDP, population and 
unit labour costs. Although the lagged ULC variable is now reporting a negative 
coefficient, we must note that it is still not statistically significant and we should not 
therefore place undue emphasis on this reversal in sign.
Equation 6.5 reports the results when the intercept dummy is included with the two- 
period lagged ULC variable. Once again, the intercept dummy is negative and 
statistically significant. On this occasion, the lagged ULC variable is also statistically 
significant at the 6% level, with the negative coefficient implying that an increase in 
unit labour costs in Mexico or Canada (relative to the US) will discourage FDI from 
US firms.
21 The intercept dummy (Di) takes the value of unity for observations in which the host country is 
Mexico and the value zero when the host country is Canada.
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In order to gain an insight into the possible length of the lag between the decision to 
undertake foreign investment and the actual realisation of that investment, we 
experimented by including different lags of the ULC variable. With a three-period 
lag the ULC variable was -1.30 with a standard error of 0.88; with a four-period lag 
the coefficient was -0.04 with a standard error of 1.09; and with a five-period lag the 
coefficient was 0.07 with a standard error of 0.93. It therefore appears that the 
investment decision may precede actual investment by two to three years.
Despite data limitations and the simplicity of the foregoing analysis, there is evidence 
that US firms take account of the prevailing unit labour costs in target countries when 
making their investment decisions -  lower (relative) unit labour costs lead to greater 
FDI.
In order to attempt a more comprehensive analysis of the determinants of Mexican 
inward FDI we have constructed a data set of FDI flows disaggregated by two-digit 
SIC manufacturing industries. US flow data for the years 1987 to 2000 was taken 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for the food, chemicals, primary 
metals, industrial machinery, electronics and transport industries. As disaggregated 
ULC data are not available for Mexico, we employ data on hourly compensation 
available from the US Bureau of Foreign Labour Statistics.
In addition to the compensation variable we included the GDP of the domestic US 
industry (INDit), and the GDP growth rates of the US (Yit) and Mexican (YJt)
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economies as explanatory variables22. This gives the following equation to be 
estimated:
In FDIijt = a  + f3xCOM1 COMPit + /J2lnINDit + {]3Yit + /]4Yj, [6.6]
Unfortunately, due to data suppression by the BEA (to protect the identity of 
individual firms) and missing values for compensation in some years, our potential 
panel size of 68 observations is reduced to 31. Given this, it is not surprising that we 
failed to achieve conclusive results, whether using pooled OLS, a random effects 
model (REM) or a fixed effects model (FEM). The sole statistically significant 
coefficient was , whose value ranged from 1.24 to 1.59 (significant at the 5 percent 
level) depending on the model specification and sample used23. This implies that, 
ceteris paribis, the size of a manufacturing industry in the US is associated with a 
higher level of FDI flows to Mexico24. Obviously though, the lack of data has 
prevented us from undertaking a more sophisticated and comprehensive study and 
this conclusion should be treated cautiously.
The empirical work we have so far undertaken on Mexican FDI seems to offer some 
evidence to support the intuition that unit labour costs (or, more correctly, two-period 
lagged relative ULC) and the size of US manufacturing industries have been factors
22 INDiY and Yt are intended to capture the ‘push’ effects on FDI and Yj the ‘puli’ effect. This is similar 
to the standard ‘gravity model’ which has proved very successful empirically at accounting for a whole 
range of factor flows.
23 In order to increase the number of observations available we also experimented with the inclusion of 
data for US FDI into Canada. However, this failed to alter the results and f52 remained the only 
significant coefficient.
24 Note that our regression specification assumes that all FDI in a given Mexican industry comes from 
US firms in that same industry. However, this may not be too unrealistic at the two-digit level.
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in stimulating inflows of FDI to Mexico. An analysis of the attraction of factors such 
as tax breaks, special economic zones and agglomeration economies would make a 
valuable contribution to the literature if a sufficiently comprehensive dataset could be 
assembled.
6.4 SPILLOVER CHANNELS
Perhaps the main reason that foreign direct attention receives so much attention, in 
policy debates, economic circles and the popular press, is the belief that it can 
contribute positively to economic growth (and hence welfare) in the recipient 
country, in excess of the contribution that can be made by domestic investment. Thus 
far we have had little opportunity to explore this idea. This case study of Mexico 
affords this opportunity by allowing us to explore the existence, or otherwise, of 
spillovers from Mexican inward FDI.
The literature identifies four main channels through which spillovers from FDI are 
thought to occur: imitation, competition effects, human capital acquisition, and export 
spillovers. We briefly consider each in turn.
6.4.1 Imitation
The most convincing explanations in the theoretical literature on why multinationals 
invest abroad as opposed to licensing or exporting tend to assume that the firm has 
some sort of ownership advantage (such as patented technology) that it must 
internalise through direct investment to overcome market imperfections (such as poor
intellectual property rights in the host country). As Hymer (1960) observed, the 
multinational will surely be disadvantaged in terms of local knowledge and so must 
have some proprietary advantage to counteract this. Either by imitation or 
demonstration, dispersion of this proprietary knowledge (whether it be technology, a 
product or process innovation, or simply managerial or organisational expertise) is 
believed to be one of the primary channels through which domestic firms can 
improve their productivity.
Immediately, it is obvious that a number of factors will be crucial in determining how 
successful domestic firms will be in gaining from this type of spillover. For instance, 
the level of technology or knowledge embodied in FDI can be expected to vary with 
the type of investment (e.g. initial capital or reinvested earnings), industry of 
investment (e.g. electronics or agriculture), and source country (e.g. US or Brazil). 
Furthermore, the host nation’s ability to benefit from any spillovers likely depends on 
its technological sophistication, levels of human capital, cultural and social capital, 
and financial institutions and markets (factors which Abramovitz (1986) might refer 
to as determining a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’). Indeed, there is quite a debate in 
the literature as to whether the size of the ‘technology gap’ (that is, the difference in 
technological sophistication between the source and host countries) exerts a positive 
or negative influence on spillovers25. The argument that it is positive rests on the 
belief that the more ‘backward’ the host nation the greater the scope for it to make 
gains on the leading countries and hence the faster domestic productivity growth will 
be. However, if the gap is large it may prove too great for domestic firms to ‘jump’
25 See Findlay (1978) and Wang and Blomstrom (1992).
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and ultimately they may gain very little from FDI (and may actually be harmed by it 
if  they are forced out of the market).
In a cross-section industry level study of Mexico for 1970, Kokko (1994) investigates 
the role of the ‘technology gap’. He finds that “factors related to technology alone do 
not seem to inhibit spillovers, but that large productivity gaps and large foreign 
market shares together appear to make up significant obstacles” (p. 290). This 
finding may be of particular concern to Mexico because US investments in 
maquiladoras in Northern Mexico exhibit aspects of enclave behaviour.
6.4.2 Competition
A number of authors emphasise the role of competition effects in generating 
spillovers from FDI (Wang and Blomstrom, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 2001). Entry by 
a foreign firm will initially increase competition in the domestic industry which 
should force domestic firms to adopt new technologies or reduce X-inefficiency even
Ofif  there are no gains in terms of imitation as discussed above . This spillover 
mechanism is analogous to the standard gains associated with increased arms-length
9 7trade and is often cited as potentially one of the most important benefits from FDI . 
Of course, if  foreign entry forces out some domestic firms that are unable to compete 
and hence ultimately leads to an increase in concentration and imperfection in the 
market, competition effects from FDI may actually harm the host economy.
26 Although entry by a similar-sized domestic firm would also increase competitive pressure, the fact 
that foreign affiliates are generally more efficient than domestic firms (Blomstrom and Wolff, 1994) 
leads us to expect that FDI will lead to greater and more beneficial competitive pressure than the 
equivalent domestic investment.
27 For example, the Cecchini Report on the benefits of completing the European Single Market 
identified competition effects as the primary source of gain (Gorg and Greenaway, 2002).
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6.4.3 Acquisition of Human Capital
Human capital has long been held to be a vital determinant of economic growth and 
has recently been incorporated into endogenous growth models to permit countries to 
enjoy increasing returns. Given this, the prospect that FDI is linked with training and 
on-the-job learning for domestic workers is particularly encouraging. Fosfuri, Motta, 
and Ronde (2000) note that “the fact that MNEs undertake substantial efforts in the 
education of local workers has been documented in many instances (e.g. ILO, 1981; 
Lindsey, 1986), and empirical research seems to indicate that MNEs offer more 
training to technical workers and managers than do local firms (Chen, 1983; 
Gerschenberg, 1987)” (p.206).
The possibility of spillovers is magnified when affiliate employees move to domestic 
firms or set up their own enterprises. Katz (1987) observes that managers of 
domestic firms in Latin America often started their careers and were trained in 
foreign affiliates. Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) investigate the possibility of 
human capital spillovers in Mexico, Venezuela, and the US by estimating the effect 
of foreign ownership on wages. They find for all three countries that FDI is 
associated with higher wages, but in Mexico and Venezuela higher wages were only 
found for workers in foreign firms. This implies that FDI does improve the human 
capital of domestic workers employed by foreign affiliates, but there is no evidence of 
human capital spillovers to workers of domestic firms (or rather that there is no 
evidence that workers in domestic firms are compensated for potential human capital 
spillovers they may have received).
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6.4.4 Export Spillovers
There is a rich history of research on the export-led growth hypothesis. More 
recently, a number of papers have considered the prospect that involvement in 
exporting increases a firm’s productivity28. Given that exports also secure foreign 
currency for the exporting nation, the prospect that FDI may enhance the ability of 
domestic firms to export has received significant attention. Multinationals have an 
obvious advantage over domestic firms when it comes to knowledge and experience 
of exporting. It is not difficult to imagine that some of this expertise may spillover 
from foreign affiliates to domestic firms, especially if the affiliate is itself engaged in 
export activity. Furthermore, if  the affiliate is producing for export then it may 
encourage the formation of export infrastructure (such as transport, warehousing etc) 
that can be utilised by domestic firms.
Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) employ cross-section firm level data for 1986 
and 1989 to study the link between FDI and export spillovers in Mexico. They find 
that the probability that a domestic plant will export is positively correlated with 
proximity to multinational affiliates, but unrelated to general exporting activity. They 
conclude that “foreign-owned enterprises are a natural conduit for information about 
foreign markets and technology, and a natural channel through which domestic firms 
can distribute their goods. To the extent that foreign investors directly or indirectly 
provide information and distribution services, their activities enhance the export 
prospects of local firms” (p.25).
28 See Bernard and Jensen (1999), Bernard and Wagner (1997), and Girma, Greenaway & Kneller 
(2002).
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6.4.5 Empirical Studies on Productivity Spillovers
As previously mentioned, Mexico has proved a popular area of study, although the 
most recent empirical studies have focussed on other developing countries from Latin 
America and East Asia. Whilst overall evidence from empirical studies on FDI 
spillovers is mixed, there is a general consensus amongst the Mexican studies that 
FDI does lead to beneficial spillovers for domestic firms.
The earliest study of spillovers in Mexico was by Blomstrom and Persson (1983) who 
related the technical efficiency of Mexican manufacturing industries in 1970 to 
capital intensity, labour quality, degree of competition, and the presence of foreign 
affiliates. They found a positive relationship between technical efficiency and foreign 
presence, which they took as suggesting that ‘spillover efficiency benefits’ do occur 
from foreign plants to domestic plants. However, the study does not indicate through 
what channels these spillovers might take place.
Blomstrom (1986) attempts to remedy this failing by analysing the effects of FDI on 
the productive efficiency of the industrial structure in Mexico between 1970 and 
1975. He does this by constructing an efficiency index, which is a measure of how 
far the average firm is from the industry frontier, and then running OLS regressions 
with a foreign share variable as one of the independent variables. In all of the 
regressions he finds a positive coefficient on the foreign share variable that he 
interprets as evidence that “MNCs have a positive independent influence on structure, 
so that industries dominated by foreign firms tend to be more efficient than others in 
the sense that the average firm is closer to the frontier” (p. 105).
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Then to investigate the possible channels through which the foreign firms may be 
contributing to structural efficiency, Blomstrom relates different aspects of structural 
change between 1970 and 1975 to changes in foreign presence during this same 
period. He finds that foreign entry is uncorrelated with both changes in the 
technological frontier and labour productivity in the least efficient plants, but that it is 
positively related to productivity changes in the industry average. This is interpreted 
as evidence that spillovers occur not through the transfer of technology but rather 
through competitive pressure. It may also indicate that FDI encourages the dualistic 
nature of developing country markets (i.e. foreign firms enter and improve the 
‘modem’ sector of an industry, whilst the ‘traditional’ sector is unaffected and falls 
further behind).
Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) investigate the influence of multinationals on 
productivity convergence between Mexico and the US between 1970 and 1975. They 
report that “there is strong evidence that the presence of multinational firms acts as a 
catalyst to the productivity growth in Mexico and that foreign direct investment 
speeds up the convergence process between Mexico and the United States” (p. 275). 
Unfortunately, the study is unable to distinguish between the direct effect of FDI and 
possible indirect (spillover) effects and so it is possible that industry productivity in 
Mexico is improved simply by the entry of more productive MNE affiliates without 
any increase in domestic firm productivity.
It is important to note that all the spillover studies discussed above make use of cross- 
sectional industry-level data. Recently, Gorg and Strobl (2001) have argued that use
of cross section data may lead to biased results because of the problem of correctly 
identifying the causation between industry productivity and multinational affiliate 
entry. They recommend that panel data be used to circumvent this problem. Gorg 
and Greenaway (2002) conduct an exhaustive survey of papers on productivity 
spillovers (covering a variety of developed, developing, and transition economies) 
and note that only “two studies using appropriate data and estimation 
techniques.. .report positive evidence for aggregate spillovers” (p. 7). The remaining 
sixteen find either negative or no statistically significant effects.
This would appear quite damning evidence against the positive spillovers found for 
Mexico. However, it must be realised that none of the studies which found negative 
or no effects were done for Mexico. As discussed previously, spillovers from FDI are 
likely to vary with the host economy under consideration. In fact, Kokko (1994) 
finds that “the technology imports of MNC affiliates seem to be larger in countries 
and industries where the educational level of the local labour force is higher, where 
local competition is tougher, and where the host country imposes fewer formal 
requirements on the affiliates’ operations” (p.280). This combined with the fact that 
the majority of Mexico’s FDI comes from the US may be the actual explanation for 
why positive spillovers have been consistently found for Mexico, but no statistically 
significant effects were found for Morocco (Haddad and Harrison, 1993) or Uruguay 
(Kokko et al., 1996).
Many developing countries, including Mexico, actively compete to attract FDI in the 
belief that it can contribute not just to the quantity of capital, but also the quality. In 
some instances governments are so eager to attract foreign firms that they will even
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subsidise the investment29. Given this, it is disappointing that there is no consensus in 
empirical research confirming the existence of beneficial FDI spillovers.
29 For instance, Head (1998) claims that the state government of Alabama paid the equivalent of 
$150,000 per employee to entice Mercedes to locate its new plant in the state.
6.5 DOES FDI ENHANCE ECONOMIC GROWTH?
The majority of empirical studies investigating the host country effects of FDI focus 
on labour or output productivity in manufacturing as the dependent variable. We take 
a different approach here and follow Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) and Carkovic 
and Levine (2002) in examining directly the growth rate of gross domestic product 
(GDP) in a model derived from a production function with FDI as an additional input 
alongside labour and physical capital. As discussed previously, foreign investment is 
attractive to host countries specifically because it is believed to embody greater 
technology and human capital than domestic investment. Given this, it is appropriate 
that the stock of foreign investment and domestic investment should enter separately 
in the production function.
In the usual manner we can represent the production function as:
Y = g {L ,K ,F ,t) [6.7]
where Y  is real GDP, L is labour, K  is domestic capital stock, F  is foreign capital 
stock, and t is a time trend capturing technical progress. Taking [6.7] to be a Cobb- 
Douglas production function with an exponential time trend, we obtain an expression 
for the growth of GDP after taking logs and differentiating:
y  = a  + J3J + fi2k + fi3f  + fi4t [6.8]
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where lower case letters denote growth rates and the beta coefficients therefore 
represent output elasticities for L , K  and F, but not for the time trend (£>4  is the 
estimated rate of technical change).
With regard to measurement of the domestic and foreign capital stock we follow 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) and take the shares of domestic investment and 
foreign investment in GDP as adequate proxies for the growth rate of the domestic 
and foreign capital stocks respectively30.
Having so far adhered closely to the model and procedure employed in 
Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), we now depart in terms of the data to be analysed. 
Whereas Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) employed cross-section data on 46 countries 
averaged over the period 1970 to 1985, we utilise time series data pertaining to 
growth and FDI in Mexico from 1970 to 200331. In all instances the data are taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online database.
The results are reported in Table 6.6. Equation 6.9 is the regression estimated for the 
entire sample. Of the independent variables, only the coefficient on I/Y  (the proxy for 
the growth rate of the domestic capital stock) is statistically significant, with an 
output elasticity of 1.05 (significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level)32.
30 In doing this Balasubramanyam et a l (1996) were themselves following “the precedent set in 
numerous previous studies by approximating the rate of growth of the capital stock by the share of 
investment in GDP” (p. 98). See, for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).
31 The World Development Indicators generally report data beginning from 1960. However, for FDI 
they begin reporting from 1970.
32 An alternative interpretation of the coefficient is that a one percent increase in the growth rate of the 
domestic capital stock will engender a 1.05% increase in output growth, ceterus paribis. This implies 
that economic growth is elastic with respect to domestic investment.
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Table 6.6 Does FDI Enhance Economic Growth?
6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16
a -15.12 -7.88 2.93 -20.69 -14.23 -11.15 -82.81 -13.19
(0.75) (0.16) (0.12) (19.80) (0.67) (0.51) (1.53) (0.59)
FDI/Y -0.43 -4.64 -1.16 -5.21 -0.75 -0.41
(0.49) (0.99) (1.09) (1.85) (0.72) (0.45)
I/Y 1.05 0.99 1.69 1.03 1.04 0.94 -0.27 1.06
(3-91) (3.14) (3.06) (3.96) (3.77) (3.20) (0.27) (3.81)
AL/L 0.19 0.26 -5.52 2.27 0.03 0.02 20.10
-0.22



















-0.06 -0.20 -0.39 -0.002 -0.08 -0.18 0.68 -0.08
(0.24) (0.29) (1.49) (0.01) (0.34) (0.70) (1.23) (0.30)
F-statistic 5.55
3.84 2.71 5.41 4.12 4.22 2.08 4.31
(4, 29) (4,11) (4, 12) (5, 28) (5, 27) (5,26) (5, 9) (5,28)
R 2 0.36 0.43 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.34 0.28 0.33
sample 1970- 1970- 1986- 1970- 1970- 1970- 1986- 1970-
period 2003 1985 2003 2003 2003 2003 2000 2003
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth rate o f real GDP. Estimation is by ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Figures in parentheses are absolute t-ratios.
290
Although the coefficient on FDI/Y is negative (contrary to expectations) it is not 
statistically significant. This suggests that for Mexico, for the period 1970 to 2003, 
FDI has not played a role in economic growth (the statistically insignificant 
coefficient on labour force growth indicates that this has likewise been the case for 
labour).
This finding is at odds with previous studies on Mexico cited earlier and also with 
Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) who report a statistically significant, positive effect 
of FDI on growth (albeit for a cross-section of 46 economies). Fortunately, the work 
of Balasubramanyam et. al. (1996) also hints at a convincing explanation for our 
finding. Bhagwati (1978) hypothesised that the volume and efficacy of inward FDI 
will be dependent on the trade regime pursued by the host nation. Further, he 
suggested that FDI would be far more beneficial under an export-promoting (EP) 
strategy than under a strategy of import substitution (IS)34 35. By separating their 
sample into EP and IS countries, Balasubramanyam et al. (1996) find evidence to 
suggest that this is indeed the case. As Mexico has undergone a dramatic reorientation 
of its trade policy during our sample period, we are motivated to explore the 
possibility that this is masking a positive effect of FDI in our overall sample.
34 The reasoning for this being that an EP strategy offers a distortion-free environment, whereas an IS 
strategy offers artificial and transitory incentives. So FDI will locate in an EP environment based 
primarily on efficiency considerations, but tax and other such incentives in an IS environment may 
encourage FDI to locate in sub-optimal locations.
35 Bhagwati (1978) also hypothesised that the volume of FDI would be greater under an EP regime. 
Balasubramanyam and Salisu (1991) offer evidence supporting this contention.
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Our initial procedure for classifying our sample into an IS period and an EP period 
was to perform the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests of structural stability. However, 
even for a range of equation specifications, neither of these tests indicated a structural 
break. Given our failure to identify a natural break, we chose to divide the sample 
according to the date given by Sachs and Warner (1995) for the liberalisation of 
Mexico (i.e. 1986). Equation 6.10, for the years 1970 to 1985, represents Mexico 
under an IS regime; equation 6.11, for the years 1986 to 2003, represents Mexico 
under an EP regime.
The variable FDI/Y fails to attain statistical significance in either of the subsamples. 
We therefore find no evidence that FDI has contributed to economic growth in 
Mexico, whether during the years of import-substituting industrialisation or the 
export-promoting period. Domestic investment (I/Y) is the only explanatory variable 
that is significant in either 6.10 or 6.11. We may interpret the larger coefficient on 
I/Y  in 6.11 as an indication that domestic investment provides a greater inducement to 
growth under an EP regime.
Another approach to investigating the possible impact of trade orientation was to 
include an interaction term between foreign investment and a measure of openness as 
an additional explanatory variable (the product of FDI/Y and ‘openness’)36. If a 
liberal regime does indeed improve the efficacy of FDI then we should find a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term. Although the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level (as reported for equation 6.12 in Table 6.6), 
the coefficient on FDI/Y is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level. The
36 The openness variable is defined as (imports + exports / GDP).
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value of the coefficients imply that foreign investment will only make a positive 
contribution to economic growth when the share of trade in GDP is 79% or greater. 
Despite increasing rapidly from 20% in 1960, this measure of openness has not 
exceeded 79% for Meixco at any point for the period under consideration. According 
to the results of equation 6.12 therefore, FDI has only detracted from economic 
growth between 1970 and 2003.
Given that there is often a substantial delay between the moment of entry of FDI and 
the point at which the foreign operation is ‘up-and-running’, or at least operating at 
expected efficiency (especially for initial investments), it seems reasonable to expect 
that output growth may lag behind growth of the foreign capital stock39. We therefore 
experimented with varying lag lengths of the foreign direct investment variable40. A 
two-period lag came the closest to achieving statistical significance (a coefficient of 
1.23 with a t-ratio of 1.11). The lags were also applied in the IP and EP subsamples 
but performed no more favourably than in the complete-period sample. However, 
when applied to the period 1986 to 2000, the two-period lagged foreign investment 
variable attained statistical significance at the 10% level with a coefficient of 4.88. 
Although this may provide some evidence that FDI has proven beneficial to Mexican 
economic growth during the EP regime (after discounting recent turbulent years), we 
must note that equation 6.15 only has nine degrees of freedom. Furthermore, 4.88 is
39 Anecdotal evidence in Hanson (2001) of investments by General Motors and Ford in Brazil would 
seem to support this assumption.
40 Note, we also experimented with the inclusion of year dummies for 1982, 1983, 1984, 1994, and 
1995 (to try and account for periods of crisis in Mexico during our sample period). The inclusion of 
these did not change the results on our variables of interest (although the dummies 1982, 1983, and 
1994 were negative and statistically significant).
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an implausibly high coefficient, implying that a 1% increase in the growth of the 
foreign capital stock leads to a (lagged) increase in economic growth of nearly 5%.
In equation 6.16 we include a variable measuring the growth rate of Mexican exports 
(AX/X) in acknowledgement of the vast literature on the export-led growth 
hypothesis. However, neither this variable (or lagged variations) proved to be 
statistically significant. We therefore find no evidence that Mexico has benefited 
from export-led economic growth.
Obviously the evidence supporting the beneficial growth effects of FDI in Mexico is 
much weaker than one might have expected. Without introducing lagged values of 
the variable, FDI/Y appears to exert no influence on growth. There is limited 
evidence that, in the presence of an appropriate host environment (e.g. the 
increasingly liberal regime found in Mexico post-1986), FDI may contribute to 
economic growth. If this is an accurate reflection of reality it is encouraging news for 
Mexico considering that it continues to attract increasing inflows of FDI and is 
consolidating its policies of liberalisation through the ongoing demands of NAFTA 
and negotiation of various bilateral treaties with countries such as the UK.
6.6 POLICY PROPOSALS
Many developing countries offer generous incentives to try to attract FDI in the belief 
that it offers an attractive social return. Given this, it is of great concern that the 
existence of positive spillovers, as supported by early cross-section studies, has been 
cast into doubt by recent empirical work. Many of these early studies focused on
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Mexico and we must investigate the cause of these empirical discrepancies. Though 
there is a suggestion (Gorg and Strobl, 2001; Gorg and Greenaway, 2002) that cross- 
section approaches lead to biased results, there are currently no panel data studies for 
Mexico. Until this is the case it is difficult to take a firm position either way. What 
should help support the view that there are spillovers in the case of Mexico, however, 
is the fact that around 60 percent of Mexico’s inward FDI comes from the world’s 
most technologically advanced nation. Subject to some evidence that spillovers may 
be reduced if the technology gap is too large (Kokko, 1994, 1996), this suggests that 
the potential is there for Mexico to reap substantial benefits from FDI.
How can Mexico ensure that it maximises the potential spillovers from FDI? As 
Caves (1999) observes, no systematic theory has emerged in the development 
literature to address this issue. This is a major failing that deserves investigation. 
Lacking sound micro-management policies on how to maximise spillovers, we are 
left to recommend broader macro objectives based on improving a country’s 
‘absorptive capacity’. These include investment in human capital, physical and 
financial infrastructure development, and openness.
The advantage of ‘investing’ in ‘absorptive capacity’ is that it also attracts FDI. 
Indeed, in an ideal world there would be no competition for FDI (in terms of tax 
concessions etc.), rather multinationals would be left to choose investment locations 
based purely on efficiency and competitive advantage considerations. This would 
ensure the maximum social return for investment in a global sense and would limit 
MNEs ability to privately capture the benefits of FDI. Despite this not being the case, 
and evidence that lower corporate tax rates do attract FDI (Hanson, 2001), we would
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recommend that Mexico discontinue any attempts to ‘artificially’ attract FDI and 
instead focus on offering a favourable economic environment (e.g. high growth, 
educated labour force, good infrastructure etc.). By providing a ‘distortion-free’ 
environment Mexico would enjoy the greatest opportunity to benefit from FDI 
spillovers41.
Furthermore, given its geographical proximity to the US, Mexico need not fear loss of 
FDI flows. The formation of NAFTA has legitimised the liberalisation policies 
adopted by Mexico in the mid-eighties and appears to be attracting considerable non­
member FDI intent on penetrating the US market. As the domestic Mexican market 
continues to grow and becomes more ‘Americanised’ it will attract more FDI in its 
own right42. Hopefully, this will allow it to move away from maquiladora-type 
operations to activities which add more value and provide greater opportunity for 
spillovers43.
Ending on a note of caution, recent research suggests that FDI may result in 
undesirable spatial effects and inequality44. The costs of these are well documented 
and this issue deserves serious consideration. Although the Mexican government has
41 Furthermore, there is evidence (Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 1999a) that Mexico and Canada do not 
compete for US investment (i.e. increased US investment in Canada will not lead to decreased 
investment in Mexico).
42 Using Hofstede’s four dimensions of national culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
individuality, and masculinity) Kogut and Singh (1998) estimate the ‘cultural distance’ between the US 
and Mexico as 3.13 (compared with 0.08 for the UK, 0.11 for Canada, 1.63 for India, and 3.60 for 
China).
43 Despite a pervasive view in the popular press that maquiladoras are little more than ‘sweatshops’ 
employing young female labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997), Silver (2002) reports that each 
maquiladora job indirectly supports 3.5 more jobs at suppliers, transport companies and other service 
providers.
44 Given that the top 20% of earners account for 55% of the income in Mexico (CIA World Factbook, 
2001), inequality is already a serious issue that needs no exacerbation.
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implemented policies to try to attract FDI and maquiladora investment into the 
southern regions, economic factors (including transport costs and agglomeration 
economies) dictate that foreign investment will continue to be concentrated primarily 
along the US-Mexico border and near Mexico City. Future integration among the 
Southern Hemisphere economies may serve to revitalise the south of Mexico, but the 
effects of any such RIA are hard to predict with much certainty.
Foreign direct investment, particularly with reference to developing economies, is a 
subject that will continue to attract a great deal of attention, and rightly so. Issues 
concerning the scope of FDI to confer spillover benefits on the host nation and how 
these benefits can best be realised are still far from resolved. The potential spatial 
effects of FDI also warrant further investigation. Regrettably, as is so often the case 
in economics, we are at the mercy of the available data.
6.7 CONCLUSION
This case study has focussed on the nature of FDI inflows to Mexico and their 
economic impact. Mexico provides an interesting case study because it has 
undergone substantial economic liberalisation since pursuing import-substituting 
industrialisation policies during the 1970s and early-1980s. It is also an ideal 
candidate because it allows us to investigate whether membership of NAFTA has 
influenced flows of FDI to Mexico. We are therefore able to explore further some of 
the issues discussed in earlier chapters.
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The US has historically been the principal foreign investor in Mexico, accounting for 
around two-thirds of Mexico’s FDI stock for the period 1976 to 1985 (Love and 
Lage-Hidalgo, 2000). However, FDI from other countries became increasingly 
important after 1985 and the US share of FDI to Mexico fell45. The formation of 
NAFTA seemed to reverse this trend for some years, although US FDI has again been 
falling (as a proportion of total Mexican FDI) in recent years. In 2004 the US 
accounted for 42% of total FDI flows to Mexico.
Although the figures show that there has been a gradual increase in FDI to Mexico for 
over four decades, there was a dramatic increase in the 1990s. In fact, Graham and 
Wada (2002) report the existence of a trend break in 1989. This preceded the 
implementation of NAFTA by some five years. Neither can it be attributed to 
expectations that NAFTA would come into existence as the earliest indications of this 
were from leaked press reports in 2000 (Graham and Wada, 2000). The true catalyst 
for the marked increases in inward FDI would seem to be the dramatic policy 
reorientation forced upon Mexico in 1985 due to its sovereign debt crisis. This crisis 
forced Mexico to stop pursuing import-substitution industrialisation and instead 
liberalise trade and investment. The apparent success of this in attracting FDI 
emphasises how important a conducive environment is to attracting investors. It also 
offers a possible explanation for our inability to detect a positive NAFTA (‘insider’) 
effect on FDI in the empirical work of Chapter 3: it is not NAFTA that has led to 
increased FDI, but rather the economic liberalisation undertaken by Mexico nearly a 
decade earlier.
45 Sachs and Warner (1995) give 1986 as the date of economic liberalisation in Mexico. Liberalisation 
seems to have had a marked effect both in increasing the volume of inward FDI and in diversifying its 
sources.
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This is not to say that the formation of NAFTA has not had an impact on FDI. The 
gateway to the US that Mexico has provided because of the provisions of NAFTA has 
undoubtedly attracted European and Japanese investors. This is supported by the 
finding in Chapter 3 that NAFTA has resulted in greater FDI inflows from ‘outsiders’ 
to ‘insiders’.
An analysis of the determinants of US FDI to Mexico indicated that the ownership 
advantages of US multinationals (e.g. superior technology, advanced management 
practices etc) together with Mexican location advantages seem to explain the majority 
of FDI. Some limited evidence is reported suggesting that low Mexican unit labour 
costs have proved attractive.
Given the benefits that inward FDI is believed to confer to the host country (be it 
through spillovers, increased tax revenues, employment or exports), it is surprising 
that little, if  any, evidence is found to support this in our empirical work of section 
6.5. One possible explanation for this lack of evidence is that the issue has been 
tackled at too broad a level. Inward FDI has had a substantial spatial effect on the 
Mexican economy, resulting in agglomeration economies centred around Mexico city 
and along the US-Mexican border. What we may be detecting is the lack of 
geographical spillovers within Mexico from regions where FDI is located to the rest 
of the country. If the data enabled us to look at regional growth in specific areas then 
we may possibly detect a substantial positive effect of FDI on economic growth.
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It is important to be aware of the potential spatial discrepancies in the effects of FDI. 
While FDI may bring benefits for the host economy, it is quite possible that these 
benefits may only accrue to certain groups or regions. Policymakers must be careful 
to ensure that the benefits are spread as widely as possible. Only then will the full 
potential of free trade and investment be realised and a true supporting consensus be 
found.
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3. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS ON 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this section we report results from our empirical investigation into the effects of 
regional integration agreements on foreign direct investment. The analysis here builds on 
work by Balasubramanyam, Sapsford and Griffiths (2002), which analysed the effect of 
NAFTA and the EU on FDI using cross-section of data for 1995. Their initial findings 
suggested that the presence of a regional integration agreement (RIA) results in an 
autonomous increase in FDI flows between member countries (albeit offset by an 
enhancement in the negative effect of distance). Further empirical results, however, led 
them to conclude: “these apparent RIA effects evaporate, implying that it is economic 
characteristics of host and investing country...that accounts for the observed pattern of 
FDI flows” (p.480).
Despite a huge number of RIAs being in existence today, we choose to focus our 
investigation on the effects of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There are several reasons for this. Firstly, RIAs vary 
considerably in the depth of integration and cooperation they foster between members, 
and it would be misleading to assume that all such agreements are homogenous. By 
explicitly examining the EU and NAFTA we are able to draw meaningful conclusions 
that apply to specific agreements. Secondly, the EU and NAFTA are the most advanced 
RIAs in existence, incorporating both trade and investment measures (in addition to many 
other common policies - see earlier discussion of the EU and NAFTA in Chapter 2).
Given this, if RIAs do have an effect on FDI it would be reasonable to expect them to be 
most readily detected in the EU and NAFTA. Thirdly, between them, the members of the 
EU and NAFTA accounted for 61% of world FDI inflows and 84% of world FDI 
outflows in 2003 (WTO, World Development Indicators, online database). 
Concentrating on the effects of the EU and NAFTA therefore retains an element of clarity 
in the empirical analysis, while ensuring that the vast majority of FDI activity is 
accounted for.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: in section 2 we introduce our 
empirical model; section 3 discusses the data and summary statistics; we report our 
benchmark OLS estimates in section 4; in section 5 we extend the model and conduct a 
sensitivity analysis; alternative regression techniques are explored in section 6; we 
conclude in section 7.
3.2 EMPIRICAL MODEL
Our favoured empirical framework is the gravity model. We have discussed this model in 
depth in the preceding chapter, so we will merely reiterate the key points. The gravity 
model has been applied to many different areas of economics, but its most popular 
application is overwhelmingly in relation to international trade1. In more recent years, the 
similarities between trade and FDI (e.g. they are both influenced by distance, market size,
1 Anderson (1979) comments that the gravity model is “probably the most successful trade device of the 
last twenty-five years” (p. 106). Anderson was also the first to offer a theoretical justification for 
application of the model in relation to trade flows. Until then, the model had been a purely empirical 
device. Following Anderson several alternative theoretical justifications were offered, and the model (in 
respect of trade flows at least) now “rests on a sound theoretical footing”.
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income etc) have led a number of authors to successfully apply the gravity model to 
investment flows2.
The basic gravity model is defined as follows:
In FDIiJt = a 0 + A ln Yn + A ln Yjt + A ln Nu + A ln N jt + A ln dij + MiJt
where FDI from country i to country j  is a function of the incomes (Y) and populations 
(N) of both countries and the geographical distance (d) between them. In the usual way, 
the error term is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. It is not unusual 
to further augment the basic model with additional explanatory variables that are thought 
to influence the location of FDI. For example, dummy variables will often be included to 
account for a common language or common border effect. Such effects may go some 
way to explaining the “home-bias puzzle”, which was first stated by McCallum (1995) 
who found (using Canadian data) that the measured effect of national borders was too 
large to be accounted for solely by border-related trade barriers.
Obviously, our model will also include variables to allow us to estimate the effect of 
integration agreements on FDI. This is achieved initially with a series of simple dummy 
variables. The first one, RIAijh takes the value of 1 if both the source and host country are 
in the same RIA (i.e. either both in NAFTA or both in the EU), and 0 otherwise. This 
dummy variable therefore makes the implicit assumption that the EU and NAFTA have
2 In addition to direct investment flows, the gravity model has also been applied to portfolio flows (see for 
example Portes and Rey (2002).
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exactly the same impact on FDI flows. A second dummy variable, EUijt, has the value of 
unity when both countries are members of the EU, and zero otherwise. A similar 
variable, NAFTAijh is constructed for NAFTA.
Later in the chapter we will construct further dummy variables to examine the potential 
effects of integration on FDI flows from ‘insiders’ to ‘outsiders’ and vice-versa. This 
should help us shed some light on the issue of FDI creation and diversion. We will also 
introduce a number of additional explanatory variables as part of our sensitivity analysis 
(e.g. internet usage and urbanisation in the home and host countries) to test whether our 
results are reliant on model specification.
3.2.1 Data and Summary Statistics
We have constructed a data set with 13 home (/) countries and 48 host (/) countries for the 
period 1992 to 2003. With a complete dataset this would allow for a total of 8,112 
observations (i x j  x t = 13 x 48 x 13). However, as with all studies on this topic, the size 
(longitudinal and latitudinal) of the data set has been restricted due to data availability for 
the dependent variable (data for the majority of the explanatory variables is readily 
available for longer time periods and for a greater cross-section of countries). Table 3.1 
reports some summary statistics for the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
that form the basic gravity model. Table 3.2 reports the mean values of the variables for 
each year.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for the Entire Data Set





FDIijt US$ billion 4414 0.88 4.1 -27.4 150
Yit US$ billion 5,048 1,700 2,590 89 10,300
Yj< US$ billion 5,033 633 1,480 6.3 10,300
Nit Million 5,048 62 77 4.3 291
Nj, Million 5,013 97 239 0.26 1,290
dij km 4,990 5,841 4,631 173 19,400
Sources: FDI data is taken from the Eurostat New Cronos database and the OECD; GDP and population 
data is from the World Development Indicators online database; distance is the great circle distance 
between capital cities (taken from www.wcrl.ars.usdagov).


















1992 295 0.37 1,400 650 61 90 5,479
1993 325 0.46 1,500 552 64 99 5,442
1994 352 0.49 1,440 634 60 102 5,382
1995 339 0.64 1,460 660 60 108 5,514
1996 395 0.64 1,660 611 64 106 5,770
1997 378 0.79 1,670 111 63 106 5,699
1998 369 1.29 1,750 731 65 106 5,611
1999 292 2.19 1,900 797 70 98 5,448
2000 395 1.68 1,790 621 60 90 5,983
2001 407 0.90 1,800 629 60 91 6,133
2002 435 0.61 1,820 454 60 88 6,161
2003 432 0.63 1,860 657 61 93 5,923
Sources: FDI data is taken from the Eurostat New Cronos database and the OECD; GDP and population 
data is from the World Development Indicators online database; distance is the great circle distance 
between capital cities (taken from www.wcrl.ars.usdagov).
109
Data on FDI flows has been primarily sourced from the Eurostat New Cronos database. 
Data from the OECD has been used to cross-check the Eurostat data for consistency. FDI 
data from Eurostat and the OECD is in nominal terms, so it has been deflated by each 
country’s GDP deflator to arrive at FDI in constant 2000 US dollars. The GDP deflator 
series were taken from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) online 
database3. The source countries have been chosen according to data availability and 
quality, and for these reasons are restricted solely to developed countries. The 48 host 
countries include both developed and developing countries (see Table 3.3 for a complete 
list of countries represented in the data).
The mean FDI flow for the entire data set is US$0.88 billion. The standard deviation is 
quite large at $4.1 billion, indicating that there is significant variability between countries 
(and through time) in the size of FDI flows. The minimum FDI value is -$27.4 billion 
and the maximum is $150 billion4.
3 OECD data is also reported in domestic currency, so data from this source was converted into US dollars 
at mid-year exchange rates. The choice of mid-year exchange rates as opposed to end-year or some other 
point is somewhat arbitrary. A further and potentially more problematic issue with exchange rates is that 
they do not take into account differences in prices levels between countries. Therefore, because of the 
significant appreciation of the US$ during the 1990s, converted FDI data from the OECD may 
underestimate the real value of FDI outflows from non-US countries. Fortunately, the Eurostat data has 
been converted at purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. This method should take into account 
variations in the price level across countries when converting values into US$. For further information on 
the calculation and use of PPP exchange rates see “Eurostat -  OECD Methodological Manual on 
Purchasing Power Parities”, 2005. Given that we used the OECD data to cross-check the Eurostat data, 
where there is a discrepancy in values that appears to have arisen due to the difference in exchange rate 
methodology, we have chosen to retain the Eurostat data.
4 A negative value indicates disinvestment. This does not mean that outflows have exceeded inflows, rather 
that inflows, in themselves, have been negative (either due to the dissolution of previous investments, or 
significant repatriation of profits etc).
110
Table 3.3 Countries Represented in the Dataset
Country Home Host Country Home Host
Argentina 4 Japan 4
Australia 4 Korea 4
Austria 4 4 Malaysia 4
Belgium / Luxembourg 4 4 Mexico 4
Brazil 4 Morocco 4
Bulgaria 4 Netherlands 4 4
Canada 4 New Zealand 4
Chile 4 Norway 4 4
China 4 Philippines 4
Colombia 4 Poland 4
Denmark 4 4 Portugal 4
Egypt 4 Romania 4
Finland 4 4 Singapore 4
France 4 4 South Africa 4
Germany 4 4 Spain 4 4
Greece 4 Sweden 4 4
Hong Kong 4 Switzerland 4
Hungary 4 Thailand 4
Iceland 4 Turkey 4
India 4 United Kingdom 4 4
Indonesia 4 United States 4 4
Ireland 4 Uruguay 4
Israel 4 Venezuela 4
Italy 4 4
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Table 3.2 reports mean values for the dependent and independent variables for individual 
years. As the dataset is unbalanced we must be careful in comparing the values across 
time. For example, the mean FDI flow apparently jumps significantly between 1998 and 
1999. While this may be a true reflection of the trend, it is important to note that the 
number of observations is substantially lower for 1999 than for other years, and this may 
be the cause of the inflated figure. As we would expect from our discussion of world FDI 
trends in Chapter 2, the mean FDI flow increases from 1992 to 1999, and then begins to 
fall back thereafter.
Figure 3.1 plots total FDI outflows (1992 to 2003) for our sample dataset, developed 
countries, and the world6. It is evident that our sample is representative of the trend in 
both world and developed-country outflows. Furthermore, our dataset accounts for a 
significant percentage of total world flows (the average percentage coverage across years 
is 59% of total world outflows and 67% of total developed country outflows).
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in constant 2000 US dollars is used for the income 
variables. Data is taken from the WDI online database. Table 3.1 reports that the mean 
value for Yit across the entire data set is $1.7 trillion. This is significantly higher than that 
for YJh which has a mean value of $0.63 trillion. This is to be expected given that the 
source countries include only developed countries, whereas the host countries include 
both developed and developing nations. This is also reflected in the standard deviations,
6 FDI outflows for developed countries and the ‘world’ were taken from the World Development Indicators 
online database.
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with that for YJt being relatively greater than that for Yit. The minimum value for Yit is $89 
billion (for Belgium-Luxembourg) and the maximum is $10.3 trillion (the US). The 
minimum value for YJt is just $6.3 billion (for Iceland), with the US again occupying the 
maximum value of $10.3 trillion. Table 3.2 shows that Yit has generally increased steadily 
over the sample period (remember, however, that the panel is unbalanced and the source 
countries have not remained constant throughout). The pattern for Yjt through time has 
been less clear. There is a significant fall in the mean value of YJt between 1999 and 2000 
(from $797 to $621 billion), which is most probably a reflection of a greater number of 
host countries being included in the sample post-2000 (due to improvements in data 
availability). Notice also that this has resulted in an increase in the number of 
observations for the years 2000 onwards.
Population data was also taken from the WDI online database. The sample mean for 
source-country population is 62 million with a standard deviation of 77 million. The host 
country mean is 97 million with a standard deviation of 239 million. The higher mean 
value of Njt also reflects the high populations of a number of developing countries (e.g. 
China, India, Indonesia, Brazil etc). The minimum and maximum values for Nu are 4.3 
million (Norway) and 291 million (US). The minimum and maximum for Njt are 260,000 
(Iceland) and 1.3 billion (China). As we would expect for population variables over a 
relatively short sample period, there is little fluctuation in the mean values of Nit and Njt 
across years. The decrease in the later years for the mean of Njt is again a reflection of 
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Distance is measured as the great circle distance, in kilometres, between the capital cities 
of the source and host countries7. For any given pair of countries (source-host, ij) the 
distance variable will obviously remain constant throughout time. Changes in the mean 
distance in Table 3.2 therefore reflect differences in the country-pairs across years. The 
average distance between investor and host for the whole data set is 5,841km. The 
standard deviation is relatively large at 4,631km reflecting that whilst many pairs are 
geographically proximate, others are separated by significant distance. This is reflected 
in the minimum and maximum values of 173km and 19,400km.
Table 3.4 gives a breakdown of the regional integration agreement dummy variables. For 
the sample as a whole, a quarter of the observations are for country-pairs in a mutual RIA. 
The EU overwhelmingly accounts for the majority of these observations, as the NAFTAijt 
dummy variable only takes the value of one when the source country is the US and the 
host is either Canada or Mexico8. The US is the only member of NAFTA included in the 
sample of investor (/) countries due to data availability and reliability. Notice that the 
number of RIA observations (i.e. where RIAW = 1) jumps considerably between 1994 and 
1995. This is due to the entry of Sweden, Austria and Finland into the EU at the 
beginning of 1995. There is a general decline in the number of RIA (and EU) 
observations from 1999 onwards due to missing data for some of the European Union 
countries.
7 Great circle distance is the shortest distance between any two points measured along a path on the surface 
of the Earth. Data taken from www.wcrl.ars.usda.gov.
8 The NAFTAij, also only takes the value of one for years 1994 onwards as NAFTA came into effect on 1 
January 1994.
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Table 3.4 Regional Integration Agreement Dummy Variables
Year RIAijt EUy, NAFTAij t
ones zeros ones zeros ones zeros
whole sample 978 2,906 958 2,926 20 3,864
1992 44 251 44 251 0 295
1993 54 271 54 271 0 325
1994 59 293 57 295 2 350
1995 99 240 97 242 2 337
1996 105 288 103 290 2 391
1997 105 271 103 273 2 374
1998 102 260 100 262 2 360
1999 94 185 92 187 2 277
2000 82 230 80 232 2 310
2001 85 222 83 224 2 305
2002 79 200 77 202 2 277
2003 70 195 68 197 2 263
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3.2.2 Benchmark OLS Estimates
We begin by estimating the basic gravity model with ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
ascertain whether our data set performs as expected and so that we have benchmark 
estimates to compare against later results from more sophisticated empirical techniques.
The coefficients on the income variables are both expected to be positive. This is the 
‘gravity effect’ on inter-country interactions. The population coefficients are both 
expected to be negative because for a given level of income, a larger population results in 
lower per capita income. Lower per capita income in the investor country is likely to 
imply less FDI to invest to begin with, and lower per capita income in the host suggests a 
less affluent country and so the “market seeking” motive for FDI is less intense9. Note 
that many studies introduce per capita GDP as a single gravity variable (instead of GDP 
and population separately). The methods are equivalent and equally valid. Geographical 
distance can be expected to increase the cost of FDI (both of the initial investment and 
ongoing monitoring costs), so we expect a negative coefficient on the distance variable10. 
As time progresses and the costs of international communications and travel fall, we 
would expect the absolute value of the distance coefficient to decrease -  it will be 
interesting to observe whether this effect occurs in our data set. As the model is being 
estimated in log-linear form, the slope coefficients are to be interpreted as elasticities (or 
semi-elasticities for the dummy variables).
9 Hamilton and Winters (1992) suggest that population is a proxy for the physical size of a country and that 
larger source countries have less need to export and larger host countries are more self sufficient and thus 
have less need to import. An analogous argument is applicable to foreign investment.
10 A strict ‘Newtonian’ interpretation would imply a coefficient on the distance variable o f -2.
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Equation 3.1 (see Table 3.5) shows that the basic gravity model performs well with our 
dataset, with nearly half of the variability in the dependent variable explained by 
variability in incomes, populations and distance. The signs on all of the explanatory 
variables are as expected. The negative coefficients on the population variables suggest 
that for a given level of income a higher population translates into lower per capita 
income which lessens the ‘supply’ of FDI from the home country perspective and reduces 
FDI ‘demand’ from the host country perspective. All of the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Though we hesitate to interpret the magnitude of the 
coefficients literally, the coefficient on Yu implies that a one percent increase in the GDP 
of the investor country leads to a 2.24% increase in FDI outflows from that country (FDI 
is therefore income elastic with respect to the home country). Likewise, the coefficient 
on Yj, implies that a one percent increase in the GDP of the host country leads to a 0.86% 
increase in inflows of FDI to that country (so FDI is income elastic with respect to the 
source country, but income inelastic with respect to the host country). The coefficient on 
Nit implies that a one percent increase in the population of the investing country results in 
a 1.43% decrease in FDI outflows, all else being equal. The Njt coefficient suggests that a 
one percent increase in host country population would lead to a reduction in FDI inflows 
of 0.25%. Finally, the distance coefficient implies that a one percent increase in distance 
between investor and host reduces FDI by 0.64%.
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Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDI flows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t-ratios.
In equation 3.2 we include the RIAy variable as an intercept dummy. As discussed above, 
this variable is defined to take the value of unity when the investor and host countries are 
both members of a common RIA (either the EU or NAFTA). The inclusion of the 
integration intercept dummy has little effect on the standard gravity variables -  they all 
remain statistically significant at the 1% level and are similar in magnitude to equation 
3.1. The coefficient on RIAy is statistically significant at the 1% level. The positive 
coefficient suggests that FDI flows between members of an RIA are higher, all else being 
equal, than flows between two countries that are not members of a common integration 
agreement. Specifically, the value of the coefficient implies that FDI flows between 
‘insiders’ are 60% greater than flows between ‘outsiders’ (since e°'46= 1.60).
As the EU and NAFTA are both regional integration agreements (i.e. agreements 
between geographically proximate countries) it is possible that the RIA dummy is picking 
up border effects in addition to integration effects11. If this is the case, the coefficient on 
the RIA dummy in equation 3.2 may be misleadingly large. To try to account for this 
possibility we include a common border dummy in equation 3.3. If the border dummy is 
significant it should pick up any proximity effects that are present, leaving the RIA 
dummy to more accurately estimate the pure integration effect. The common border 
dummy, bordery, is defined to equal unity when the investor and host countries share a 
common border12.
11 Many of the EU members share a common border and the US shares a common border with both of the 
other NAFTA members (Canada and Mexico).
12 Across the entire data set, the common border dummy takes the value of unity for 335 country-pair 
observations (and has a zero value 3,549 times).
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Equation 3.3 also incorporates a common language intercept dummy which is defined as 
unity when the investor and host share a common language and zero otherwise13. The 
benefits to the investor of a common language are likely to be significant given that the 
entity established through a direct investment will undoubtedly require some form of 
ongoing monitoring from the parent company throughout the lifetime of the investment. 
A common language is therefore likely to significantly reduce FDI-related costs.
The results in Table 3.5 reveal that the coefficient on the border dummy is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Its estimated coefficient of 0.31 implies that contiguous 
countries invest more in each other than countries that do not share a common border. 
The common language dummy is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
estimated coefficient of 1.29 implies that FDI flows between countries that share a 
common language are 372% the magnitude of flows between countries that have different 
languages. This seems implausibly high, even when we take into account that the 
common language dummy is probably also accounting to some extent for other effects, 
such as similarity in institutions and legal framework, colonial ties etc. It would be 
interesting to compare the size of this coefficient with that for a common language 
dummy in a gravity model of exports. This is something we will do in the following 
chapter.
Contrary to our suspicion that the RIAijt dummy in equation 1.2 might be artificially high 
due to the inclusion of a spurious border effect, following the inclusion of the additional
13 The common language dummy (langy) has the value of unity (zero) for 318 (3,566) observations. Given 
that the principal language of many developing countries is a product of their colonial roots, the common 
language dummy may, to some extent, be picking up the effect of colonial ties.
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dummy variables in equation 3.3, the coefficient on RIAyt has actually increased in value 
and become more statistically significant. The estimated effect is now 70% compared 
with 60% previously.
Thus far we have imposed the restriction that the EU and NAFTA have an identical 
integration effect. In equation 3.4 we introduce separate integration variables for the EU 
and NAFTA, therefore permitting them to have differing effects on the dependent 
variable. The EUyt variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and has a value of 
0.54, which is very similar to the coefficient for the combined integration dummy in 
equation 3.3. Perhaps this is not surprising given that the EU accounts for the vast 
majority of the observations between ‘insiders’. The coefficient on the NAFTA dummy 
is not statistically significant. Judging solely from the results reported in Table 3.5, we 
would conclude that the EU stimulates FDI between members but NAFTA does not. 
However, given that there are only 20 NAFTA ‘insider’ flows across the entire dataset, 
we must be careful of concluding that NAFTA does not have an influence on FDI.
Having presented our initial benchmark OLS results we now proceed by conducting a 
sensitivity analysis to ascertain whether our findings are dependent on the inclusion or 




The results reported in Table 3.5 show that the basic gravity model, when applied to our 
dataset, explains 46% of the variability in the dependent variable. When integration and 
common language dummies are also included this rises to 50%. This still leaves 50% of 
the variability in the dependent variable unexplained by our model. It is possible that this 
unexplained element could be biasing the coefficients on the gravity and/or the dummy 
variables due to the absence of other determinants from the model. In this section we 
discuss the regression results from various specifications of the gravity model that have 
been augmented to include a range of additional explanatory variables that might have an 
impact on FDI flows.
Table 3.6 tabulates the summary statistics for the additional explanatory variables that we 
introduce into a number of ‘augmented’ gravity equations. With the exception of the 
Corruptions Perception Index (CPI) and Unit Labour Cost (ULC), the data for all of the 
variables was derived from the WDI online database. Some of the variables suffer from a 
reduced number of observations (i.e. CPIj, ULCj, EEj, Internety). As the ‘missing 
observations’ will typically be for the Tow-income’ countries, inclusion of these variables 
in a regression will result in the inclusion of fewer developing countries compared with 
the equations reported in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.6 Summary Statistics for Additional Explanatory Variables (1992 -  2003)
Explanatory




Growthj % 3884 2.42 3.27 -14.3 12.8
Pj,<-i % 3877 20.9 143.8 -3.96 2075.9
CPIj Score 1 - 10 2850 6.18 2.43 1.7 10
ULCj US$ 2418 0.65 0.27 0.09 1.5
EEj % 3340 90.4 4.99 72.9 97.7
Urbanj % 3884 69.6 18.2 26.0 100
Internetj Number of users 3547 96.2 136.5 0.001 647.9
Notes: Income Growthj is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP; P  is the lagged (one period) 
inflation rate; CPIj is the Corruptions Perceptions Index score; ULCj is the unit labour cost; EEj is the 
electricity transmission efficiency; Urbanj is the percentage of the population living in urban areas; and 
Internetj is the number of internet users per thousand population. All variables refer to the host country.
Sources: All data is from the World Development Indicators online database, with the exception of CPIj 
(taken from Transparency International) and ULCj (taken from the International Labour Organisation’s 
K1LM database).
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The first variable in the table, Income Growthj, is the annual per capita GDP growth of 
the host country. The mean value across all host countries and across all years is 2.42% 
with a standard deviation of 3.27%. There is a substantial gap between the minimum (- 
14.3%) and maximum (12.8%) values. A high rate of income growth in the host country 
should prove attractive to multinationals looking to exploit fast-growing markets, so we 
expect the coefficient on the income growth variable to be positive.
Pj,t-i is the lagged (one year) inflation rate in the host country. The mean value is very 
high (certainly compared to what we would consider normal in developed/industrialised 
countries), largely due to some very high observations for a handful of countries (the 
maximum value is 2076%, for Brazil, 1995)14. Although changes in the inflation rate 
foster uncertainty, and rapidly rising inflation in a host country is likely to discourage 
investment, steady inflation is not likely to discourage FDI. Furthermore, disinflation is 
likely to act as a deterrent to investment as it means prices will be falling. It is therefore 
difficult a priori to predict the sign on this variable15.
The Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI), compiled by Transparency International, scores 
countries according to the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians. It is a composite index based on a number of surveys that reflect 
the views of business people and analysts from around the world, including experts who 
are resident in the country of interest. Countries are scored from 1 to 10 with a higher 
number indicating less corruption. The index was initiated in 1995, so we are missing
14 In 1990 the inflation rate in Brazil was a record 2,938% (www.nationsencyclopedia.com).
15 It also suggests that inflation should perhaps be included in the model in a polynomial form (although 
when this was performed, the polynomial inflation coefficient was not statistically significant).
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observations for all countries in years 1992, 1993 and 1994. Neither does the index offer 
complete coverage of our sample of host countries (although its coverage improves with 
each year).
In its inaugural year, the CPI scored 41 countries based on seven surveys. In 2003, scores 
were reported for 133 countries based on seventeen surveys16. Scores are therefore 
susceptible over time to changes in the data and methodology used to compile the index 
and this should be remembered when interpreting the coefficient on this variable. 
Corruption in the host country is obviously a deterrent to foreign investors and so we 
expect the coefficient to be positive (because a higher score indicates a less corrupt 
economy).
Unit Labour Cost (ULC) data it taken from the ILO’s KILM database, and is the labour 
compensation per unit of output in 1990 US dollars. The mean value across all host 
countries and across all years in our dataset is $0.65 with a standard deviation of $0.27. 
The minimum and maximum values are $0.09 and $1.5. Low unit labour costs in the host 
country should attract “resource-seeking” FDI from multinationals looking to locate 
production stages in their lowest cost location. We therefore expect the coefficient on 
ULCj to be negative.
16 Survey sources for the 2003 index include: the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic 
Forum; the World Competitiveness Yearbook from the Institute for Management Development in 
Switzerland; the Survey of Middle Easter Businesspeople from Information International; the World 
Business Environment Survey from the World Bank; Country Risk Service and Country Intelligence reports 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit; the Nations in Transit survey from Freedom House; Risk Ratings by 
the World Markets Research Centre; the State Capacity Survey from Columbia University; the Asian 
Intelligence Issue from the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy; the Opacity Index from 
PricewaterhouseCoopers; a corruption survey by Gallup International on behalf of Transparency 
International; and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey by the World Bank and 
EBRD.
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EEj captures the electricity transmission efficiency of the host country. It is derived from 
WDI data on electric power transmission and distribution losses as a percentage of 
electricity output17. The mean value is 90.4% with a standard deviation of 5%. Minimum 
and maximum values are 72.9% and 97.7%. This variable is intended to act as a proxy 
for infrastructure sophistication in the host country (i.e. quality of infrastructure as 
opposed to quantity), something potential investors should have regard to. We therefore 
expect the coefficient on EEj to be positive.
Urbanj is a host-country measure of the percentage of the total population in urbanised 
areas. It is derived from the WDI measure of the percentage of the total population in 
rural areas (Urbanj = 100 -  Rural]). The mean value for the variable in our dataset is 
69.6% with a standard deviation of 18.2%. The minimum value is 26% while the 
maximum is 100% (reflecting the presence in the list of host countries of the city-states 
Singapore and Hong Kong). A high level of urbanisation in the host country should 
reduce market access costs and distribution costs for firms and is therefore likely to prove 
attractive to foreign investors (at least for those undertaking “market-seeking FDI”). 
However, a number of countries that are commonly believed to attract FDI due to low 
labour costs (or, more correctly, low unit labour costs) also have large rural populations 
(e.g. India, China etc), and this may have a negative influence on the coefficient of 
Urbanj. The variable may also act as a more general measure of the economic 
development of the host (because countries become more urbanised as they become more




Internetj is taken from the WDI and is the number of internet connections per thousand 
population in the host country. The mean value is 96.2 and the standard deviation is 
136.5. There is a significant discrepancy between the minimum and maximum values of 
0.001 and 647.9. This variable is intended to capture the general level of technological 
sophistication of the host economy and its citizens, and as such we would expect the
i o
coefficient to be positive .
The additional explanatory variables we have discussed above could be added in many 
different combinations to allow us to estimate literally hundreds of different regression 
equations. To keep the analysis manageable, and to avoid overly complicating the 
discussion, we introduce each additional explanatory variable in isolation from the other 
additional explanatory variables. Table 3.7 reports the results for these regressions. In 
each instance we are adding an additional explanatory variable to our favoured 
specification from Table 3.5 - equation 3.4 (the basic gravity model with the EU, 
NAFTA, common language and border dummy variables).
In equation 3.5 we include the income growth of the host country variable. This has little 
impact on either the magnitude or the statistical significance of the other variables. 
Income growth is statistically significant, however, and the positive coefficient suggests 
that an increase in the rate of per capita income growth in the host country encourages
18 An alternative proxy variable would be the number of internet service providers (ISPs) per thousand 
population.
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greater inflows of FDI than would otherwise be the case, all else being equal.
The lagged inflation rate in the host country is included in equation 3.6. Again it has very 
little impact on the other variables, with all coefficients retaining their statistical 
significance and approximate magnitude. Although the coefficient is positive, it is not 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Furthermore, its inclusion does not 
improve the explanatory power of the regression. In alternative specifications (not 
reported here for brevity) we included the current inflation rate and the inflation rate 
lagged two periods. The results were similar to those reported in equation 3.6, with 
neither specification impacting the other variables or proving statistically significant.
The inclusion of the CPI variable has a more noticeable impact on the other variables. 
The absolute magnitude of all of the gravity variables (except distance) falls slightly. In 
each case the t-ratio also falls, although all gravity variables remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the CPI variable contains some information 
that was originally being picked up by the gravity variables. CPIj is positive, as 
predicted, but is not statistically significant.
Our real interest, of course, is in the effect on the integration dummies. The inclusion of 
CPIj results in a significant reduction in the magnitude of the EU dummy parameter 
estimate and a decrease in its statistical significance to the 2% level. The NAFTA 
dummy remains statistically insignificant. Prima facie this would seem to suggest that 
the EU does not provide as great a stimulus to internal FDI as was suggested by the 
results of equation 3.4. However, notice that the number of observations used in the
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estimation of equation 3.7 is significantly lower than the number used in equation 3.4.
CPI data is missing for all observations for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994, and for many 
of the observations in the remaining years19. We need to investigate whether it is this 
reduction in observations, rather than the inclusion of the CPI variable per se, that is 
resulting in the loss of significance of the EU dummy. In order to do this we re-estimate 
equation 3.4 restricting the observations to those for which CPI data exists. The results 
are reported as 3.13 in Table 3.7.
The results of equation 3.13 are very similar to those of equation 3.7, particularly the 
effect on the EU dummy. This indicates that the drop in magnitude and significance of 
the EU dummy is not due to the inclusion of the CPI variable itself, but rather the 
resultant loss of observations. Furthermore, this implies that the strong integration effect 
found for the EU in the entire dataset (equation 3.4) is weakened when certain 
observations are removed. Note however, that the gravity variables are all highly 
statistically (and economically) significant in equation 3.13. This begs the question 
whether it is the loss of the observations from years 1992, 1993 and 1994, or the biasing 
of the sample towards the more developed countries (i.e. those for which CPI data exists) 
that is causing this effect. We will explore this issue in greater depth in a subsequent 
section when we come to disaggregate the dataset by years.
19 CPI data is missing for some countries between the years 1995 to 2003 because of the coverage of the 
constituent surveys on which the CPI is based. Missing values will typically be for the smaller, less 
developed countries. Inclusion of CPI will therefore bias the sample towards observations in which the host 
country has a higher GDP per capita.
130
Table 3.7 Regression Results for Sensitivity Analysis with Additional Explanatory Variables























































































































































































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log o f FDI flows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t~ ratios.
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Before moving on, we should note one interesting difference between equation 3.13 and
3.7. The coefficient on host population, Nj, in equation 3.13 has approximately the same 
value and statistical significance as in equation 3.4 (which is the same estimating 
equation, but includes all available observations), but the same coefficient in equation 3.7 
has dropped in value and statistical significance. This indicates that the CPI variable is 
incorporating some information that was previously captured by the host population 
variable. Furthermore, it suggests that countries with a high population are more corrupt
91(the correlation between host population and the CPI variable is -0.36) .
Equation 3.8 incorporates the unit labour cost (ULC) in the host country as an additional 
explanatory variable. As this data was not available for the entire dataset, the regression 
is limited to 2,418 observations. The inclusion of ULCj has little effect on either of the 
integration dummies (EUyt remains statistically significant and NAFTAy remains 
insignificant). There is also limited effect on the other explanatory variables, although 
the coefficient on distance rises to 0.70 and the coefficient on host population rises in 
absolute magnitude. The ULC coefficient itself has the expected sign (-0.82, significant 
at the 1% level), implying that a 1% increase in the average ULC of the host country 
results in a 0.82% decrease in FDI flows. This finding provides support for the
21 Recall that a lower CPI value indicates a more corrupt country, so the negative correlation does confirm 
that countries that have a larger population tend to be more corrupt. We are unable, however, to make any 
statement regarding causality. While a larger population may provide a more accommodating environment 
for corruption, it is perhaps more likely that the correlation is spurious and there is no causality between 
population and corruption (with both variables independently correlated to a third variable, such as income 
per capita).
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efficiency-seeking motivation for FDI.
Equation 3.9 includes a measure of electricity efficiency in the host country. Curiously 
the coefficient on the EEj variable is negative (and statistically significant at the 1% 
level), which was not the expected sign. This implies that higher electricity efficiency in 
the host country results in a decrease in FDI inflows. We introduced EEj as a potential 
proxy for the sophistication of infrastructure in the host country, but perhaps this result 
indicates that this is not the case22. A low value for EEj may indicate that there are 
attractive investment opportunities within the infrastructure sector of the host country. 
Given that such investments can be sizeable, the negative correlation may be a reflection 
that FDI is attracted to countries where there is greater potential to upgrade the existing 
stock of infrastructure. In any case, the inclusion of the EEj variable has little effect on 
the other explanatory variables.
The percentage of the total population in the host country living in urban areas is included 
in equation 3.10. This coefficient has the expected positive sign and is significant at the 
1% level. Its inclusion has little effect on the EUjt dummy and the NAFTAiJt coefficient 
continues to be statistically insignificant. There is little effect on the other explanatory 
variables, except for host income and population. The population variable in particular is 
significantly affected by the inclusion of the urbanisation variable (it increases from a 
value o f -0.18 and high statistical significance in equation 3.4 to a value o f -0.01 and not 
statistically significant in equation 3.10). However, the explanation for this is clear when
22 In a search for alternative infrastructure measures, we also ran regressions with the number of fixed and 
mobile telephone lines per thousand population and the number of personal computers per thousand 
population (in place of EEJ).
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we observe that the correlation coefficient between urbanisation and population is -0.51.
Equation 3.11 in Table 3.7 presents the results for the inclusion of the internetj variable. 
This variable has the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. It also 
has little effect on the other explanatory variables.
Figure 3.2 plots the coefficients of the two integration dummies according to their 
estimated coefficients for the different model specifications reported in Table 3.7 (for 
equations 3.5 to 3.12). The figure highlights the fact that, with the exception of equation
3.7, the coefficient on the EU dummy is not very sensitive to the inclusion of a range of 
explanatory variables. Although the NAFTA dummy does not fluctuate significantly 
(except for its value in equation 3.8), it did not achieve statistical significance in any of 
the regression specifications reported in Table 3.7.
Figure 3.3 is similar to Figure 3.2, this time showing the sensitivity of the gravity 
variables to the inclusion of the range of additional explanatory variables. The chart 
illustrates that the majority of the coefficients have proved to be extremely stable across 
equations, varying within a small band throughout. The variables describing the host 
country (i.e. host income and population) have varied to a greater extent (particularly for 
equation 3.8), but this is not surprising given that a number of the additional explanatory 
variables are correlated with them to some extent.
Both the common language and common border dummies proved to be remarkably stable 
throughout the additional specifications.
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The additional explanatory variables have themselves proved to be statistically significant 
(with the exception of lagged inflation) and of the predicted sign (with the exception of 
EEJ). To summarise, they imply that FDI inflows are greater when the host country has 
higher per capita income growth; lower unit labour costs; and more internet connections 
per person. Although the level of perceived corruption and the extent of urbanisation 
appeared to be significant when included in the regression specification individually, they
2 3lost statistical significance when all variables were included together (equation 3.12) .
23 Note, due to missing observations for a number of the additional explanatory variables, including all of 
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3.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis — Specific Years
Due to restrictions in the number of observations available for the CPI variable, we were 
motivated to estimate a parsimonious model on a reduced dataset (equation 3.13). The 
results of this indicated that the positive integration effect of the EU reported for 
regressions on the entire data set may be significantly weakened. when certain 
observations are excluded due to missing values for CPI. In particular, lack of data for 
1992, 1993 and 1994 for the CPI variable indicated that the integration effects may break 
down when data is not included for the earlier years of the sample. Accordingly, we now 
conduct a sensitivity analysis on the dataset when it is disaggregated through time.
Table 3.8 reports the results when equation 3.4 is applied to the dataset for each year. 
The explanatory power of the model remains roughly constant throughout, with the 
adjusted-!?2 varying between 0.44 and 0.56. The gravity variables (and the common 
language variable) remain statistically significant throughout, though the estimated 
coefficients vary from year to year. Figure 3.4 illustrates the change in the estimated 
parameters of the gravity variables. The coefficients on InYj and InNj remain relatively 
stable, InYj varying between 0.69 and 1.00 and InNj varying between -0.05 and -0.34. 
The variation in the coefficients on the other gravity variables, however, is somewhat 
more pronounced.
It is striking that the coefficients on investor GDP and population are virtually mirror 
images of one another (see Figure 3.4). There is a similar pattern for host GDP and 
population. This suggests that it may be more appropriate to use the log of GDP per
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capita {In Y/Ni) rather than InYi and InNi separately. We have decided to continue with 
the conventional gravity model formulation here.
The apparent absence of a trend in the gravity variables suggests that there is no need to 
include time dummies in our regressions for the entire dataset (i.e. any increase in global 
FDI flows through time seems to be accounted for by the gravity variables). In order to 
be certain of this however, in Table 3.9 we report the results for equation 1.4 estimated 
with the inclusion of time dummies for the years 1993 to 2003 (a year dummy is not 
included for 1992 so this becomes the ‘base case’ against which we interpret the 
coefficient of the other year dummies).
Contrary to expectations, the majority of the year dummies are in fact statistically 
significant (see Table 3.10 below), although the inclusion of the year dummies has little 
effect on the gravity variables or the common language and border dummies. However, 
the magnitude of the EU dummy is slightly reduced (from 0.54 to 0.47).
Table 3.10 reports the coefficients of the year dummies included in equation 3.4b. All are 
statistically significant at the 5% level with the exception of 1993 and 2003 (which are 
not statistically significant). As we might expect from the discussion (in a previous 
chapter) of the trend in global FDI flows, the coefficient values tend to increase in value 
up to 1999 and then begin to decrease.
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Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDIflows between countries i and j. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t- ratios. Figures for the constant term are not reported.
Figure 3.4 Sensitivity of Gravity Variables to Longitudinal Disaggregation
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Having found year dummies to be statistically significant, they will be included (where 
relevant) in all future regressions.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the sensitivity of the integration dummies to longitudinal 
disaggregation of the dataset. Note that there are no values for the NAFTAyt dummy in 
1992 and 1993 as NAFTA had not yet been implemented. In the early years, the EUyt 
dummy is statistically significant and has a relatively high value (compared with its value 
in equation 1.4 for the entire dataset). However, from 1995 onwards the dummy tends to 
fall in magnitude and is in any case not statistically different from zero (with the 
exception of 1996 when it is significant at the 5% level). The NAFTAyt dummy does not 
reach statistical significance for any year.
These results imply that the finding of positive integration effects across the entire dataset 
(equation 3.4) is driven purely by the EU effect in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1996. This may 
be a fair or misleading representation of reality. If it is indeed a fair reflection then we 
need to consider why there is a positive effect on ‘insider’ FDI flows of the EU in the 
early years of our sample, but no effect in later years. Furthermore, why do we not find a 
corresponding positive effect due to the creation of NAFTA? If it is a misleading finding, 
then we need to investigate what may have caused it.
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Table 3.9 Equation 1.4 Re-estimated with the Inclusion of Year Dummies
3.4b 3.4
a
- 3 0 . 3 5 - 3 0 . 9 3
( 2 4 . 7 ) ( 2 6 . 4 )
In Yi 2 . 2 5
( 2 0 . 1 )
2 . 3 1
( 2 1 . 9 )
In Yj 0 . 7 8
( 2 8 . 8 )
0 . 7 8
( 2 8 . 8 )
In Ni - 1 . 5 1
( 1 2 . 9 )
- 1 . 5 7
( 1 4 . 2 )
InNj - 0 . 1 9
( 7 . 9 )
- 0 . 1 8
( 7 . 7 )
In dy - 0 . 5 1
( 1 5 . 3 )
- 0 . 5 0
( 1 4 . 8 )
EUy 0 . 4 7
( 5 . 9 )
0 . 5 4
( 6 . 8 )
NAFTAy - 0 . 1 7
( 0 . 4 5 )
- 0 . 1 1
( 0 . 2 8 )
Langy 1 . 3 1
( 1 3 . 2 )
1 . 3 0
( 1 3 . 0 )
Bordery 0 . 3 6
( 3 . 2 8 )
0 . 3 5
( 3 . 1 8 )
R 2 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 1
Obs. 3 , 8 8 4 3 , 8 8 4
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDIflows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t-ratios. Results for the year dummies included in equation 
1.4b are reported separately below (see Table 10). The results for equation 1.4 (without year dummies) are 
included for comparison.
Table 3.10 Coefficient on the Year Dummies for Equation 3.4b
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0 . 1 5 0.32 0 . 3 1 0 . 3 6 0 . 4 3 0 . 6 1 0 . 9 2 0 . 5 4 0 . 3 4 0 . 3 0 0 . 1 3
( 1 . 1 5 ) ( 2 . 5 8 ) ( 2 . 4 5 ) ( 2 . 8 8 ) ( 3 . 4 4 ) ( 4 . 8 2 ) ( 6 . 8 8 ) ( 4 . 1 1 ) ( 2 . 5 7 ) ( 2 . 1 8 ) ( 0 . 9 5 )
Notes: Figures are the estimated coefficients for the year dummies from equation 1.4. Figures in 
parentheses are absolute t-ratios.
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Let us first assume that the finding is not an accurate representation of reality. It is 
possible that the regressions for individual years do not provide sufficient observations to 
allow the integration dummies to be properly estimated. If this were the case, however, 
we would perhaps not expect the EUyt dummy to be significant for any individual years 
(or at least for the pattern of significance to be more random). Alternatively, the method 
of estimation may be flawed, and we will investigate this in a later section by considering 
random and flxed-effects models. It is also possible that the integration dummies should 
be properly introduced as slope effects, and we will also investigate this in a later section.
If the finding is in fact accurate, two likely explanations suggest themselves. Firstly, 
regional integration agreements will surely have an effect on other economic variables. 
For instance, the EU has gone far beyond simple trade measures (such as tariff 
reductions) by introducing common European institutions and laws -  factors that are 
likely to impact variables such as the CPI. To the extent that integration agreements 
influence FDI indirectly though their impact on other economic factors, we would not 
necessarily expect to pick up an integration effect by the inclusion of dummy variables in 
a regression equation24. Of course, if this were in fact the case, it is unlikely the 
integration dummies would have been significant in any of the regressions we have 
estimated. Furthermore, equations 3.14 to 3.25 do not include any of these ‘other 
economic factors’, and so even if integration effects were purely indirect it is likely the 
dummy variables would have picked up this effect in their absence.
24 For instance, by encouraging trade and migration between members, it is likely that the formation of the 
EU has contributed to rising income levels in its member states. As we have seen, higher GDP (of both 
source and host countries) results in greater FDI flows. Therefore, notwithstanding any direct effects that 
the EU may have had on foreign investment flows, it is probable that it has encouraged FDI indirectly. 
Such indirect effects will not be captured by the integration dummy while GDP is also present as an 
explanatory variable.
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Secondly, it is possible that integration agreements do influence flows of FDI, but that the 
impact is not consistent over time. Rather, the effect may manifest itself primarily in the 
early years of the integration agreement and then dissipate through time. This may be 
particularly true if RIAs have a significant signalling effect (i.e. they indicate to foreign 
firms that the host country is serious with regard to lowering trade and investment 
barriers). The implementation of an RIA will therefore be accompanied by increased FDI 
flows (compared with the quantity predicted by the standard gravity variables) in the 
early years, but perhaps as the RIA becomes more mature its effects become fully 
accounted for by the gravity variables and other macroeconomic factors. Evidence that 
NAFTA resulted in increased FDI flows to Mexico in years prior to its implementation 
(when it became known that discussions were taking place between the three prospective 
members) in 1994 offer some support for this theory (Griffiths and Sapsford, 2004). If 
this explanation holds any truth, we might expect to initially find an EU effect which 
decreased in magnitude over time. It does not explain, of course, why we have found no 
evidence of a NAFTA effect as our dataset includes observations before and during 
NAFTA’s existence25.
The completion of the Single European Market (SEM) in 1992 perhaps lends some 
support to the argument outlined above. Although efforts to reduce impediments to
25 It is possible that the formation of NAFTA resulted in pre-implementation effects on FDI flows that 
dissipated very rapidly resulting in no detectable effect on the NAFTA dummy post-implementation. To 
test for this possibility we created a pre-NAFTA dummy defined to take the value unity in 1992 and 1993 
for flows between NAFTA members (and zero otherwise). However, this dummy variable was not 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level when added to equation 3.4, implying that NAFTA did not 
result in an increase in FDI flows between ‘insiders’ prior to its implementation. This may seem contrary to 
the evidence reported from Griffiths & Sapsford (2004), but this study did not discount the possibility that 
the increased inflows to Mexico were from ‘ousiders’ (looking to exploit advantageous access to the US, 
and possibly Canadian, markets).
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internal European Union trade and investment still continue today, the major strides in 
this regard where made between 1985 and 1992. It is not unreasonable to therefore 
expect the greatest impact on FDI to have occurred during these years and for a limited 
number of years thereafter. As we move away from 1992, it may be that the positive 
effect of the EU on FDI becomes primarily captured within the standard gravity variables. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of availability of disaggregated FDI data prior to 1992, we are 
unable to investigate this possibility further by empirical means.
Before moving on to test the model using alternative regression techniques, it is 
interesting to briefly discuss the effect of distance, common language and common border 
variables on FDI flows. The coefficient on the common language dummy remained 
remarkably stable (and statistically significant) through time, varying in value between 
1.07 and 1.57. Furthermore, there appears to be no discernible pattern in the change in 
value over the years (i.e. we cannot say that a common language is becoming either more 
or less important in influencing FDI).
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The common border dummy variable did not demonstrate comparable consistency. The 
estimated coefficient fluctuates between 0.05 and 0.67 and is only statistically significant 
(at the 10% level) for years 1993, 1996 and 1998.
In earlier discussion, we suggested that the coefficient on the distance variable might be 
expected to decline through time as communication and other distance-related costs fell 
and hence became a less important determinant of FDI flows. However, Figure 3.6, 
which plots the estimated coefficient on the distance variable for equations 3.14 to 3.25, 
shows that the absolute value appears in fact to be increasing over time. This suggests 
that the distance-related costs of foreign investment (e.g. monitoring costs) are becoming 
an increasing deterrent to firms when deciding to undertake FDI. Rather surprisingly, 
geography appears to be becoming increasingly important despite the improvement in 
communications and the trend towards greater globalisation.
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3.2.5 Different Estimating Techniques: Fixed and Random Effects Models
Thus far, we have employed the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique to 
derive benchmark estimates for an augmented gravity model. Although this has produced 
statistically significant parameter estimates in many of the regressions reported, we 
cannot be certain that OLS provides optimal results. In particular, coefficient estimates 
derived using OLS may be subject to omitted variable bias26. Furthermore, Cheng and 
Wall (2002) demonstrate that OLS estimation of the gravity model may be susceptible to 
heterogeneity bias27.
The dataset we have constructed is derived from cross-section (country-pair) observations 
through time, which is known as a panel dataset (or cross-sectional time-series dataset). 
In fitting OLS regressions we are essentially pooling all of the observations and imposing 
the restrictions that there are no significant cross-section or temporal effects. By 
employing the panel structure (and allowing for the possibility of cross-section or 
temporal effects) it is sometimes possible to control for omitted variables (even if these 
variables cannot themselves be observed) by modelling changes in the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2002).
There are several types of panel data regression techniques, the most popular being fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models. The FE model allows for country-pair
26 Omitted variable bias may arise when there are one or more variables that have been omitted (either 
unintentionally or because they cannot be adequately measured or proxied) which have an effect on the 
dependent variable.
27 If observations on country-pairs are subject to effects not fully captured by the existing explanatory 
variables, and these effects are related to the existing variables, then OLS estimators will be biased.
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individual effects by estimating a separate intercept for each country-pair. As it requires 
the inclusion of a dummy variable for all (but one) of the country-pairs in the dataset this 
technique is demanding in terms of degrees of freedom28. The major limitation to this 
approach is that it is unable to provide an estimate of time invariant explanatory variables, 
as these variables are dropped following the required data transformation. The FE 
technique applied to the gravity model is therefore unable to provide an estimate of the 
effect of distance on FDI flows. Of more concern, given that our integration variables are 
largely time invariant the FE approach is likely to provide inefficient estimates.
The RE model does allow for estimation of time invariant explanatory variables. This 
model assumes that country-pair individual effects are random and can be incorporated 
into the error term. Although it typically provides more efficient estimates than the FE 
model (because it does not require the presence of dummy variables and so has more 
degrees of freedom available for estimation), it requires the assumption that the country- 
pair effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which is often not empirically 
the case (McPherson and Trumball, 2003).
3.2.5.1 Stata Estimation
Before proceeding to employ these different estimation techniques, let us first discuss the 
estimation approach employed. Thus far, using OLS to estimate our pooled dataset, we 
have assumed the following regression specification:
28 The use of dummy variables explains why the FE model is also known as the least squares dummy 
variable (LSDV) approach.
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y ijt= a  + P 'x ijt+eiJt [3.1]
In [3.1] eyt is a “well-behaved” error term with the usual properties (zero mean, 
uncorrelated with itself and x, and homoscedastic). However, it is possible that 
significant cross-section effects exist, implying that the regression equation should be 
correctly specified as:
yv =‘z + xttf i  + vvi+svi [3.2]
In [3.2] vyt is a country-pair-specific residual which may vary both between country-pairs 
and within country-pairs (i.e. through time). Such country-pair effects may result from 
the omission of explanatory variables, such as cultural or colonial ties . If [3.2] is 
indeed the correct specification, then OLS estimation of [3.1] will result in biased 
estimators (if vytis correlated with Xyt).
Whatever the properties of Vijt, we may take the temporal means to derive a third 
equation:
y is = a  + /3'xIJ+vIJ+£iJ [3.3]
29 To the extent that such ties encourage increased (or decreased) bilateral investment between certain 
countries (and assuming such an effect is not fully captured by the common language dummy), their 
omission could be a potential source for such an effect. Although it is likely that the impact of such ties 
will wane over time, it is not unreasonable to assume that their effect would be constant over the relatively 
short time horizon of our dataset.
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where y f = y„,/T„, xtJ = 'Z f y / T y , and £tj = Y , ,£v<lTij ■
Subtracting [3.3] from [3.2] removes the time invariant factors, leaving:
O s ,  -  y,i) = 0 , , ,  -  x,jW+ {ev, - Sy) [3.4]
Equations [3.2], [3.3] and [3.4] provide the basis for estimating (3 using the fixed and 
random effects panel techniques. Specifically, the FE model is equivalent to using OLS 
to estimate [3.4], and the RE model is equivalent to performing OLS on:
The Between Effects (BE) model is equivalent to using OLS to estimate equation [3.3]. 
As this model simply regresses the means of the explanatory variables against the mean 
values of the dependent variable, it discards all temporal information and is therefore 
rarely used in empirical studies. The BE model is required, however, to provide the 
estimated variance of vijt (&l)  and eijt {&]) which are required by Stata to derive the RE 
model estimators.
Ofy “ f y )  =  ( l -  ° ) a  +  (x ijt ~  d x i j ) P ' +  {C1 " 0 ) v ijt + ( £ iJt ~  e s i j ) } [3.5]
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3.2.5.2 Fixed Effects Model
The fixed effects model is equivalent to using OLS to estimate equation [3.4]. As it is 
based only on deviations from group (country-pair) means, fixed effects estimators are 
also known as within estimators. It is this property that allows the fixed effects model to 
return unbiased estimators even in the presence of significant cross-section effects (as 
time invariant factors are dropped from the model). The fixed effects model is popular 
because it does not require the same zero correlation assumption as the RE (and BE) 
model.
Applied to the basic gravity model, employing the fixed effects model is equivalent to 
estimating the following equation using OLS:
(In FDIijt -  In FDI-) = (In yit -  In ) #  + (In yjt -  In y} )/?2 + (In nit - ln n ;)/?3 + (\nnjt - In  rij)fiA
As discussed above, the distance variable is excluded because it does not vary across time 
(i.e. geographical distance is constant between each country-pair)30. The FE model is also 
likely to provide inefficient estimates of the integration effects because our integration 
dummy has limited temporal variance -  we must be conscious of this point when we 
come to interpret the FE results for the integration dummies.
30 An alternative distance measure, such as the average freight cost between countries, would be included in 
the fixed effects model as this measure would exhibit both cross-section and temporal variation.
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3.2.5.3 Between Effects Model
The between effects model is equivalent to using OLS to estimate equation [3.3]. As it is 
based solely on group means, this model excludes all temporal information and is 
therefore typically less efficient than the fixed effects or random effects models. The 
model also requires the same restrictive assumption as the RE model; that Vyt is 
uncorrelated with all explanatory variables.
Applied to the basic gravity model, utilising the between effects model is equivalent to 
estimating the following equation using OLS:
3.2.5.4 Random Effects Model
The random effects model is a weighted average of the estimates produced by the fixed 
effects and between effects model, with 6 determining the relative weighting applied:
In FDIi} = a  + J31lnyi + fi2 In y . + /?3ln ni + /?4ln n} + /?5ln dtj + vy + si}
Therefore, if the estimated variance of V j j t  ( &2U) is zero then 6 will equal zero and 
equation [3.2] may be estimated directly by OLS. If the estimated variance of %  {a])  is
zero then 6? will equal one and the fixed effects model will return all of the available 
information.
Applied to the basic gravity model, utilising the RE model is analogous to estimating the 
following equation by OLS:
(In FDIijt -  din FDI.) = (1 -  d)a + (In yit -  din y^f3x + (In yjt -  din ys )/?2 + (In nu -  din n. )/?3 
+(lnnjt -  d lnrij)^ + (IndiJt -  dlnd.)/35 + {(1 -  d)vijt + (sijt -  d s^}
3.2.5.5 Empirical Results
Table 3.11 reports the results for estimation of our dataset using the BE, FE and RE 
models (OLS results are also presented for comparison).
The BE model is estimated on country-pair group averages, which is reflected in the 
number of observations (groups) of only 517 (the average group size is 7.5). The relevant 
R2 is 0.64 which is somewhat higher than the R2 of 0.51 reported for the OLS regression. 
The F statistic tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are all jointly insignificant -  its value of F(8,508) = 122.19 leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis that our model is significant.
The reported coefficients for the BE model are very similar to those for the OLS 
regression, although they have higher standard errors. As with the pooled OLS model, 
the EU is found to have a positive effect on FDI flows between insiders, but the NAFTA
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dummy coefficient is not statistically different from zero. The standard gravity variables 
and common language dummy have the same sign (and similar magnitude) in the BE 
model as they do for the OLS results.
The results for the FE model are markedly different from the BE and pooled OLS model. 
Firstly, the relevant R2 is significantly lower at 0.14 which suggests that the FE model is 
inadequate for identifying the determinants of FDI flows between countries. The 
estimated coefficients are also substantially different. Neither the EU nor NAFTA 
integration dummies are statistically significant, but as discussed this is to be expected 
given that there is little temporal variation in either dummy variable. The distance and 
common language variables have been dropped by Stata because they exhibit no temporal 
variation and cannot therefore be estimated within the FE model. The F statistic, 
F(6,3361) = 89.23, indicates that the explanatory variables present in the FE specification 
are jointly significant.
The results for the RE model are similar to those for the BE and pooled OLS models. 
Their similarity to the BE model instead of the FE model would seem to suggest that most 
of the relevant information is contained between country-pairs and not within, and hence 
a low value for 6. However, the median value for 6 was in fact 0.70 (6 is not constant 
because the panel is unbalanced).
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Table 3.11 Panel Data Regression Results

































































































Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDI flows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
under the estimated coefficients are absolute t ratios (z statistics in the case of the RE results). *The figure 
reported for the RE model is the Wald test statistic, which is compared against the distribution.
The relevant R2 of 0.50 in the RE model is comparable to that for the pooled OLS model 
and substantially higher than that for the FE model. All coefficients have the same sign, 
and are of a similar magnitude as in the pooled OLS model. The only exception is the 
NAFTA dummy which, despite a reversal in sign, remains statistically insignificant. The 
absolute magnitudes of all of the gravity variables (and common language dummy) are 
slightly higher in the RE model than in the pooled OLS results. The EU integration 
dummy, however, has fallen substantially in magnitude (0.36 in the RE model compared 
with 0.54 for the pooled OLS model and 0.59 for the BE model). Taking a literal 
interpretation of the coefficient implies that, according to the RE model results, FDI flows 
between EU members are 143% of the magnitude they would be if the countries were not 
both members of the EU. This is significantly lower than the 172% and 180% implied by 
the pooled OLS and BE models respectively.
Rather than reporting an F statistic for overall significance, Stata reports the Wald test 
statistic (which is appropriately compared against the X2 distribution). This takes the 
value of 1293.4 for the reported regression which allows us to reject the null hypothesis 
that the explanatory variables are not jointly significant.
3.2.5.6 Hausman Specification Test
Although the choice between the FE and RE models is typically a subjective one, the 
Hausman specification test provides a simple statistical test which is commonly used to 
aid such decisions. Although the FE model always returns consistent results with panel 
data, it may not be the most efficient model. Whilst the RE model may give more reliable
estimates, we cannot be certain that they are unbiased. The Hausman specification test 
compares the estimates of a consistent model (i.e. FE) with the estimates of an efficient 
model (i.e. RE) to make sure that the more efficient model also gives consistent results 
(the null hypothesis). Being unable to reject the null hypothesis therefore provides 
support for the RE model.
The Hausman statistic is 89.2 which leads us to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis, and hence suggests that the RE estimates are not consistent. 
Before discarding the RE model however, we should note that the Hausman test may be 
unreliable in small samples. Furthermore, the FE model not only explicitly precludes the 
estimation of time invariant variables (i.e. distance and common language), but it also 
renders effectively meaningless the estimates of the integration dummy variables due to 
their lack of temporal variation. As these are the key variables of interest, the FE 
technique proves a rather limited model.
Given this (and despite the results of the Hausman specification test) we therefore favour 
the RE model for estimating the dataset in panel format. Not only does it offer a 
significantly better goodness of fit than the FE model, it also reports parameter estimates 
that are comparable to the pooled OLS results and are economically more realistic.
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3.2.6 Insider and Outsider Effects
One way in which the empirical analysis may be developed further is by extending it to 
test for possible FDI effects on ‘outsiders’. The formation of an RIA involves a reduction 
in trade (and often investment) barriers between members, and this may encourage firms 
from non-member countries to invest in a member country to establish a production 
facility from which the entire RIA-market can be served by exports. There is a wealth of 
anecdotal evidence of such an effect occurring within both the EU and NAFTA31.
In order to test for this possibility, we construct two additional dummy variables, 
nEUiEUj and nNAiNAj. The former takes the value unity when the investor is a non- 
member country and the host is an EU member, and zero otherwise. The latter does the 
same for NAFTA. Table 3.12 reports the regressions results with the inclusion of these 
dummy variables.
The results for equation 3.26 show that the ‘outsider’ dummy for the EU (nEUiEl)}) is not 
statistically significant, but the ‘outsider’ dummy for NAFTA is significant at the 1% 
level. This implies that the existence of NAFTA creates an attraction for FDI from non­
members that would otherwise not exist. Although we should be cautious about making a 
literal interpretation, the coefficient on nNAiNAj indicates that FDI flows from non­
members to members of NAFTA are 57% greater than flows between two ‘outsiders’. 
This effect is almost as large as the effect on ‘insider’ flows generated by the EU (as
31 For example, Ireland has benefited significantly from FDI from ‘outsiders’ since its membership of 
NAFTA in 1973 (although policies designed specifically to attract MNEs have also helped).
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measured by the EUijt dummy).
In addition to encouraging inward investment from ‘outsiders’, it is possible that an RIA 
will have an effect on flows from member countries to non-members. It is difficult to 
predict the a priori effect, as it will likely depend on the dynamic adjustment process in 
the investor country following the formation of the RIA. To the extent that the RIA 
reduces investment barriers between members, however, we would anticipate an FDI 
diversion effect as members relocate investments from non-members to members. If a 
reduction in trade barriers post-RIA encourages internal FDI to be replaced by exports, 
however, FDI from members to ‘outsiders’ may increase. Equation 3.27 in Table 3.12 
presents the results when two dummy variables are included to test for this ‘insider- 
outsider’ effect. EU^El)) is a dummy variable that takes the value unity when the 
investor country is a member of the EU and the host country is not a member of the EU 
(and zero otherwise). NAtnNAj is constructed in a similar manner with NAFTA as the 
RIA of interest. The coefficient on the former dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient of 0.58 implies that investment 
from EU members to ‘outsiders’ is 81% greater than ‘outsider-outsider’ investment. The 
coefficient on the NApNAj dummy is not statistically significant. Note also that the 
inclusion of the ‘insider-outsider’ effects in equation 7.2 has resulted in a substantial rise 
in the estimated coefficient of the EUijt dummy.
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Table 3.12 Effect of Additional Integration Dummy Variables
Explanatory
Variables 3.26 3.27 3.28
In Yi 2.28 2.82 2.82(19.2) (19.1) (19.1)



















































R 2 0.51 0.52 0.52
Obs. 3,884 3,884 3,884
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDI flows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t-ratios. Year dummies (for years 1993 to 2003) are 
included, but not reported. Constant term is not reported.
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Equation 3.28 reports the results when we include the four additional integration 
dummies in a single equation. Again, there is a marked increase in the coefficient values 
of the EUuj dummy. Its value of 1.13 implies that the FDI between EU members is 316% 
of the magnitude of FDI between countries that are not in a common integration 
agreement.
Encouragingly, the nEUiEUj dummy variable also obtains statistical significance in 
equation 3.28. This suggests that, as with NAFTA, the EU has also attracted ‘super­
normal’ FDI from ‘outsiders’32.
The inclusion of the additional integration dummy variables has enhanced the estimation 
of the ‘insider’ (i.e. EUyt and NAFTAyt) effects. The simple explanation for this is that the 
model is more correctly specified when the additional integration dummies are also 
included. When EUyt and NAFTAyt are included in a regression specification on their 
own, the ‘base case’ (against which we interpret them) includes ‘insider-outsider’ and 
‘outsider-insider’ observations in addition to ‘outsider-outsider’ observations. Equations 
3.26 and 3.27 have demonstrated that ‘insider-outsider’ and ‘outsider-insider’ flows are 
greater (all else being equal) than ‘outsider-outsider’ flows. The positive effect of the 
RIA on ‘insider-insider’ flows was therefore being dampened when EUyt and NAFTAyt 
were included in isolation. When all six of the integration dummies are included in a 
single regression (equation 3.28), the ‘base case’ against which we interpret all of the 
dummy variables is solely ‘outsider-outsider’ observations. This allows the ‘true’ effect
32 This suggests there is empirical evidence to support the anecdotal evidence cited earlier regarding 
Ireland’s ability to attract FDI from ‘outsiders’ following its membership of the EU.
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of the integration agreements to be estimated.
In light of the improved performance of the original integration dummies, we now re- 
estimate the individual year regressions with the addition of the ‘outsider-insider’ and 
‘insider-outsider’ dummies to investigate whether the lack of any integration effect post- 
1995 is overturned. Table 3.13 reports the results.
As with the total sample, the inclusion of the additional integration dummies has a 
substantial affect on the EUyt dummy (there is less effect on NAFTAyt). Although the 
EUyt dummy falls in magnitude and statistical significance for the years 1997, 1998 and 
1999, it returns with a vengeance in 2000. In fact, the coefficient value of 4.60 
(statistically significant at the 1% level), for the year 2000, would imply that flows 
between ‘insiders’ are around ten times the volume of flows between ‘outsiders’, all else 
equal. Following 2000 the EUyt dummy falls in magnitude each year, although even in 
2003 it is still substantially greater than the value in the early years of the sample. The 
pattern of coefficient values on EUijt over the years perhaps suggests that the positive 
effects (of the integration agreement) on FDI flows had begun to ebb away when 
suddenly there was a renewed stimulus around the year 2000.
Including the additional integration dummies has a much less marked effect on the 
behaviour of the NAFTAijt dummy. It remains statistically insignificant throughout.
162





















































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of FDI flows between countries i andj. Figures in parenthesis 
beneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t-ratios. The constant term is not reported.
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There are limited instances of the ‘outsider’ dummy variables attaining statistical 
significance. In each of these instances, the coefficient on the dummy variable is 
positive. The dummy variable nEUiEUj is significant in 1992, 1993 and 1994, suggesting 
that in these years the EU encouraged increased inward FDI from ‘outsider’ countries to 
members of the EU. Similarly, nNAiNAj is significant in 1994, 1995, 1997 and 2000, 
indicating that ‘outsider’ flows to NAFTA members were inflated in these years. The 
EUinEUj dummy exhibits similar behaviour to the EUyt dummy (i.e. it is substantially 
positive and statistically significant for the years 2000 to 2004). This suggests that EU 
members, in the new millennium, are more active investors than countries that are not 
members of the EU. Finally, the N AtnNAj variable is significant in 1994 and 2000, 
suggesting increased flows from NAFTA members to non-members for these two years.
3.3 CONCLUSION
There has been a proliferation of regional integration agreements over the last few 
decades. Accompanying this, there has been a long-standing debate as to the benefits of 
regionalism versus multilateralism. Although multilateralism may be the ideal scenario, 
in its absence regionalism probably provides the second-best solution to furthering 
integration between the world’s economies. Further integration should prove universally 
beneficial as countries can increasingly engage in trade and firms can allocate capital to 
the location where it can achieve the greatest return.
As we discussed in the introductory chapter, foreign direct investment is considered to be 
one of the primary channels through which the benefits of globalisation materialise. As
regional integration agreements are thought to stimulate FDI flows between countries, 
this would imply that such agreements result in economic benefits for member
33countries . This chapter has been concerned with empirically testing the effect that RIAs 
exert on FDI flows (not only between member countries, but also on ‘outsiders’). 
Specifically, we have focussed on the experiences of the European Union and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement.
Our initial OLS benchmark results indicated that RIAs do exert a positive influence on 
FDI flows between member countries. However, after disaggregating the RIA dummy 
variable into separate EU and NAFTA dummies, it transpired that the entire integration 
effect was being generated solely by a positive EU effect (the NAFTA dummy was not 
statistically significant). A literal interpretation of the coefficient on the EU dummy 
implies that FDI between EU members is 72% greater than FDI between non-members.
In order to investigate whether the EU result was dependent on the specification of the 
model, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to test whether the EU dummy coefficient was 
susceptible to the inclusion of various additional explanatory variables34. We found the 
EU dummy coefficient to be highly consistent, therefore providing support that it reflects 
a genuine effect in the data and is not merely due to model mis-specification.
We also investigated how the integration effect varies through time by estimating each
33 R ece n t R IA s are in crea s in g ly  in c lu d in g  in v estm en t (in  addition  to trade) p ro v is io n s  in  their articles o f  
a sso c ia tio n . W e  w o u ld  e x p ec t th is to  act as a further stim ulan t to in tra-R IA  in vestm en t.
34 T h e  add itional variab les w ere  for the  h ost country: p er cap ita  in co m e  grow th , la gged  in fla tion  rate; 
corruptions p ercep tion  in d ex  score; unit labour cost; e lec tr ic ity  tran sm ission  e ffic ien cy ; urbanisation; and  
p ercen tage o f  in ternet users.
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regression for individual years (1992 to 2003). We found the EU dummy to be most 
significant and of the highest magnitude in the early years of the dataset (i.e. 1992 to 
1994). From 1997 onwards the coefficient was not statistically significant35. A possible 
explanation for this is that the EU’s positive influence on FDI has gradually decreased 
over time; in the early years of the agreement it may have acted as a substantial stimulant 
to intra-RIA FDI, but over the last decade it seems to have had minimal effect. The 
completion of the Single Market in 1992 may have acted as a stimulus to FDI (in addition 
to trade) for a number of years afterwards, but perhaps this effect has diminished over 
time.
Alternative regression techniques (namely fixed-, random- and between-effects models) 
were introduced to examine whether this had any impact on the results. The random- 
effects model proved to be the most favourable technique, but did not alter the 
conclusions from the OLS benchmark results.
In order to investigate the possible effect of the EU and NAFTA on non-members we 
introduced four additional integration dummy variables. The results indicated that both 
integration agreements have attracted foreign investment from outsiders looking to 
exploit the enlarged internal market. This provides support for the wealth of anecdotal 
evidence that describes the experiences of countries such as Ireland and Mexico that have 
benefited from considerable amounts of FDI from non-member countries seeking to 
either avoid tariff and non-tariff barriers, exploit favourable investment provisions, and/or 
gain direct access to a greatly expanded market place.
35 The NAFTA dummy failed to achieve statistical significance for any individual year.
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EU members also appear to have invested more in non-member countries than they would 
have otherwise. This effect may result from efficiency savings from internal trade and 
investment (due to lower internal barriers) permitting more resources to be available for 
external investment. The results for NAFTA on this score, however, were not statistically 
significant.
Our analysis has therefore provided results which indicate that the EU has acted as a 
stimulant to FDI between member countries, but that NAFTA has not. There is evidence, 
however, that both RIAs have allowed member countries to attract greater than normal 
investment from non-member countries. For many countries, particularly the smaller 
and/or more peripheral members, this will have been one of the principal benefits of 
membership. For instance, there is a considerable body of work on the gains that Ireland 
has made from external FDI following its membership of the EU in 1973. Undoubtedly, 
much of Ireland’s success is due to forward-looking domestic policies which have created 
an attractive environment for foreign companies, but we should not underestimate the pull 
of the Single Market (boasting over 350 million consumers) to which Ireland provides 
access.
The experience of Ireland, and the seeming ability for membership to attract investment 
from non-members, raises the question of whether members should compete with one 
another to attract FDI. Presumably, to a large extent, investors from non-member 
countries are ambivalent to the exact location of their investment within the RIA (at least 
to the extent that their investment is motivated with the goal of exploiting the enlarged 
market). If one member country offers investment incentives (e.g. tax breaks) that are
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more favourable than those available in the other member countries, it becomes probable 
that the investor will choose to invest there. In this manner, the majority of FDI from 
‘outsiders’ may become located within a small number of member countries. The 
problem in this scenario is when a number of member countries compete to attract FDI by 
offering ever greater incentives to foreign investors. These incentives allow the investor 
to capture more of the benefits of the investment at the expense of the host nation. In 
extreme circumstances, members may become so desperate to attract FDI that they 
actually offer more in incentives than they have the opportunity to gain from the
■3 z:
investment .
A further concern with employing incentives to attract FDI is whether this type of 
investment is more transitory than FDI that has occurred independent of incentives. In 
the event of a global or regional recession, or perhaps even a localised crisis, investors 
may be quick to withdraw transitory FDI, causing problems for the host nation (i.e. 
pressure on the balance of payments and employment). The persistency, or otherwise, of 
FDI was a popular topic in the aftermath of the Asia financial crisis. Most studies 
concluded that investors were slow to withdraw existing investments due to sunk costs, 
the fear of losing a foothold in strategic markets etc. Direct investment certainly proved 
to be more persistent than portfolio investment during the crisis.
The recent enlargement of the European Union, to include the ten countries from central 
and eastern Europe, surely provides an ideal opportunity to study these issues going
36 Given the obvious problems in accurately measuring the varied benefits believed to derive from FDI, it is 
normally difficult for policymakers to determine an appropriate level for investment incentives.
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forward. Undoubtedly, one of the principal attractions of membership for these countries 
is the opportunity it provides for them to attract FDI, both from fellow members and non­
members. Once data becomes available it would be interesting to explore how their 
membership has affected both internal and external investment flows. As with the 
completion of the Single Market, it seems likely that the enlargement may act to stimulate 
FDI flows (both within the enlarged EU and from non-members). Over time it will also 
be possible to address issues regarding the persistency of FDI and the benefits and costs 
of offering investment incentives.
Although our analysis suggested that the EU has acted as a positive stimulant to intra-
nn
regional investment, we found no evidence that NAFTA has had a similar effect . 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to say with certainty whether the NAFTA result is an 
accurate reflection of reality, or whether our analysis has simply failed to detect a 
statistically significant effect. The limited number of observations between NAFTA 
members will certainly have hindered the analysis. In Chapter 6 we undertake a case 
study of Mexico which will allow this matter to be investigated in further depth. Future 
work should also focus on increasing the number of observations for the NAFTA 
countries by collecting accurate and disaggregated investment data from Canada and
no
Mexico .
37 Although we did find evidence to suggest that NAFTA has had an effect on FDI from non-member 
countries.
38 As Canada and Mexico only existed in our dataset as host countries, NAFTA observations were limited 
to the cases where the US was the source country.
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4. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS ON
EXPORTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter we investigated the impact of regional integration agreements 
(specifically the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement) on 
flows of foreign direct investment. In this chapter we perform a similar analysis for 
exports. This not only allows us to estimate the effect of the EU and NAFTA on trade, 
but also affords greater understanding and comparability of the augmented gravity model 
specification we have chosen to utilise for our empirical analysis. It is also a prerequisite 
for the empirical work we will undertake in Chapter 5 on the relationship between exports 
and FDI.
Given that integration agreements result in a reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers, we 
expect to find that both the EU and NAFTA have stimulated intra-regional trade. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that the coefficients on the EUyt and NAFTAiJt 
dummies will be greater in magnitude than they were in the previous chapters as these 
agreements include more trade-related than investment-related provisions1.
1 In both the EU and NAFTA, the removal of impediments to trade is more advanced than the removal of 
restrictions on foreign investment. For example, under NAFTA there remain a number of industries in 
which direct foreign investment is prohibited (e.g. the Mexican oil industry, Canadian natural resources, the 
US Defence sector).
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4.2 DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The dataset used in the previous chapter to investigate the effects of regional integration 
agreements on flows of foreign direct investment again forms the basis for the analysis in 
this chapter. The only difference is that exports from the source country (z) to the host 
country (j) are taken as the dependent variable (as opposed to bilateral FDI flows). This 
data is taken from the OECD’s International Trade Statistics and deflated by the GDP 
deflator for each country taken from the WDI online database (therefore giving exports in 
constant 2000 US dollars).
The first row of Table 4.1 summarises the exports variable for the entire dataset. The 
mean value is US$4.95 billion with a standard deviation of US$11.8 billion. The 
minimum value is zero, indicating observations where there have been no exports from 
country i to country j  for a particular year2. The maximum value is US$162 billion 
(exports from the US to Canada in 2000).
As in the previous chapter, an augmented gravity model is our favoured regression 
specification for estimating the determinants of the dependent variable:
In X iJt = + #  In Yit + /?2 In Yjt + /?3 In nit + (3, In njt + In dtj + P6EUijt + fyNAFTA^ +figt
2 Due to the log-linear specification of the regression equation, we are forced to omit observations for which 
the there have been no exports from country i to country j  for any given year. This results in a loss of 92 
observations (or approximately 2% of the total observations). Although this is not a substantial number, we 
should be aware that it may bias the sample slightly towards more developed host countries.
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where exports from country i to country j  in year t (Xyt) are a function of the incomes and 
populations of both countries, and the geographical distance separating them. EUyt and 
NAFTAijt represent integration dummy variables, included to capture the effects of these 
integration agreements on exports. In the usual way, the error term, is assumed to be 
statistically well-behaved.
Summary statistics for all of the independent variables are given in the previous chapter 
(see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3).
4.3 BENCHMARK OLS ESTIMATES
We start by estimating the basic gravity model with ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
ascertain whether our dataset performs as expected, and so that we have benchmark 
estimates to compare against later results from more sophisticated empirical 
specifications.
Our a priori expectations are that the coefficients on both income variables will be 
positive. Higher host country (j) income increases the demand for imports and higher 
source country income (i) increases the maximum potential supply of exports. Both 
population coefficients are expected to be negative. Hamilton and Winters (1992) 
suggest that population is a proxy for the physical size of a country and that larger source 
countries have less need to export and larger host countries are more self sufficient and 
thus have less need to import. As distance is a proxy for transport costs it is expected to 
have a negative effect on exports.
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics for the Dependent Variable (Exports)





1992 - 2003 4990 4.95 11.8 0 162.0
1992 295 4.74 10.1 0.03 96.3
1993 325 4.36 9.5 0.04 104
1994 352 4.72 10.2 0.04 117
1995 339 5.51 11.5 0.02 126.
1996 395 5.62 12.1 0.02 130
1997 378 5.91 12.8 0.04 144
1998 369 6.22 13.6 0.03 146
1999 292 6.49 13.8 0.03 153
2000 564 4.53 12.8 0 162
2001 564 4.23 11.6 0 147
2002 553 3.79 10.0 0 142
2003 564 4.78 12.5 0 147
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Regional integration agreements reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) between 
member countries. As this reduces the cost of trade we expect exports from one RIA 
member to another to be greater than trade between two countries who are not both 
members of a common RIA. The coefficient on the EUgt and NAFTA yt dummies are 
therefore expected to be positive.
Table 4.2 reports the results for the benchmark OLS estimates. As we would expect, 
equation 4.1 shows that the basic gravity model performs well in explaining the 
variability of exports in our dataset. The adjusted-R2 of 0.81 indicates that 81% of the 
variability in exports is explained by variability in the gravity variables -  this is 
considerably higher than the adjusted-R for the comparable FDI regression (see the 
results for equation 3.1. of the previous chapter). There is therefore less unexplained 
variability in the dependent variable (after the inclusion of the standard gravity variables) 
in the case of exports than FDI .
All of the gravity variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, they 
all have the expected sign, with the exception of the source country population (Nj which 
is positive. We interpret the coefficient of Yt of 0.52 as implying that a 1% increase in the 
income of the source country leads to an increase in exports from the source country of 
0.52%, holding all else constant. This means that exports are (home country) income 
inelastic, whereas FDI was income elastic (coefficient of 2.24). This suggests that as a 
country becomes richer, outward FDI will increase relative to exports.
3 There are a greater number of observations in the exports regression (4,898) than the FDI regression 
(3,884) due to better coverage and reporting of trade data than investment data (particularly for developing 
countries). Also, countries typically have more export destinations than they do investment destinations.
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Table 4.2 Benchmark OLS Estimates
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4
a - 12.19 - 12.74 - 12.28 -12.25(23.2) (24.1) (24.1) (23.8)
In Yi 0.52 0.57 0.55 0.55( 11.1) ( 12.1) ( 12.1) ( 12.0)
In Yj 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.79(75.7) (71.0) (71.6) (71.6)
In Nj 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.27(7.1) (5.9) (5 .9) (5 .9)
InNj -0.13 -0.12
-0.10 -0.10
( 13.2) (11.7) ( 10.8) ( 10.8)
In dy
-0.76 -0.71 -0.64 -0.64






















F- 1337 1273 1256 1193
statistic ( 16,4881) ( 17,4880) ( 19,4878) (20,4877)
~R2 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83
Obs. 4,898 4,898 4,898 4,898
Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country i toj. Figures in parenthesis beneath 
the estimated coefficients are absolute t ratios. Year dummies are included in all regressions, but are not 
reported.
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The coefficient on Yj is of a similar magnitude (0.83) and implies that a 1% increase in 
the GDP of the host country increases exports from the source country by 0.83%4. Once 
again, this implies that exports are inelastic with respect to host country income (this is 
also the case for FDI -  coefficient of 0.86)5.
As we have mentioned, the coefficient on home country population is positive which is 
contrary to expectations. Following the argument of Hamilton and Winters (1992), 
countries with a larger population should have less need to export (due to greater 
domestic demand). The positive coefficient, however, indicates that a higher population 
is associated with greater exports, holding all else constant.
As expected, the coefficient on host population (Nj) is negative, suggesting that for a 
given level of income a higher population implies lower per capita GDP and hence less 
domestic demand (for both domestic goods and imports).
The distance coefficient takes the expected negative sign with the value of 0.76 implying 
that a 1% increase in the geographical distance between the source and host countries 
results in a reduction in exports of 0.76%.
The standard gravity model is augmented to include our basic integration dummy variable 
(RIAyt) in equation 4.2. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1%
4 Note that the coefficient on Yj also implies that a 1% increase in the GDP of the host country will lead to 
an increase of 0.83% in total imports.
5 Note, however, that exports are elastic with respect to aggregate GDP, so it does follow that trade has 
grown faster than world GDP.
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level. As we have said before we must be careful in making literal interpretations of the 
coefficients, however, the value of 0.24 implies that exports between ‘insiders’ will be 
128% the magnitude of exports between ‘outsiders’, all else being equal. This coefficient 
is lower in magnitude than it was for FDI, indicating that the positive impact of 
integration agreements is greater for FDI than it is for exports. The inclusion of the 
integration dummy in equation 4.2 has little effect on the other explanatory variables in 
the regression.
In equation 4.3 we introduce additional dummy variables to account for the possible 
effects of a common border and common language between the source and host countries. 
Both variables are significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of the common language 
dummy (Langy) has a value of 0.50, which implies that exports between two countries 
that share the same language are 166% (e0'50) the magnitude of exports between two 
countries that have different native languages (holding all else constant).
We would expect geographical distance to have a greater impact on trade costs than on 
investment costs. This is confirmed by the absolute magnitude of the coefficient on the 
distance variable being greater for the export regressions than it was for the FDI 
regressions6. The common border dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
the coefficient of 0.65 implies that exports between contiguous countries are 194% the 
magnitude of exports between countries that do not share a common border. The 
magnitude of the common border coefficient is roughly twice the magnitude in the
6 Whereas it is reasonable to assume that transport costs increase proportionally with distance, investment- 
related costs (e.g. communication costs) do not double when the distance between countries doubles.
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exports regressions as it is the FDI regressions -  providing further support for the theory 
that distance is a more important determinant of the volume of exports than it is of FDI.
The final column in Table 4.2 reports the results when the integration dummy is divided 
into two dummies, each separately reflecting the existence of the EU and NAFTA. The 
EU dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the NAFTA dummy is 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of 0.26 on the EU dummy is identical to that 
for the combined integration dummy (RIAyt) in equation 4.3. The NAFTA coefficient is 
slightly larger at 0.32, and implies that exports between two members of NAFTA are 
138% of the value we expect between two countries that are not both members of 
NAFTA7. The value for the EU dummy is approximately half the value it was for FDI, 
while the NAFTA dummy was not statistically significant in the FDI model. This 
suggests that the EU provides a slightly greater stimulant to FDI than it does to exports,
o
but NAFTA provides a greater boost to exports than it does to investment .
7 Or to put it another way, the coefficients imply that exports between two countries will increase by 29% 
(38%) when they both become members of the EU (NAFTA).
8 Although both the EU and NAFTA have introduced many investment-related provisions (such as equal 
treatment for foreign companies, dispute mechanisms etc), the EU is undoubtedly more deeply integrated 
than NAFTA. Furthermore, the NAFTA countries may be more natural trading partners than the EU 
members (perhaps due to their distance from many of the other developed countries of the world). These 
factors, amongst others, may explain why NAFTA seems to act as a greater stimulant to intra-regional trade 
than the EU, and also why the EU has a greater effect on FDI than it does on exports.
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4.4 EXTENDING THE MODEL
4.4.1 Additional Explanatory Variables
As in the previous chapter, we now investigate the effect of adding additional explanatory 
variables to the model and of disaggregating the dataset by year.
Table 4.3 reports the results when we introduce various additional explanatory variables 
into the model. To permit comparison with the analysis of FDI, we utilise the same seven 
variables as used in the previous chapter, namely: annual per capita income growth; 
lagged inflation rate; the Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI); unit labour costs (ULC); a 
measure of electrical efficiency; the level of urbanisation; and the number of internet 
connections per thousand population. All variables refer to the host country (j) and are as 
described in the previous chapter (see Table 3.5 of Chapter 3 for summary statistics).
Equation 4.5 includes per capita income growth of the host economy as an additional 
explanatory variable. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. As we would expect, the result suggests that higher income growth in the host 
economy results in an increase in imports (i.e. exports from other countries). The 
inclusion of the additional explanatory variable has very little effect on the other 
independent variables (they all remain statistically significant at the 5% level and of 
approximately the same magnitude)9.
9 The only exception is NAFTAijt which is significant at the 10% level.
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The lagged inflation rate is included in equation 4.6. Again, it has very little impact on 
the other explanatory variables, with all coefficients retaining their statistical significance 
and approximate magnitude. The inflation rate coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1% level and its negative value indicates that a higher rate of inflation in the host country 
discourages exports from other countries. In alternative specifications (not reported here 
for brevity) we include the current inflation rate and the inflation rate lagged two periods. 
The results are very similar to those reported for equation 4.6, with both alternative 
inflation variables statistically significant at the 1% level and of negative sign.
The inclusion of the host country’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) value has more of 
an effect on the other explanatory variables. The coefficients on both income variables 
fall in magnitude while the coefficients on the population variables increase (the host 
population coefficient actually becomes positively signed). The EU dummy falls in 
magnitude from 0.26 (in equation 4.4) to 0.18. There is virtually no change in the 
NAFTA dummy. The coefficient on the CPIj variable is itself positive and significant at 
the 1% level. Its value of 0.09 implies that a less corrupt environment (or at least the 
perception of less corruption) is more conducive to attracting exports.
As in the previous chapter, we run an auxiliary regression to ascertain whether the effect 
on the explanatory variables of introducing the CPIj variable is directly due to the 
variable itself, or rather because its introduction results in quite a severe loss in the 
number of available observations (recall that the CPI index is not available prior to 1994). 
Equation 4.13 (see Table 4.4) reports the results for equation 4.4 restricted to those 
observations for which there is a CPIj observation. It is evident that the majority of the
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impact on the existing explanatory variables stems from the reduction in the number of 
observations and not because of the introduction of the CPIj variable itself. However, the 
impact on the host country population variable would seem to derive purely from the 
inclusion of the CPIj variable and not from the reduction in observations10.
In equation 4.8 we include the unit labour cost (ULC) of the host country. It would 
appear that this results in an increase in the coefficients on the two integration dummies 
but, as with the CPI variable, we cannot be sure whether this is due to the inclusion of the 
variable itself or because of the reduction in observations (to 2,746) that it entails. 
Equation 4.14 in Table 4.4 reports the results of re-estimating equation 4.4 restricted to 
observations for which there is an observation for ULCj. It appears that the increase in 
the magnitude of the integration dummies is due to the reduction in observations, and not 
because of the inclusion of ULCj per se. The effect on the host population variable 
appears to be primarily due to the inclusion of ULCj however11. Note also that the 
adjusted-R2 is the same in both equations, so it is not the inclusion of ULCj itself that has 
resulted in the increase in the amount of explained variability.
10 This is probably due to the high negative correlation between the CPI and host population variables (- 
0.36).
11 Correlation between the ULC and host population variables in -0.09.
Table 4.3 Results for Additional Explanatory Variables
Explanatory
Variables 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.10 4.11 4.12
































































































































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country i to j. Figures in parenthesis beneath 
the estimated coefficients are absolute t ratios. Year dummies are included in all regressions, but are not 
reported. Constant term is not reported.
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Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country i to j. Figures in parenthesis beneath 
the estimated coefficients are absolute t ratios. Time dummies are included in all regressions, but are not 
reported.
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Our measure of electrical efficiency (a proxy for infrastructure sophistication of the host
country) is included in equation 4.9. EEj is statistically significant at the 1% level and the
positive coefficient implies that a host country with more developed infrastructure attracts 
12greater exports . Its inclusion in the regression specification has a limited effect on the 
other explanatory variables (although the coefficients on the population variables fall in 
significance, this is again due to a reduction in available observations as opposed to the 
specific inclusion of the EEj variable).
Equation 4.10 incorporates the level of urbanisation in the host country as an additional 
explanatory variable13. This variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and the 
positive coefficient indicates that the more urbanised the host country is the more exports 
it is likely to attract. The inclusion of the measure of urbanisation has little effect on the 
other explanatory variables.
In equation 4.11, we include the number of internet connections per thousand population 
of the host country. We can think of this variable as a proxy for both the sophistication of 
the technology and communication infrastructure in the host country and for the technical 
sophistication of the population in general. This variable is statistically significant at the 
1% level and the positive coefficient implies that a greater number of internet connections 
(for a given population) is associated with a greater value of imports. The inclusion of 
this variable has little effect on the other explanatory variables.
12 Electrical efficiency may proxy infrastructure sophistication, which in turn may be correlated with 
distribution costs in the host country -  lowering final market prices for exports.
13 By ‘urbanisation’ we mean the percentage of the total population living in urban areas.
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Finally, in equation 4.12, all of the additional explanatory variables are introduced 
together. Under this specification, the lagged inflation rate, electrical efficiency and 
internet variables are statistically insignificant. The unit labour costs, urbanisation, 
income growth and corruption variables are all statistically significant at the 5% level14. 
The EU and NAFTA dummies retain their approximate magnitude and remain 
statistically significant at the 5% level. There is an interesting effect on the income and 
population variables of the host (j) country; the coefficient on Yj drops in magnitude and 
the coefficient on Nj becomes positive (both are statistically significant at the 1% level). 
This suggests that in the ‘basic’ gravity model, the income and population variables are 
capturing some effects that may be more directly attributable to a range of other factors15.
The inclusion of additional explanatory variables has had limited impact on the dummy 
variables and (albeit to a lesser extent) the gravity variables16. For clarity, Figure 4.1 
plots the estimated coefficients of the two integration dummies according to the different 
model specifications reported in Table 4.3.
Figure 4.1 illustrates that the EU dummy was more sensitive to the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables than the NAFTA dummy. Indeed, the estimated coefficient of the 
NAFTA remained perfectly stable across equations 4.5 -  4.7. The minimum (0.18 in
14 ULCj and Urbarij have actually risen in statistical significance, but we should note that this may have 
been influenced by the reduction in the number of available observations as opposed to the change in 
regression specification.
15 In order to ensure that the change in the host income and population variables was not due solely to the 
reduction in the number of available observations in equation 4.12, we estimated the ‘basic’ gravity model 
(i.e. gravity variables plus integration, common language and border dummies) restricted to the 1,884 
observations available in equation 4.12. The coefficient values (and t-ratios) for Yj and Nj were 0.76 (40.5) 
and -0.02 (0.88) respectively.
16 We have demonstrated that where there has been a marked impact, this is typically ascribable to a loss in 
the number of observations available.
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equation 4.7) and maximum (0.33 in equation 4.8) values for the EU dummy both 
resulted from a reduction in the number of available observations and not because of the 
introduction of the additional explanatory variable itself. Discounting these equations, 
the EU dummy coefficient was far less subject to fluctuation. The maximum coefficient 
value (0.36 in equation 4.8) for the NAFTA dummy was also the product of a limited 
number of observations. We can therefore conclude that the integration dummies were 
very stable to the inclusion of a range of additional explanatory variables. Furthermore, it 
is encouraging to see the EU and NAFTA dummies fluctuating in a similar manner for 
equations 4.8 -  4.12, because it suggests that the inclusion of the additional explanatory 
variables is accounting for information previously captured by the dummy variables.
We also see from Table 4.3 that the coefficient on the distance variable varies little, 
between a minimum of -0.75 and a maximum of -0.59. The income and population 
variables for the source country vary to a greater extent, although again the largest 
variation is due to a loss in observations and not the inclusion of a specific variable per 
se. The host income and population variables also fluctuate, although this is less 
pronounced than for the source country variables. Note that for both the source and host 
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It is clear from Table 4.3 that the coefficients on both the common language and common 
border dummies are extremely stable, with both estimated coefficients varying by less 
than 0.1 throughout.
The results reported in Table 4.3 afford us some confidence that our model specification 
of equation 4.4 is fairly stable and insensitive to the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables. In particular, the coefficients on the integration dummies remain within a 
relatively narrow range and always retain their statistical significance (even when the 
number of available observations is severely reduced). Although each of the additional 
explanatory variables was itself statistically significant, none of them had a marked effect 
on the explanatory power of the regression, suggesting that they are not major 
determinants of the level of exports between trade partners.
Furthermore, we cannot be sure of the direction of causality between the dependent and 
independent variables. It may be the dependent variable that is influencing the 
explanatory variables (and not vice versa). For example, as a country imports more, 
exporters may demand improved infrastructure. To the extent that the sophistication of 
infrastructure is correlated with electricity efficiency, this would result in higher exports 
(i.e. higher imports to the host country) driving improved electrical efficiency.
4.4.2 Annual Analyses
The aim of this section is to investigate changes in the estimated coefficients (especially 
EUyt and NAFTA#) over time. The inclusion of additional explanatory variables in the
previous section indicated that the gravity variables and integration dummies may be 
sensitive to restrictions in the number of observations used to estimate the regressions. In 
this section we divide the dataset into 13 individual year cross-sections. Given the 
improvement in data availability in recent years, the later cross-sections have 
considerably more observations than the earlier ones and we should bear this in mind 
when comparing the results from different years.
Table 4.5 reports the results when the model is run for each year separately. It is evident 
that the coefficients on 7* and Ni are extremely sensitive to the year of estimation. The 
coefficients on Yj and Nj remain relatively stable through time. Once again, notice the 
symmetry of the income and population variables for both the source and host countries. 
These results indicate that the model is very unstable when run separately for each year. 
Perhaps this is not surprising given that exports can vary substantially in the short run. 
This instability in the estimated coefficients suggests that it is more appropriate to 
estimate the impact of the explanatory variables over a longer time period than a single 
year.
The variation in the distance variable across time is interesting because there is a clear 
increase in the estimated effect of distance (with the coefficient falling from -0.52 to -0.79 
between 1992 and 2003). This is surprising given that shipping and haulage costs 
continue to fall over time. However, even if these costs are falling in absolute terms, they 
may be increasing as a percentage of total production costs. This could explain the trend 
we have observed in the estimated parameter of the distance variable over time.
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Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country i to country j. Figures in parentheses 
are the absolute t-ratios.
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Figure 4.2 shows the change in the two integration dummy variables for each year 
regression. There is a clear downward trend in the magnitude of the EU coefficient, 
suggesting that the positive effect on trade between any pair of EU ‘insiders’ has been 
decreasing during the nineties. In fact, the coefficient is not statistically different from 
zero (at the 10% level) from 1997 onwards. We found a similar effect for FDI flows in 
the previous chapter and hypothesised that this effect may be due to the completion of the 
Single European Market in 1992 (i.e. the implementation and completion of the SEA had 
a strong positive effect on trade which has petered out over time).
By comparison, the estimated parameter for the NAFTA dummy reveals no apparent 
trend and only attains statistical significance once (at the 10% level), for the year 1994. 
This should not cause undue concern however, as it may simply be the case that the 
individual year regressions do not afford sufficient observations to allow the NAFTA 
dummy to be adequately estimated. When the years are pooled together (i.e. in equation
4.4 in Table 4.2), the estimate on the NAFTA dummy is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.
The common language and common border dummies remain statistically significant 
throughout. Strangely, the two dummies appear to exhibit a striking level of symmetry, 
whereby an increase in the coefficient of one dummy is accompanied by a fall in the 
coefficient of the other. After 1995, the common language coefficient exhibits an upward 
trend and the common border coefficient a downward trend. This suggests that in recent 
years a common language is becoming ever more important in facilitating international 
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4.4.3 Insider and Outsider Effects
As in the previous chapter, we now extend the empirical analysis to investigate whether 
RIAs have an impact on trade between an ‘outsider’ and an ‘insider’. To this end, we 
employ the additional integration dummies introduced in the previous chapter -  nEUiEUj, 
nNAiNAj, EUinEUp and NAinNAj. nEUiEUj takes the value unity when the investor in not 
an EU member but the host country is. Likewise, nNAiNAj, has unit value when the 
investor is not a NAFTA member but the host is. EU nEUj takes the value unity when the 
investor country is a member of the EU but the host country is not. NAtnNAj takes the 
value unity when the investor is a NAFTA member but the host is not.
Table 4.6 reports the results when we introduce the additional integration dummies into 
the model. In the previous chapter, the inclusion of the additional integration dummies 
resulted in a sizeable increase in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the 
integration dummies (EUyt and NAFTA^). A similar effect occurs here for the EUyt 
dummy (coefficient is 0.46 in equation 4.27 compared with 0.26 in equation 4.4), but the 
NAFTAijt dummy falls slightly in magnitude (and is still not statistically significant). 
There is also limited effect on the other explanatory variables, although source-country 
population is no longer statistically significantly.
The estimated coefficient for nEUiEUj is not statistically significant. This means that we 
have been unable to detect an impact on flows on FDI from ‘outsiders’ due to the 
formation of the EU. The coefficient on nNAiNAj is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It has a negative coefficient, which indicates that NAFTA has resulted in a
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reduction in exports from non-members to members. This accords well with theory, 
which argues that the formation of a RIA will encourage ‘outsiders’ to replace exports 
with ‘tariff-jumping’ FDI in order to gain access to the enlarged market. We have already 
discussed anecdotal evidence pertaining to Mexico that would seem to fit with this 
empirical finding. Following its membership of NAFTA, Mexico was fortunate to 
receive considerable inflows of FDI from non-member countries keen to exploit the 
enlarged RIA-market and to avoid tariffs and quotas on their imports into the region. To 
the extent that these investments have been responsible for generating output which has 
displaced exports from the non-member countries, we would expect to find a negative 
coefficient on the nNAiNAj dummy variable.
A similar story can be told of Ireland (and likely holds true for other EU members), so in 
this regard it is somewhat surprising that we have not found a statistically significant 
negative coefficient for the nEUiEUj. Indeed, there is evidence in the literature that the 
EU has discouraged exports from non-member countries. For example, Sapir (1997), 
reports that increased integration within the EU has negatively impacted exports from 
non-members into EU countries. He argues that this effect has encouraged European 
countries that are not members of the EU to apply for membership.
The EU nEU j coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. Its positive value 
suggests that the EU has resulted in higher exports from members to non-members than 
would otherwise have been the case. The estimated coefficient of 0.29 indicates that 
exports from an EU member to a non-member are 34% greater than exports between two 
‘outsiders’.
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Conversely, the estimated coefficient on NAtnNAj is negative, suggesting that NAFTA has 
resulted in fewer exports from ‘insiders’ to ‘outsiders’ than would otherwise have been 
the case. The estimated coefficient of 0.20 suggests that exports from a NAFTA member 
to a non-member are 22% less than exports between two outsiders. Unfortunately, the 
reason for the different effect for the EU and NAFTA is not obvious. The negative 
coefficient for NAtnNAj may simply be a reflection of the geographical remoteness of the 
US from most of its major trading partners (if this is not being adequately captured by the 
distance variable).
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Notes: dependent variable is the natural log of exports from country i to j. Figures in parentheses 
underneath the estimated coefficients are absolute t-ratios. Year dummies are included in all regressions, 
but are not reported.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
As expected, the results reported in this chapter suggest that the EU and NAFTA have 
stimulated intra-regional trade. Benchmark OLS results imply that an EU member will, 
on average, export 29% more to a fellow EU member than a non-member (all else being 
equal). Furthermore, the impact of NAFTA on exports is found to be even greater at 
38%.
These ‘integration effects’ are robust to the inclusion of a range of additional explanatory 
variables. Indeed, when all seven additional variables were included in the regression 
specification simultaneously, the estimated magnitude of the integration effects increased 
(to 35% for the EU and 46% for NAFTA).
These results accord well with preceding empirical studies, the majority of which tend to 
find in favour of the hypothesis that regional integration agreements lead to increases in 
intra-regional trade. For example, Aitken (1973), using cross-section data from 1951 to 
1967, finds that the European Economic Community (EEC) experienced cumulative 
growth in internal gross trade creation during the years 1958 to 196717. Frankel and Rose 
(2001) report statistically significant results that indicate that two members of a common
17 Aitken also finds that the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) resulted in positive internal trade 
effects between 1961 and 1967. He argues that his finding that the EEC was more trade stimulating than 
EFTA provides support for the notion that deeper integration results in greater trade creation.
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RIA will trade more with each other than two countries that are not in a common RIA, all 
else being equal18.
However, not all studies have found in favour of increased intra-regional trade. Soloaga 
and Winters (1999) employ the gravity model approach to investigate nine major regional 
blocs between 1980 and 199619. They report a statistically significant negative effect for 
European Union intra-regional trade20. Unfortunately, the authors offer little explanation 
as to why membership of the EU might discourage intra-regional trade.
A comparison of the results of this chapter with those reported in Chapter 3 for FDI flows 
is instructive. The coefficient value for the EU dummy in this chapter is approximately 
half the magnitude it was in the previous chapter. However, the NAFTA dummy is 
positive and statistically significant in this chapter, whereas it was statistically 
insignificant in the previous chapter. This suggests that the EU provides a slightly greater 
stimulant to FDI than it does to exports, but NAFTA provides a greater boost to exports 
than it does to investment21. Such a finding is probably due to a number of connected 
factors. For instance, the trade and investment provisions enshrined within the respective 
integration agreements will undoubtedly play a considerable role. Following on from our
18 This is actually a secondary finding of the Frankel and Rose (2001) paper. Their main focus is the impact 
of a common currency, which they find leads to a substantial increase in trade.
19 The nine pacts investigated by Soloaga and Winters (1999) are: the ANDEAN Community, the Central 
American Common Market (CACM), the Latin American Integration Association (LALA), MERCOSUR, 
NAFTA, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council, the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA), and the European Economic Community (EEC).
20 They do, however, find a positive effect on intra-regional trade in relation to CACM, LAIA, ANDEAN 
and MERCOSUR. They also find that NAFTA has a positive effect on intra-regional trade, but this result is 
not statistically significant.
21 As expected, geographical distance is a greater deterrent to exports than it is to foreign investment. A 
common border, however, proves more attractive to exporters than to investors.
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earlier discussion of Chapter 2, the EU is generally considered to me more deeply 
integrated than NAFTA22. This would perhaps support the idea that the EU stimulates 
FDI to a greater extent than NAFTA23. However, the investment-related provisions in 
NAFTA (enshrined in Chapter XI) are extremely comprehensive. They go beyond the 
requirements of the World Trade Organisation TRIMs Agreement, are reinforced with a 
most favoured nation clause, and include a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism 
(Fahnbulleh and te Velde, 2005). Perhaps, therefore, it is not the extent of the provisions 
that is of paramount importance, but rather the degree of change that is introduced by 
these provisions24. To further complicate matters, the trade and investment effects of 
integration agreements will also be heavily influenced by a range of dynamic and 
interrelated factors, such as changes in relative prices, the size of effective demand, 
resource endowments within the region, and agglomeration and competition effects. 
Future work on this topic may look to address these issues more thoroughly in the context 
of a general equilibrium framework.
We also investigated changes in the estimated coefficients of the integration dummies 
over time. The EU dummy exhibited a clear downward trend in magnitude over the 
period, suggesting that the positive effect of the EU on trade has been decreasing as the
22 Not only has the EU been much longer in the making, it also a range of supranational institutions and 
policies that are not matched by NAFTA.
23 Given that FDI typically involves considerable sunk costs, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
firms would view deeper integration as a significant benefit in relation to FDI (as deeper integration implies 
less chance of a reversal in investment-friendly policies). Although there are also considerable costs 
associated with exporting, to the extent that these are not up-front sunk costs, firms may place less store in 
deeper integration when it comes to exporting within the region.
24 In other words, even if extensive investment-related provisions are incorporated into an integration 
agreement, these provisions may have little impact on FDI flows if the member countries were already 
extremely open to foreign investment prior to the agreement. Conversely, even limited investment 
provisions may have a substantial effect on FDI if the member countries severely restricted foreign 
investment prior to the agreement.
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integration agreement matures25. It is possible that this effect owes much to the 
implementation of the Single European Market (SEM) Program between 1985 and 1992. 
The goal of the SEM was to eliminate the remaining restrictions on the exchange of 
goods and services within the EU, and involved the adoption of nearly 300 measures to 
eliminate internal non-tariff barriers (OECD, 2005)26. These measures will have 
undoubtedly made it easier and less costly to trade within the EU, leading to an increase 
in intra-regional trade. To the extent that this stimulus will have been at its most 
powerful during the years of implementation and perhaps shortly after completion of the 
SEM in 1992, we might expect to find that the coefficient on the EU dummy falls in 
magnitude as time progresses. This would be an interesting avenue to pursue in future 
work using data prior to 1992.
To explore the possibility of trade creation and trade diversion, we introduced additional 
integration dummy variables. Although the EU appears to have little or no effect on 
exports from non-member countries, NAFTA seems to have discouraged non-members 
from exporting to member states. It is not immediately obvious from our analysis 
whether this effect is due to trade diversion (i.e. more expensive imports from member 
countries replacing cheaper imports from non-members due to lower trade barriers) or 
rather a natural result of external firms replacing their exports to the region with “tariff- 
jumping FDI” (or, of course, a combination of both factors). Although examining a 
different period, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) report evidence of trade diversion
25 A similar effect was found in the previous chapter in relation to FDI flows.
26 These measures fell into five main categories: simplification of border controls; mutual recognition of 
product standards; deregulation of transportation; equality in public procurement; and deregulation of 
service sector activities.
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during the formation of the EEC. Soloaga and Winters (1999) also “find convincing 
evidence of trade diversion” for the EU (p. 13). However, both of these papers use a 
relatively simplistic metric to evidence trade diversion, and could therefore be accused of 
overlooking the possibility that reduced exports from non-members are due to increased 
tariff-jumping FDI as opposed solely to trade diversion27.
In the previous chapter we reported results which indicated that both the EU and NAFTA 
have encouraged increased inward FDI from third countries. When we combine this with 
the finding from this chapter that EU members seem to export more to non-members than 
they would otherwise have done, it is more difficult to conclude that the EU has led to 
trade diversion28. NAFTA members, however, appear to export less to ‘outsiders’ than 
would otherwise be the case, suggesting it may be more culpable of fostering trade 
diversion.
Although the focus of this chapter has been the effect of the integration dummies on the 
dependent variable, the results for the ‘standard gravity variables’ (i.e. incomes, 
populations, and distance variables) affords a level of comfort in the suitability of the 
‘gravity model’ as the favoured empirical tool. The coefficients on these variables are 
within expectations and largely accord with the extant empirical literature.
27 A reduction in non-members imports, accompanied by an increase in intra-regional trade, is taken as 
evidence of trade diversion by both Bayou & Eichengreen (1997) and Soloaga and Winters (1999). We 
would argue that these are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to evidence trade diversion.
28 An increase in EU exports to ‘outsiders’ suggests that trade linkages have strengthened as a result of the 
EU.
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5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
EXPORTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A significant subset of the work on international trade and the multinational enterprise 
has addressed the nature of the relationship between FDI and trade. Stretching back to 
the 1960s, there has been considerable concern, particularly amongst policymakers and 
special interest groups, that outward FDI will lead to a loss of employment in the source 
economy as foreign production displaces domestically produced exports. In severe cases, 
it is feared that this could even lead to deindustrialisation.
During this time there has been a very favourable change in the general attitude towards 
globalisation and multinational corporations. Whilst multinational corporations were 
blamed for all manner of ills that beset countries back in the 1960s, today most 
governments actively seek to attract them. Though perhaps still lacking conclusive 
empirical support, it has become a widely held belief that FDI contributes positively to 
the growth and development of the recipient country. While intranational trade is still 
freer than international trade, the Ricardian notion that free trade is welfare enhancing for 
all participants has been largely embraced.
Despite this, there remains considerable opposition across the world to globalisation, as 
unfailingly witnessed at World Trade Organisation (WTO) summits. The formation of a 
new regional integration agreement (RIA) is typically accompanied by considerable
concern that it will lead to a loss of jobs. Furthermore, this fear is not the preserve of any 
one group. For example, plans to implement the Single European Market (SEM) program 
gave rise to vehement protests from ‘outsiders’ convinced that “Fortress Europe” would 
drastically curtail their access to these markets; during NAFTA negotiations US and 
Canadian special interest groups (i.e. ‘insiders’) voiced fears that domestic firms would 
relocate thousands of jobs to Mexico to take advantage of cheap and abundant labour1.
Often, concern over the perceived costs of globalisation will be voiced only by the 
minority, with the majority comfortable that the benefits will outweigh the costs2. 
However, to the extent that the minority can exert significant political influence (e.g. 
trade unions, specialist interest groups etc), they have a real opportunity to derail the 
progress of globalisation3. This is obviously of great concern if we believe that 
globalisation, through the mechanisms of international investment and free trade, confers 
considerable benefits across the globe.
Regardless of the explosion in international investment that has been undertaken in recent 
decades, concern regarding its effect on home exports (and hence domestic employment 
and the balance of payments) will have undoubtedly resulted in less FDI taking place than
1 Ross Perot, a former US Presidential Candidate, thought NAFTA would manifest as a “giant sucking 
sound to the South”.
2 Note that it is not only important for the benefits to outweigh the costs, but also that those costs should not 
be borne by a minority that are not entitled to compensation. Unless the ‘losers’ from a RIA are folly 
compensated out of the gains received by the beneficiaries, a Pareto optimal solution will not have been 
attained.
3 An example of this would be the emergency protections implemented by President George W. Bush to 
protect the US steel industry from overseas imports. Despite the extensive costs inflicted on other US 
industries (those which make extensive use of steel during manufacturing) and the threat of a trade war with 
the EU, the political power of the ‘Rust Belt’ States (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) meant that it 
was politically expedient to introduce the measures.
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would otherwise have been the case. This is unfortunate given the belief that FDI can be 
growth-enhancing for both home and host nations.
In this chapter we investigate whether outward FDI is in fact accompanied by a reduction 
in exports. The next section discusses the theoretical arguments regarding the 
relationship between FDI and exports. As we discussed in chapter 2, our empirical 
analysis builds on the approach favoured by Graham (1995) -  his work is reviewed in 
section 3. The results of our analysis are discussed in section four. Section five 
concludes.
5.2 THEORY
Vernon’s product-life-cycle theory implicitly assumes that FDI and exports are substitutes 
(at the individual firm level) as firms opt to invest in production facilities abroad rather 
than export directly as products mature. While this may have some relevance to the 
activities of a single firm (although it is clearly overly simplistic), it offers little insight 
into the relationship between FDI and exports at an aggregate country level. 
Unfortunately, more recent theoretical models are of little more help.
The horizontal model (also known as the proximity-concentration hypothesis) considers 
the investment decision to be a trade-off between minimising transport costs and 
exploiting plant-level economies of scale (Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1997). If 
transaction costs are high relative to economies of scale firms will be more inclined to 
undertake FDI to establish foreign subsidiaries in their target market. If transaction costs
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are low relative to economies of scale, firms will have an incentive to concentrate 
production in their home market and export to their target market abroad. Investment 
induced because of this motivation is often known as “market-seeking” FDI, and is 
commonly believed to be a substitute for exports (in this scenario FDI and exports are 
two rival modes of foreign market penetration). “Tariff-jumping” FDI may be thought of 
as a special case of market-seeking FDI, as tariffs are just one element of aggregate 
transaction costs (along with transport costs, non-tariff barriers, exchange rate uncertainty 
etc).
The vertical model (also known as the factor-proportions hypothesis) posits that firms 
undertake FDI to exploit factor price differentials across countries (Helpman, 1984; 
Helpman & Krugman, 1985). The motivation for multinationals in this scenario is 
locating production in its lowest cost geographical location (and hence this type of FDI is 
commonly known as “efficiency-seeking”). It is difficult to predict the relationship 
between FDI and exports in this situation as it will surely depend on the activities of the 
firm prior to it undertaking foreign investment.
Let us consider a number of alternate scenarios. Firstly, imagine a national firm that 
serves only its domestic market (i.e. no exports). This firm decides to relocate production 
overseas to take advantage of lower labour costs, importing the product back into its 
home market4. In this case, FDI cannot have lowered existing exports because there were 
none to begin with, but it is clear that FDI has resulted in a loss of jobs as domestic
4 The firm has obviously calculated that the labour cost savings outweigh the costs of importing the product 
back into the home market. A typical example of this would be a small US manufacturer that decided to 
locate production in Mexico following the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement.
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production has been replaced by foreign production. However, to the extent that the firm 
must now export intermediate goods (including “corporate services” or “headquarter 
services”) to its foreign subsidiary, FDI may have led to the creation of exports where 
there were none before, therefore partially offsetting the loss of domestic production jobs. 
Note, however, that even if new exports are generated where there were none before, this 
does not necessarily mean that employment in the source country will increase, as it is 
likely that these intermediate goods were already being produced (they are now being 
exported instead of consumed domestically)5. Of course, we have assumed that the firm 
has undertaken FDI because it can make efficiency gains by locating production in the 
foreign country. This implies that it will be able to lower price and increase quantity sold. 
All else being equal this should result in greater production which will require more 
intermediate goods and therefore lead to an increase in employment at home.
Secondly, consider the situation where the firm is initially a national firm that supplies to 
the domestic market and exports to a single foreign market. The firm determines that it is 
cheaper to relocate production abroad and export from there both back to its home market 
and to the foreign market it initially served by exports from home. It is clear in this case 
that FDI will have acted as a substitute for exports from the home country (though not 
‘world’ exports in aggregate). However, to the extent that FDI leads to the creation of 
trade in intermediate goods to the foreign subsidiary, the loss in exports from the source 
country may be partially offset.
5 However, it may also be reasonable to assume that the overseas subsidiary requires a greater input of 
intermediate goods per unit of output than the domestic plant did. If this is the case, relocating production
abroad will lead to greater employment at home (assuming that the cost of producing the intermediate 
goods remains constant).
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Thirdly, consider the case where the firm is already a multinational, having undertaken 
horizontal FDI to establish a second plant (in addition to the domestic one) in its target 
foreign market. It now determines that it would be cheaper to relocate its foreign plant to 
a third country and export back to the target foreign market6. On the surface it would 
appear that the firm is undertaking FDI with no effect on exports from the home country. 
However, the effect is more complicated than this, as there may be disinvestment from 
closing down the original subsidiary (i.e. selling the factory, inventory etc), there will be 
the creation of exports from the new foreign host to the old, and there may be new 
intermediate good exports from the host country to the new foreign subsidiary. What we 
can conclude is that relocation of the foreign subsidiary (i.e. the new FDI) should not lead 
to a loss of employment in the home economy.
We can introduce a variation on the third scenario to complicate matters further. Assume 
now that the new foreign subsidiary offers cheap enough production so that it becomes 
favourable to export not only to the foreign target market, but also back to the home 
economy. In this case (as in the first scenario we considered) FDI, while not leading to a 
reduction in home-country exports, may result in a loss of jobs in the home economy as 
domestic production is replaced by imports from the foreign subsidiary.
We could continue to envisage further plausible scenarios, but our discussion has 
sufficiently illustrated the point that it is not possible to make an a priori prediction for
6 Horizontal FDI is essentially being replaced by a combination of vertical FDI and exports.
8 Even under the vertical scenario in which FDI results in a complete replacement of home-country exports, 
exports of intermediate goods to the foreign affiliate should offset to some extent the negative relationship 
between FDI and exports. While this may also be true of horizontal FDI, the offset is likely to be to a lesser 
extent.
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the relationship between FDI and exports in the case of vertical FDI; in some instances 
they may be complements, in others substitutes. What we can conclude is that the 
relationship between FDI and exports should be more positive (or less negative) for 
vertical FDI than it is for horizontal FDI8.
5.2.1 Dynamic Effects
Our discussion thus far has focussed on static effects that may influence the FDI-exports 
relationship. Undoubtedly, however, there will be myriad dynamic effects. For instance, 
the establishment of a foreign subsidiary motivated by vertical FDI assumes efficiency 
gains for the firm9. This should lead to a reduction in the price of the firm’s final good 
and a corresponding increase in demand. Besides the welfare effect this should confer on 
the home economy, it should also result in an increase in intermediate good exports as 
production is increased in the foreign subsidiary to meet higher demand.
In the case of horizontal FDI, the establishment of a foreign subsidiary in a market that 
was previously served solely by exports may induce a market for the firm’s other 
products (assuming it has multiple products). This may be because the foreign presence 
improves brand loyalty in the foreign market, or because the firm gains more market 
intelligence from having a local presence, or because the establishment of the foreign 
subsidiary has included more advanced marketing and distribution services which can be 
utilised for other products, or for a number of other reasons. To the extent that these
9 Obviously this will not always be the case as there will inevitably be instances where foreign investment 
fails to meet expectations.
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other products are supplied by home-country exports, the relationship between FDI and 
exports may become less negative; even complementary.
On the other hand, it is quite possible that direct investment by one multinational may 
encourage rival firms from the home market to also undertake FDI so as to protect market 
share in the overseas market. In fact, rival firms may feel forced to replace exports with 
local foreign production even when the cost considerations do not favour FDI. Under this 
scenario, initial FDI by a single firm could potentially result in significant copy-cat 
behaviour and a considerable reduction in exports from the home industry.
Hopefully we have demonstrated the ambiguity inherent in the relationship between 
exports and FDI. Theory is inconclusive as to the exact nature of this relationship and so 
we must turn to empirical approaches to try to resolve the issue. Next we review Graham 
(1995), and related literature, as he employs an empirical approach which we intend to 
build on for our own empirical analysis.
5.3 REVIEW OF GRAHAM (1995) AND RELATED LITERATURE
We reviewed the empirical literature concerning the relationship between FDI and trade 
as part of the broader literature review of chapter 2. Recall that the majority of the 
literature can be criticised for failing to adequately address the fact that FDI and exports 
may be simultaneously determined. Studies which neglect to control for potential 
common causal factors are at risk of reporting a complementary relationship between FDI
209
and exports without being able to rule out the possibility that they are in fact simply 
spuriously correlated.
Graham (1995) employs a methodology that allows him to examine the relationship 
between FDI and exports after removing the influence of a range of variables that may 
potentially simultaneously determine both. This is a two stage process: step one involves 
running separate gravity model regressions for FDI and exports; step two regresses the 
residuals from the stage one regressions against one another. The assumption made is 
that stage one removes any simultaneity bias, leaving the coefficient in stage two to give 
an unbiased indication of the nature of the relationship between FDI and exports.
Graham (1995) applied this methodology to test the relationship between FDI and exports 
for both the US and Japan. His sample comprised 40 destination countries for US FDI 
and exports, and 36 destination countries for Japanese FDI and exports. For both the US 
and Japan, the samples were further subdivided into three subsets: only those countries 
located in Europe; only those countries located in the western hemisphere; only those 
countries located in East Asia. The two-stage process was repeated for three separate 
years (1983, 1988 and 1991) with roughly consistent results (Graham therefore elected 
only to report and discuss the results pertaining to the 1991 data).
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Graham’s regression results from step one reveal that the gravity model specification 
provides a good overall fit for the US sample and subsamples. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 repeat 
his results for FDI and exports respectively.
Although the gravity methodology employed in the previous two chapters differs from 
Graham’s (i.e. our analysis utilises panel data and includes multiple source countries and 
additional explanatory variables), it is interesting to contrast our results with his. For the 
world sample, Graham found that variability in host per capita income, host population, 
and distance can explain 60% of the variability in US FDI. This is slightly higher than 
the R values reported in chapter 3 (despite the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables in our specification), suggesting that the gravity model is a better descriptor of
1 RFDI for the US than it is for developed countries in general . As expected, the 
coefficient on host per capita income is positive and statistically significant19. The 
coefficient on host population is positive (although not statistically significant) which is at 
odds with the negative (statistically significant) coefficient reported in chapter 3. Given 
that host population is likely to be correlated with the income per capita variable in 
Graham’s specification (causing multicollinearity problems) it is not surprising that the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Encouragingly, the reported coefficient o f -0.77 
for the distance variable is very similar to the range of values (-0.64 to -0.50) reported in 
table 3.5 of chapter 3).
18 Alternatively, the higher R2 reported by Graham may simply reflect differences in methodology and 
dataset (i.e. Graham uses cross-section data for a single year whereas we employ pooled cross-section time- 
series data for 13 years).
19 Although we did not include per capita income as an explanatory variable, the coefficients on income and 
population (see Table 3.5 of chapter 3) indicate that its inclusion (in place of income and population 
separately) would have yielded a positive coefficient.
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Table 5.1 Stage-one Results for US Foreign Direct Investment Abroad, Graham (1995)
Host per capita 


















Notes: The dependent variable is US FDI (1991). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Graham (1995)
Table 5.2 Stage-one results for US exports, Graham (1995)
Host per capita 



















Notes: The dependent variable is US exports (1991). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Graham (1995)
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The results for the Europe, Western Hemisphere and East Asia subsamples are interesting 
because they suggest that different factors are important in attracting US FDI depending 
on the location of the host nation. For Europe, income per capita is not statistically 
significant and distance has an implausibly large negative coefficient of -9.57. Population 
appears to be the most important determinant of US FDI21. For the Western Hemisphere 
and East Asia subsamples, income per capita is dominant while population and distance 
are not statistically significant.
For the world sample applied to US exports, Graham reports an R2 of 0.54. It is 
somewhat surprising that this is lower than the R for his FDI regression as the gravity 
model typically performs better when applied to trade than to investment. Indeed, we 
report significantly higher R2 values for our export model of between 0.81 and 0.83 (see 
Table 4.2 of chapter 4). As for the FDI regression, the coefficient on income per capita is 
positive and statistically significant, but the population coefficient is positive and lacks 
statistical significance. The distance coefficient has a negative coefficient that is roughly 
half of the magnitude of those reported in Table 4.2 (they vary between -0.76 and -0.64 
depending on which additional explanatory variables are included).
The gravity model appears much less successful at explaining the location of US exports 
in the three subsamples (although Graham seems to pay this little regard). Although the
21 Graham suggests that the seeming unimportance of income per capita may be due to the fact that this 
variable differs little between countries within this subsample and so cannot be accurately estimated. This 
may also be an explanation for the reported distance coefficient (as the relative distance between the US 
and each European country varies little).
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independent variables are jointly significant for the Europe and East Asia subsamples (as 
evidenced by F-tests), none of the variables are individually significant. Only distance is 
statistically significant for the Western Hemisphere sample. It would appear that the 
subsamples (and possibly the sample as a whole) is either plagued by multicollinearity, or 
suffers from too few observations (or perhaps both).
Table 5.3 below repeats Graham’s results for the second-stage regressions for the US 
sample and subsamples. To recount, the residuals from the gravity equations in stage one 
are regressed against each other: a positive coefficient is interpreted as evidence of 
complementarity; a negative coefficient as evidence of substitutability.
The positive coefficient for the world sample indicates that US exports and US outward 
FDI are global complements (the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level). A 
similar result is found for the Europe and East Asia subsamples, but a statistically 
significant negative coefficient is reported for the Western Hemisphere.
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East Asia 0.524 0.228




Graham suggests that the sign for the Western Hemisphere sample may be negative 
(indicating that US exports and FDI are substitutes in relation to Western Hemisphere 
countries) because of the legacy of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) policies 
adopted in many Latin American countries during the 1970s and early 1980s. Under 
these policies, multinationals were induced to establish local production facilities which 
operated behind protectionist walls (sourcing most, if not all, intermediate goods from 
local firms). This type of foreign investment is therefore more likely to substitute for 
exports than the type of foreign investment undertaken by US multinationals in countries 
located in Europe and East Asia. Although most Latin American countries abandoned 
their ISI policies during the later 1980s, Graham believes that their effect may have 
survived into the 1990s. He supports this argument by citing results for the Western 
Hemisphere sample with Canada removed -  the coefficient on the second stage regression 
becomes greater in magnitude (-0.955 instead of -0.866) and achieves greater statistical 
significance.
Graham’s Japanese sample comprises 36 host countries, which he further subdivides into 
East Asia and non-East Asia samples22. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the stage-one results for 
Japanese outward FDI and Japanese exports respectively. The gravity model appears to 
successfully model Japanese exports, but performs inadequately when applied to FDI. 
Given the small number of observations (particularly for the subsamples) the poor fit for 
FDI is perhaps not surprising if we recall that the gravity model typically performs better 
for trade data than it does for investment data.
22 Australia and New Zealand are included in the East Asia subsample.
216
Table 5.4 Stage-one results for Japanese Foreign Direct Investment Abroad, Graham (1995)
Host per capita 
income Host population Distance R2
World 0.48 0.45 0.01 0.18(0.20) (0.20) (0.45)





0.61East Asia 0.088(0.33) (0.47) (1.02)
Notes: The dependent variable is Japanese overseas FDI (1991). Figures in parentheses are 
standard errors.
Source: Graham (1995)
Table 5.5 Stage-one Results for Japanese Foreign Exports, Graham (1995)




























The second stage results for Japan are in Table 5.6 below. As with the results for the US, 
we interpret the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the World and Non- 
East Asia samples as indicating that Japanese FDI and exports are both global 
complements, as well as complements with respect to Non-East Asia nations23. The 
coefficient for the East Asia sample however, although positive, is not statistically 
significant. Graham argues that this result is driven solely by the presence of Indonesia in 
the subsample; when it is removed from the East Asia sample the second-stage coefficient 
becomes statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (a value of 1.15 with a 
standard error of 0.23). To this he attributes a similar explanation as to that for US FDI in 
the Western Hemisphere - Indonesia has long been a recipient of Japanese FDI that has 
been motivated in response to import substituting industrialisation (ISI) policies.
Using the same methodology as was applied to the US and Japan, Graham and Liu (1998) 
investigate the relationship between FDI and exports for Taiwan and South Korea. Over 
the last decade relative labour costs in these countries have risen and in response 
Taiwanese and Korean firms have moved towards more capital intensive activities, 
moving some of their more labour intensive production activities offshore. As a result, 
the trade impact of FDI has become an important question for policymakers in these 
countries.
23 Notice that the magnitude of the coefficient is greater for Non-East Asia than for the World sample. 
Interpreting this literally would suggest that the relationship between Japanese FDI and exports is more 
complementary with respect to Non-East Asia countries than it is globally. Furthermore, Japanese FDI and 
exports would seem to have a more complementary relationship than US FDI and exports.
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Table 5.6 Second-stage Regression of Residuals on Residuals (Japan), Graham (1995)
Coefficient Standard Error
World 0.97 0.20
Non-East Asia 1.35 0.28
East Asia 0.31 0.39




Table 5.7 shows the second-stage results for both Taiwan and South Korea. In addition to 
estimating the stage one gravity model using the three explanatory variables employed by 
Graham (1995), the authors include a series of dummy variables they suspect may be 
relevant in determining both FDI and exports24. In each instance the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. The evidence therefore 
indicates that outward FDI and exports, for both Taiwan and Korea, are complements. 
Furthermore, given that the magnitude of these coefficients is greater than those for either 
the US and Japan (except for South Korea when compared with Japan’s non-East Asia 
subsample), it would seem that the complementary relationship is stronger for the two 
Tiger economies than it is for either the US or Japan25.
24 Three dummy variables are included to try to capture the effects of a common language, development
status, and geographical location.
25 To reiterate, however, we should be cautious making literal interpretations based on the magnitude ot the 
coefficients.
Table 5.7 Second-stage Regression of Residuals on Residuals (Taiwan and South Korea), 




South Korea3 1.25 5.45
South Korea15 1.09 3.89
Notes: Regression of (stage one) gravity equation export residuals on gravity equation FDI 
residuals.a indicates the model without dummies.b indicates the model with dummies.
Source: Graham and Liu (1998)
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It is also interesting to note that the magnitude of the coefficients for both Taiwan and 
South Korea fall when dummy variables are included in the stage-one gravity equations. 
A possible explanation for this is that the unexplained variation remaining following the 
stage-one regression of FDI and exports using Graham and Liu’s simple model (without 
dummies) is spuriously contributing to inflated stage-two coefficient values. When this 
unexplained variability is reduced following the inclusion of the three dummy variables in 
the stage-one regression, the spurious correlation is minimised and the stage-two 
coefficients fall in magnitude. Of course, given that we cannot completely eliminate 
unexplained variability (i.e. achieve an R2 equal to one) it is probable that the stage-two 
coefficient will incorporate an element of spurious correlation (at least to the extent that 
FDI and exports are jointly determined by a third factor in practice). The aim therefore 
becomes to minimise the unexplained variability remaining after the stage-one 
regressions by ensuring that the model is correctly specified and includes all relevant 
explanatory variables.
Di Mauro (2000), employing Graham’s methodology, introduces some variables linked to 
economic integration in order to “clean even further the remaining information in the 
residuals” (p. 11/12). Interestingly, Di Mauro considers this a supplementary way of 
testing the complementarity versus substitutability question. She argues that prima facie 
evidence could be provided by observing the coefficient on a tariff variable in a 
regression with FDI as the dependent variable. A positive and statistically significant 
coefficient would support the ‘tariff-jumping’ argument (“a synonym for exports and FDI 
being substitutes” (p. 12)). In making this argument, however, Di Mauro seems to 
overlook the possibility that FDI and exports may be substitutes with respect to tariffs,
222
but complements in an aggregate sense. As we have discussed, tariff-jumping is just one 
of several possible motives for undertaking foreign investment. While this motive may 
displace exports to some extent, other motives may actually encourage exports to such a 
degree that the overall relationship is one of complementarity. Furthermore, the finding 
of a negative or statistically insignificant tariff coefficient does not necessarily imply that 
FDI and exports are complements. We should not therefore rely on such evidence as 
indicating complementarity of substitutability, but rather interpret with regard to the 
existence or otherwise of one particular motive for FDI (i.e. the tariff-jumping motive).
Di Mauro employs the following model for her stage-one regressions:
In Yi . = a  + SUMGDPjj +  p 2SIMSIZE~ + fi^RELENDO W-j
+^DISTy  + fi5TARij + fi6NTB.. + f^ERVy + R f l j  +
where: Yy represents either FDI or exports from country i (home) to country j  (host); 
SUMGDP represents the sum of GDPs of the home and host economies; SIMSIZE is a 
measure of how similar the home and host are in terms of GDP; RELENDOW is a 
measure of the difference in per capita incomes of the home and host; DIST is the relative 
distance between home and host; TAR is the level of tariff faced by goods and services 
exported from the home to the host; NTB is a measure of non-tariff barriers between 
home and host; ERV is a measure of the exchange rate variability; and Cl is a measure of 
corruption in the host country.
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Although she argues that her model can easily be recognised as the gravity model, it is a 
variant of the one typically employed. The inclusion of the SIMSIZE and RELENDOW 
variables is intended to capture aspects of both the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ theories of 
multinational activity.
Di Mauro estimates her stage-one model using cross-section data for three separate years 
(1998, 1993 and 1996). France, Germany, Italy, UK, Japan, South Korea, Canada and the 
US constitute her sample of home countries, with both OECD and non-OECD members 
included as host countries26. In general, the exports equation performs better than the FDI 
equation in terms of goodness of fit (i.e. higher adjusted R2 and lower standard errors). In 
both equations the variables SUMGDP, SIMSIZE and DIST are significant and have the 
expected sign. Evidence that exports are positively affected by similarity in size between 
home and host is taken as support for the Helpman and Krugman (1985) theory of intra­
industry trade. The RELENDOW variable shows a positive coefficient for exports, but is 
not statistically significant for FDI. The author interprets this as evidence that both intra­
industry trade and inter-industry trade co-exist, but the former is the more dominant of the 
two. Furthermore, she argues that FDI is not driven by differences in factor endowments, 
but rather by the similarity of countries. This provides support for the ‘horizontal’ theory, 
in favour of the ‘vertical’ theory, of multinational activity.
26 S ou th  K orea  is  in clu d ed  to represent the  ex p erien ce  o f  em erg in g  e co n o m ies , m a n y  o f  w h om  are 
b e c o m in g  n e t in vestors h av in g  trad itionally  b een  n et recip ien ts o f  F D I. G iven  the p otentia l d ifferen ce  in  
m o tiv e s  firm s from  South  K orea  m a y  h a v e  to  undertake outw ard F D I com pared  w ith  firm s from  the group  
o f  ad v a n ced  industrial n a tion s, it  w o u ld  h a v e  b een  in teresting  had D i M auro tested  her m od e l both w ith  and 
w ith o u t S ou th  K orea. That w ou ld  h a v e  enab led  us to ascertain  w h eth er  the  in c lu sio n  o f  S outh  K orea w a s in  
a n y  w a y  in flu e n c in g  the overa ll resu lts.
2  ^ A s  p r e v io u s ly  m en tion ed , D i M auro interprets th is as pvivnci fcicic ev id en ce  that exports and F D I are in  
fa ct co m p lem en ts. H ow ev er , w e  w o u ld  argue that lack  o f  support for the “tariff-jum ping” argum ent d oes  
n o t in  i t s e l f  translate as ev id en ce  o f  com plem entarity .
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As expected, the distance coefficient is greater in magnitude for exports than it is for FDI 
(indicating that geographical distance has a greater dampening effect on exports than on 
investment). Exchange rate variability has a negative impact on exports but is never 
statistically significant with respect to FDI. Its inclusion has little impact on the 
magnitude of the remaining explanatory variables. The tariff and non-tariff barrier 
variables (classed as the ‘commercial’ variables by Di Mauro) both have the expected 
negative effect on exports. The tariff variable, however, is not statistically significant in 
the FDI regression, revealing an absence of support for the “tariff-jumping” motive28. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for NTB is negative with respect to FDI29.
The corruption index (Cl) variable is generally positive for both exports and FDI, 
indicating that perceived corruption can act as a disincentive for both exporters and 
investors30. This result is interesting in highlighting the potential flaw in many of the 
earlier empirical studies: as FDI and exports are both positively influenced by less 
corruption, omitting this variable from the stage-one regressions could contribute to a 
false finding in favour of complementarity in stage two.
Di Mauro’s second-stage results are shown in Table 5.8. Although the t-statistic reported 
for 1996 is 0.13, she states that “for all three years considered the coefficients are positive
29 D i M auro su g g ests  th e  n eg a tiv e  sign  for the N T B  variab le cou ld  b e  exp la in ed  in  term s o f  m arket 
a c c e s s ib ility  and sunk co sts  (1£w h en  foreign  firm s in v e st  in  a h o st country, th ey  incur sunk co sts  in  setting  
up the  a ffilia tes; i f  th ey  can n ot a ccess  a larger m arket, n o t b eca u se  o f  tariffs but b eca u se  o f  N T B s, their 
lo s s e s  can  b e  ev en  greater than for exporters” (p .2 1)).
30 T h e C l variab le  is  constructed  so  that le s s  corrupt e co n o m ies  h av e  h igh er ratings. T herefore, a p o sitiv e  
c o e f f ic ie n t  in d ica tes that le s s  corrupt countries (or at least th o se  perceived to  b e  le s s  corrupt) attract m ore  
exp orts and in v estm en t, all e lse  b e in g  equal.
225
and highly significant” (p.21). This suggests that the t-statistic reported for 1996 is a 
misprint; the similarity in estimated coefficients suggests that 0.13 is in fact the standard 
error (which implies that the 1996 coefficient of 0.98 is highly statistically significant). 
Correcting for the misprint, the relationship between exports and FDI is fairly consistent 
for all three years, staying close to a one-for-one relationship. The results therefore 
suggest that FDI and exports are complements, with a given increase in FDI generally 
leading to a roughly similar increase in exports.
Table 5.9 summarises the findings of the empirical literature discussed above. The 
support for complementarity (indicated by a *+’ symbol) is striking. However, as Graham 
(1995) observes, many of the earlier studies can be accused of ignoring the possibility 
that spurious correlation may be behind the finding of a positive relationship between 
exports and FDI. Although the most recent papers (Graham (1995), Graham and Li 
(1998), Di Mauro (2000)) provide some comfort that this is not the case, it is still possible 
that unexplained variation remaining following stage one is clouding the result of stage 
two.
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Notes: Regression of (stage one) gravity equation export residuals on gravity equation FDI 
residuals. * Actual figure reported in Di Mauro (2000) is 0.13, but it is likely that this is in fact the 
standard error.
Source: Di Mauro (2000)
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Table 5.9 Summary of the Empirical Literature
Paper Relationship
Gruber et al. (1967) -
Reddaway (1968) +
Hufbauer & Adler (1968) +
Horst (1972) -
Lipsey & Weiss (1981) +
Lipsey & Weiss (1984) +
Blomstrom et al. (1988) +
Pearce (1990) +
Grubert & Mutti (1991) +
Graham (1995) +
Graham & Li (1998) +
Di Mauro (2000) +
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When discussing FDI and exports there is a tendency to assume the relationship is either 
one of complementarity or one of substitutability. However, theory tells us that the 
relationship is not likely to be so clear cut. Rather, substitutability-driving forces (such as 
tariff-jumping FDI) and complementarity-driving forces (such as intra-firm trade) coexist 
and jointly govern the nature and strength of the relationship between FDI and exports31. 
These forces will undoubtedly vary depending on the characteristics of the home and host 
nations, as well as the characteristics and motives of the firms involved.
It is a common assertion that trade between industrial nations is dominated by intra­
industry trade and that multinational enterprises are more likely to be motivated by 
strategic rather than factor cost considerations. In this case, exports and FDI are liable to 
be alternative methods of servicing foreign markets33. This suggests that the relationship 
between FDI and exports when the home and host countries are both advanced industrial 
nations may tend more towards substitutability than complementarity.
In the case where the home country is an industrial nation and the host is a developing 
country, multinationals are likely to be predominately engaged in efficiency-seeking FDI. 
Foreign investment allows multinationals to combine their advantage in capital, 
technology and know-how with natural resources and/or low cost labour that are often 
abundant in developing countries. Therefore, the motivations behind investment and the
31 Instead  o f  th in k in g  o f  the relationsh ip  in term s o f  tw o  d iscrete sta tes (i.e . com p lem en tarity  v s.
su b stitu tab ility ), le t us co n sid er  a spectrum  o f  p o ss ib ilit ie s  ranging b etw een  the tw o  extrem es.
33 A lth o u g h  F D I m a y b e  part o f  a strategic p ro cess (i.e . a resp onse  to  the activ ities o f  a rival) and the  
d e c is io n  to in v est  m a y  b e  in dependent o f  export con sid eration s, there w ill a lm ost certain ly  b e  a p o st­
in v estm en t im pact on  exports.
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motivations behind exporting are likely to differ. While FDI is primarily engaged in the 
production of labour intensive goods or the provision of labour intensive services (e.g. 
basic assembling activities or call centres), exports will tend to be of capital intensive 
goods and services (e.g. finished consumer goods, capital goods). Subsequently, an 
increase in FDI may not result in a corresponding decrease in exports. The relationship is 
therefore likely to be characterised by a greater degree of complementarity than the 
relationship between two industrial nations.
For FDI and exports between two developing countries the relationship is likely to be 
governed by similar forces as those that act between a developed and a developing 
country. The ability to invest overseas (at least in significant amounts) is typically 
limited to those developing countries classed as newly industrialising (such as South 
Korea, Brazil etc). Newly-industrialising countries have proven a popular location for 
labour intensive production facilities from developed countries, but rising unit labour 
costs in recent years has seen these countries attempt to move up the ‘production ladder’ 
into more capital and knowledge intensive activities. They themselves have begun to 
move labour intensive production offshore to countries less developed than themselves. 
The effect of such a transition on exports will depend crucially on the activities of the 
multinational in the fist instance: if it had originally been producing at home for the 
domestic market then it will not suffer a loss in exports (though imports are likely to rise 
and domestic employment may suffer); if it had been producing for both the domestic 
market and overseas then exports may be displaced .
34 N o te , h o w ev er , that B a la n ce  o f  P aym ents shou ld  n o t b e  d isadvantaged  g iv en  that d om estic  firm s w ill b e  
th e  u ltim ate b en efic ia r ies  o f  the activ ities  o f  their overseas subsid iaries.
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Note from our earlier discussion of the empirical literature that there is some support, 
albeit limited, for the hypothesis that the relationship will vary according to the 
characteristics of the two countries involved. Using a Tobit model on a pooled data set, 
Carr et al. (2001) find that a “bilateral increase in parent and host-country trade 
costs...generally decreases affiliate production when the non-US country is a developing 
country (‘complements’) but increases affiliate production when the non-US country is 
another high-income country (‘substitutes’)” (p.705).
Although Lipsey & Weiss (1984) find in favour of overall complementarity, the second 
stage coefficient is greater in magnitude for the developing countries subsample than it is 
for the developed countries subsample. The authors state that this “suggests that much of 
the relationship to worldwide parent exports may involve exports to the less developed 
areas” (p.3 06)35.
The results of Carr et al. (2001) and Lipsey & Weiss (1984) support our contention that 
the relationship between FDI and exports will be more substitutable (or at least less 
complementary) when both home and host are developed nations, than when the host is a 
developing country. However, Graham (1995) reports a result that is at odds with this 
hypothesis. He finds a complementary relationship in aggregate, but reports a negative 
relationship for US FDI to the Western Hemisphere. When Canada is removed from the 
Western Hemisphere sample (leaving only developing countries or newly industrialising
35 A lth o u g h  w e  h a v e  ca u tio n ed  aga in st m a k in g  a literal in terpretation  o f  the  m agn itu d e o f  the  co e ffic ie n ts ,  
le t  u s d o  so  h ere  to  illu stra te  the  p o in t. T h e au th or’s resu lts im p ly  that an in crea se  in  n e t  a ffilia te  sa le s  o f  $1 
w il l  lea d , ce ter is  p arib is, to  an in crea se  in  exp orts o f  6  cen ts to  a d e v e lo p e d  cou n try  b ut o f  21 cen ts to  a le s s  
d e v e lo p e d  country.
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countries) the second stage coefficient becomes increasingly negative. This suggests that 
the relationship between two industrial countries may be complementary, while the 
relationship between an industrial country and a developed one may be governed by 
substitutability. Note, however, Graham himself suggests that this finding may result 
from the legacy of import-substituting industrialisation adopted by many Latin American 
countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, his results are based on limited 
observations and apply specifically to the case of outward FDI from the US.
5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We now turn to our own empirical analysis of this issue. As discussed, the main focus 
will be to investigate whether the relationship between FDI and exports is dependent on 
the characteristics of the countries involved. This is a departure from most previous 
studies which seem to implicitly assume that the relationship is constant across countries 
and time.
In the preceding section we discussed how the relationship between FDI and exports may 
vary depending on the status of the home and host countries (i.e. developed or 
developing). Due to data limitations (specifically the lack of reliable outward FDI data 
for developing countries) we are unfortunately unable to empirically test situations in 
which the home country is a developing country. This means that we are limited to 
developed-to-developed and developed-to-developing cases. Given that, in aggregate,
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developed nations accounted for approximately 92% of global outward FDI in 2004 and 
approximately 63% of global exports, we are still being afforded a fairly accurate picture 
of the general global situation despite the absence of developing countries in the list of 
home nations. However, developing countries are becoming increasingly important 
outward investors, and so the consistent collection of accurate data for these countries 
should be a priority.
In order to try to minimise the problem that FDI and exports may be simultaneously 
determined by a third factor, we follow the methodology used by Graham (1995). As 
discussed previously, this involves a two-stage process. First, separate gravity model 
regressions are estimated with FDI and exports as the dependent variables. The residuals 
(i.e. unexplained variability) from these two regressions are then regressed against each 
other. A positive coefficient in the second-stage regression is taken as evidence of 
complementarity; a negative coefficient as evidence of substitutability. By adopting a 
two-stage process we attempt to remove all observable factors which may simultaneously 
determine both exports and FDI before then examining the direction, if any, of the 
remaining correlation.
Having previously analysed the effects of regional integration agreements on FDI and 
exports (chapters 3 and 4), we have already ascertained our favoured gravity model 
specification for estimating the stage-one regressions:
233
[5.1]
In FDI.jt = « 0 + A  ln 1// + P2 to Yjt + A ln % + A ln »y/ + P s 111 d ij + PeE U ijt +  P iNAFTAijt + P jionE U pU j 
+P9nonNAFTA.NAFTA. + PwEUinonEU] + ^ , NAFTArionNAFTA. + /?12CZ.. + ^13C5.. +
[5-2]
ln X., = a 0 + /?, ln K, + A  ln 7 V + p 3 ln n/; + £  ln n + £  ln F  + P6EUip + P^AFTA.., + PjionEU .E U . 
+P9nonNAFTA.NAFTA. + p^EU.nonEU. + puNAFTA.nonNAFTA. +  P I2C F  + PaCBi} + /a.,
Where the dependent variables FDIijt is outward investment from country i to country j  at 
time t, and Xyt is exports from country i to country j  at time t. The independent variables 
(ignoring country and time subscripts) are defined as follows: Y is gross domestic 
product; n is population; d is great circle distance between capital cities. These are the 
standard ‘gravity variables’. The remaining variables are a series of dummy variables 
intended to capture various factors thought to influence both FDI and exports: EUy is 
unity when both home and host countries are members of the European Union; NAFTAy 
is unity when home and host are both members of NAFTA; nEUMUj is unity when the 
home country is not a member of the EU but the host is; nNAiNAj is unity when the home 
country is not a member of NAFTA but the host is; EUinEUj is unity when the home 
country is a member of the EU but the host country is not; NAynNAj is unity when the 
home country is a member of NAFTA but the host is not; CLy is unity, when the home and 
host countries share a common language; CBy is unity when the home and host countries 
share a common border.
We may recall from the previous chapters that we experimented with a wide range of 
explanatory variables to investigate which factors have a statistically significant influence
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on FDI and/or exports37. Not all of the variables that proved to be statistically significant 
have been included in equations [5.1] and [5.2] as we favoured a parsimonious model. In 
this manner, we hope to leave as little unexplained variability as possible following the 
stage-one gravity regressions, while avoiding the temptation to simply data mine38.
Columns 5.1a and 5.1b of Table 5.10 report the first-stage results when equations [5.1] 
and [5.2] are estimated using our entire panel dataset spanning the period 1992 to 2003. 
Although such a comprehensive sample would often be referred to as a ‘world’ sample in 
the literature (i.e. from the results general inferences concerning the determinants of FDI 
and exports at a ‘world’ or ‘global’ level would be made), it is important to remember
■5Q
that the home countries in our sample consist solely of advanced industrial nations .
The results shown in columns 5.1a and 5.1b have already been reviewed in detail in 
chapters 3 and 4 so we do not intend to repeat this discussion here. However, let us 
summarise the main findings: first, the ‘standard gravity variables’ are all statistically 
significant (with the exception of home population in the exports regression) and have the 
expected sign; second, common membership of the EU exhibits a positive effect on both 
FDI and exports, but the effect is stronger for FDI; third, common membership of 
NAFTA does not have a statistically significant effect; fourth, sharing a common 
language has a positive effect on both FDI and exports, but again the effect is stronger
37 In addition to the standard gravity variables, we tested variables including a measure of corruption, the 
rate of inflation, economic growth etc. For an exhaustive account see chapters 3 and 4.
38 Ideally, all unexplained variability remaining following the first stage FDI regression would be due solely 
to the influence of exports (and vice versa). Obviously this will not be the case in reality and we must be 
mindful of this when interpreting the second stage coefficient.
39 To restate, the home countries in the sample are: US, Belgium/Luxembourg, Germany, UK, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Denmark, Finland and Norway.
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for FDI; fifth, sharing a common border has a positive effect on both FDI and exports, but 
the effect is stronger for exports.
As we have discussed, in order to try to ensure that the second-stage results do not suffer 
from spurious correlation, it is important to minimise, as far as possible, the unexplained
variability that remains following the stage-one regressions. With this in mind, the
.2adjusted R for the exports regression is encouraging as it indicates that 83% of the 
variability in exports is explained by the explanatory variables specified in [5.2]. The 
adjusted R2 for the FDI regression is not as high, however, with 51% of the variability in 
FDI explained by the independent variables40. This means that 49% of the variability in 
FDI is unexplained, not an inconsiderable amount41. Unfortunately, there is no simple 
solution to this problem -  the gravity model is simply not as successful at modelling 
investment as it is at modelling trade.
Having estimated equations [5.1] and [5.2] we are able to calculate the residuals for both 
FDI and exports42. Figure 5.1 plots the residuals against one another. There is a clear 
positive relationship between the residuals. The first row (‘total sample’) of Table 5.11 
reports the second-stage results when the export residuals are regressed against the FDI 
residuals. The coefficient is positive (0.83) and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, FDI and exports from developed countries to the rest of the world appear to be 
complements.
40 This is broadly consistent with previous empirical studies.
41 It is not surprising that there is a considerable amount of unexplained variability for FDI. The decision to 
invest (compared to the decision to export) is likely to be more nuanced, depending on such intangible 
concepts as strategy, and expectations of the future political and economic environment of the host country. 
That it is difficult to capture all such effects with readily-measurable variables is perhaps to be expected.
42 Residuals are the difference between the actual and fitted values.
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Table 5.10 First-stage Regression Results
Explanatory 5.1a 5.1b 5.2a 5.2b 5.3a 5.3bVariables






2.82 0.94 2.60 0.97 3.19 0.93
(19.13) (14.58) (14.32) (14.78) (12.97) (7.91)
In Yj
0.74 0.82 0.72 0.75 0.96 1.04
(24.29) (66.70) (14.95) (44.77) (13.84) (35.53)
In Nj
-2.04 -0.08 -1.82 -0.20 -2.34 0.06
(13.99) (1.29) (10.24) (3.08) (9.50) (0.52)
In Nj
-0.17 -0.12 -0.13 0.002 -0.31 -0.29
(7.16) (12.04) (2.56) (0.11) (8.60) (17.57)
Indij
-0.51 -0.64 -0.78 -0.69 -0.07 -0.70









































0.67 0.29 0.69 0.19 0.52 0.50
EUinEUj (6.26) (6.71) (4.97) (3.99) (3.10) (6.90)
0.07 -0.20 0.56 -0.36 -0.66 0.06
NAinNAj (0.53) (3.64) (3.26) (6.12) (3.13) (0.67)
1.32 0.53 1.09 0.51 1.54 0.55











176 1,022 106 784 68.5 349
F-statistic (24,3859) (24,4873) (24,2423) (24,2912) (19,1408) (19,1933)
R 2
Obs.
0.52 0.83 0.51 0.86 0.47 0.77
3,884 4,898 2,448 2,937 1,428 1,953
Notes: D ependent variable is either the natural log o f  FD I o r the natural log o f  exports from  country i to 
country j .  Figures in parentheses are absolute t-ratios. Year dummies are not reported. The t subscript 










Figure 5.1 Plot of FDI Residuals against Export Residuals
46 As we have commented previously, we would ideally like to test the relationship to changes in both the 
home and host country, but limitations in data availability mean that this is not an option.
Table 5.11 Stage-Two Regressions of FDI Residuals against Export Residuals
Coefficient t-statistic





Relative per capita income < 1 1.28 14.96
Relative per capita income >1 0.69 17.69
Urbanisation ratio < 1 0.91 15.43
Urbanisation ratio £:1 0.78 18.13
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In terms of magnitude, the coefficient is approximately twice the value of that reported by 
Graham (1995) for US FDI and exports, but slightly less than the coefficient he reports 
for Japanese FDI and exports and less than the coefficients reported by Di Mauro (0.98 to 
1.20).
Finding in favour of complementarity at an aggregate, or ‘global’, level is common to 
most studies on this topic. What we want to do now is investigate whether this 
relationship changes depending on the nature of the host country46. To begin, we follow a 
similar approach to Graham (1995) and divide our dataset into different subsamples. 
Whereas Graham selects his samples according to geographical region, however, we 
select our sample according to the level of development of the host country47. 
Accordingly, we divide our dataset into OECD and non-OECD subsamples (i.e. if the 
host country is an OECD member it will be part of the OECD subsample, if not it will be 
part of the non-OECD sample)48. The first-stage results for the two subsamples are given 
in columns 5.2a to 5.3b of Table 5.10.
Columns 5.2a and 5.2b report the results for the OECD subsample. All of the coefficients 
have the expected sign and are of a similar level of statistical significance as in the full 
sample. The only exception is the coefficient on host population for the exports 
regression, which has gone from being highly statistically significant in the full sample to 
being statistically insignificant. This suggests that the presence of a few heavily
47 We choose to make level of development the decision criteria (rather than region) because it is this that 
we think may affect the relationship between FDI and exports.
48 The OECD sample accounts for 63% and 60% of total observations (from our full sample) for FDI and 
exports respectively. Accordingly, the non-OECD sample accounts for 37% and 40 A> respectively.
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populated non-OECD countries (such as China and India) may be driving the negative 
coefficient in the full sample results49.
The results for the non-OECD subsample are reported in columns 5.3a and 5.3b of Table 
5.10. Again, the results are in line with those for the full sample. Note that some of the 
dummy variables have been automatically dropped because of insufficient observations. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on the distance variable is not statistically significant with 
respect to FDI. This suggests that distance does not act as a deterrent for investment to 
non-OECD countries.
Having estimated the first-stage regression for both sub-samples we now turn to the 
second-stage regressions of residuals against residuals. The results are reported in rows 2 
and 3 of Table 5.11. Both coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. However, the OECD coefficient is twice the magnitude of the non-OECD 
coefficient. Although previously we have cautioned against interpreting the magnitude of 
these second-stage coefficients literally, this is nevertheless an indication that the 
complementary relationship between FDI and exports is stronger when the home and host 
nations are both developed countries than when the home country is developed but the 
host is developing.
The above statement relies on OECD membership being an accurate classification of 
whether a country is developed or developing. Perhaps this is not ideal classification
49 This is supported by the results for the exports non-OECD subsample (column 5.3b) which reports a 
coefficient for host population that is high in both magnitude and statistical significance.
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criteria. As an alternative we choose an arbitrary cut-off of US$10,000 (constant 2000 
dollars) for host country per capita income. All observations for which the host country 
has a per capita income greater than this will be classed as developed; observations below 
this threshold will be classed as developing50. The first-stage regression results are very 
similar to those for the OECD and non-OECD subsamples (and so are not reported here 
for brevity). Table 5.11 reports the second-stage results in rows 5 and 6. They too are 
very similar to the previous results and continue to support the notion that the relationship 
between FDI and exports is stronger for developed-developed interactions (coefficient of 
1.13) than it is for developed-developing interactions (coefficient of 0.57).
Unfortunately, our analysis is still far from ideal. We have results that clearly support the 
hypothesis that the relationship between FDI and exports (at least the strength of that 
relationship if not the direction also) is dependent upon the home and host countries 
involved. Instead of imposing an arbitrary criterion to categorise the host countries 
however, we would somehow like the data itself to tell us what the correct criteria should 
be. To this end, we now experiment with allowing the sub-samples to ‘self-select’ 
themselves based on the relative value of various variables.
In chapter 3 we introduced a number of additional explanatory variables (in addition to 
the ones utilised in specifications [5.1] and [5.2] in this chapter). Although these 
variables proved not to be strong determinants of FDI or exports, they are useful in 
allowing us to divide our sample for the purposes at hand. Table 5.12 describes the
50 The ‘developed’ sample accounts for 57% and 55% of total observations (from our full sample) for FDI 
and exports respectively. Accordingly, the ‘developing’ sample accounts for 43 /o and 45 /o respectively.
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variables that we have used to partition our full sample into subsamples. The variables 
are GDP per capita, unit labour costs, a measure of electrical efficiency, urbanisation, and 
the number of internet connections per thousand population.
In order to allow the sample to ‘self-select’, we calculate the bilateral ratio for each 
variable (i.e. home country value divided by host country value). If the ratio is equal to or 
greater than one then the observation is assigned to one group and if the ratio is less than 
one the observation is assigned to another group. In this manner we create a series of 
dual sub-samples partitioned according to the relative values of these variables for the 
home and host countries.
Given the similarity in results, we chose to report and discuss only those for the sub­
samples divided according to the ratio of per capita incomes and urbanisation (the results 
for the subsamples ‘self-selected’ according to energy efficiency, unit labour costs, and 
internet connections are not materially different). The first-stage results for the per capita 
income subsamples are shown in Table 5.13. The majority of the coefficients are 
statistically significant and correspond well with previous results. An interesting effect 
has occurred for the second subsample however, with a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for host income and statistically significant positive coefficient for host 
population for both the FDI and exports regressions (see columns 5.4a and 5.4b)51. This 
indicates that when the investing country has lower per capita income than the recipient
51 By ‘first’ subsample we mean the sample containing those observations for which the home country has a 
lower per capita income than the host country.
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economy, contrary to our usual findings, higher host income actually discourages FDI and 
exports, whereas high host population encourages both.
The first-stage results for the urbanisation subsamples are given in Table 5.14. They are 
broadly consistent with the results for the full sample (as reported in Table 5.10). The 
second-stage results are reported in rows 6 to 9 of Table 5.11. The results for the per 
capita income subsamples indicate that the relationship between FDI and exports is more 
complimentary when the host country has a higher per capita income than the country that 
is the source of the investment. Similarly, the results for the urbanisation subsamples 
suggest that the relationship is more complimentary when the host is more urbanised than 
the investor. These findings are consistent with the OECD/non-OECD and 
‘developedV‘developing’ subsample results in that they suggest that the complementary 
relationship between FDI and exports is stronger the more developed the host nation.
The second-stage results reported in Table 5.11 are contrary to a priori expectations. We 
hypothesised that the relationship between outward FDI and exports would be stronger 
for developed-developing interactions than for developed-developed interactions due to 
the different motivations multinationals have for investing abroad. However, our 
empirical results suggest the opposite is true. This suggests that the complementary 
forces acting between FDI and exports (such as intra-firm trade, demonstration effects, 
marketing synergies etc) are greater when the countries involved are both developed 
countries. Regardless of the countries involved, the finding of positive, statistically 
significant second-stage coefficients for the total dataset and all subsamples implies that 
complementarity-driving forces are more powerful that substitutability-driving forces.
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Table 5.12 Selection of Variables used for Sub-sample ’Self-selection’
Units Observations Mean Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
GDPp.c.i US$ 5,048 24,503 6,590 11,313 A0,521
ULQ u s$ 4,414 0.77 0.12 0.54 1.19
EEi % 3,897 93.97 1.65 90.14 97.67
Urbant % 5,037 75.17 9.40 60.72 89.11
Internet
N u m b er  
o f  u sers
4,461 205.0 183.2 0.70 573.1
GDP p.c.j US$ 5,033 14,158 11,137 323 40,527
ULCj u s$ 2,418 0.65 0.27 0.09 1.5
EEj % 3,340 90.4 4.99 72.9 97.7
Urbanj % 3,884 69.6 18.2 26.0 100
Internetj
N u m b er  
o f  u sers
3,547 96.2 136.5 0.001 647.9
Notes: GDP p.c. is gross domestic product per capita in constant 2000 US$; ULC is unit labour 
cost; EE is electricity transmission efficiency; Urban is the percentage of the population living 
in urban areas; Internet is the number of internet users per thousand population. The i 
subscript denotes source country; the j  subscript denotes host
Sources: All data is from the World Development Indicators online database, with the 
exception o f unit labour costs which are taken from the International Labour Organisation’s 
KILM database.
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Table 5.13 First-stage Results for Relative per capita income Sub-samples
5.4a 5.4b 5.5a 5.5b
sample
selection
Relative per capita 
income ^1
Relative per capita 
income < 1
criterion






































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is either the natural log of FDI or the natural log of exports from, country t to 
country j .  Figures in parentheses are absolute t-ratios. Year dummies are not reported. The t subscript 
has been dropped from the explanatory variable descriptions for simplicity.
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Table 5.14 First-stage Results for Urbanisation ratio Sub-samples

















































































































































Notes: Dependent variable is either the natural log of FDI or the natural log of exports from country i to 
country j. Figures in parentheses are absolute t-ratios. Year dummies are not reported. The t subscript 
has been dropped from the explanatory variable descriptions for simplicity.
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5.5 CONCLUSION
Despite the widely perceived benefits of globalisation, with its accompaniment of foreign 
direct investment and free trade, there are those who fear that it will irreparably damage 
their livelihood. A particular concern is that outward FDI will displace exports to the host 
country and therefore lead to a loss of domestic employment and, in the extreme, possibly 
even result in deindustrialisation. Although such thinking may be in the minority, to the 
extent that such a minority can exert disproportionate influence on policymakers (e.g. via 
special interest groups), it should be of concern to all those who believe that free trade 
and free movement of capital are powerful mechanisms for fostering economic growth in 
all countries of the world.
To this end, this chapter has focussed on the relationship between FDI and exports. The 
majority of the extant empirical literature finds in favour of complementarity (which 
would suggest that outward FDI is not harmful to domestic net employment). However, 
much of the literature can be criticised for failing to take proper account of the possible 
effects should FDI and exports be simultaneously determined. This omission may have 
biased some studies towards finding in favour of a complementary relationship. To avoid 
this potential pitfall, Graham (1995) employs a two-stage regression approach that allows 
him to investigate the relationship between FDI and exports after removing a range of 
factors that might simultaneously determine exports and FDI. Graham finds that US 
exports and US FDI are complements at the global level (i.e. using data from his ‘world’ 
sample), and with respect to Europe and East Asia. However, his results indicate that US 
exports and US FDI are substitutes with respect to western hemisphere countries.
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Having utilised a gravity model specification to investigate the impact of regional 
integration agreements on FDI and exports in the two preceding chapters, it was a 
relatively simply exercise to extend Graham’s methodology to our panel dataset. By 
using panel data we have been able to include many more observations than Graham 
(who analysed the outward FDI and exports of a single country for a single year), which 
should afford more confidence in the statistical significance of our results52.
Our second-stage results (for the regressions of FDI residuals on export residuals) are 
reported in Table 5.11. The coefficient for the ‘total sample’ is 0.83, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This is in keeping with Graham’s results and provides strong 
support for arguing that FDI and exports are complements at a ‘global’ level. Having 
mitigated the possibility that FDI and exports are being jointly determined by a third 
independent variable, we still report evidence in support of complementarity. This 
suggests that perhaps we should not be too quick to disregard the findings of other 
empirical studies simply because they failed to take account of the possibility of spurious 
correlation between FDI and exports.
Although the empirical evidence points to FDI and exports being complements in a 
‘global’ sense, we hypothesised that the relationship between FDI and exports may vary 
depending on the nature of the countries involved. If this is true, then it would be 
possible for FDI and exports to be complements at a global level, but substitutes with
52 Although Graham (1995) has data for three separate years, he does not pool the data, but rather estimates 
his model for each year separately and only reports and discusses the results for a single year.
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respect to interactions between certain countries53. Should this be the case, minorities 
may be justified in their fears, despite evidence indicating that higher global FDI is 
associated with higher global exports.
In order to test our hypotheses we divided our dataset into different samples, based 
broadly on the level of development of the host country. Our results were supportive of 
our first hypothesis, with the strength of the relationship between FDI and exports 
apparently fluctuating depending on whether the host was more or less developed. 
However, contrary to our second hypothesis, we found the relationship between FDI and 
exports to be more (rather than less) complementary between two developed countries 
than it is between a developed and a developing country. For instance, the second-stage 
correlation coefficient for the OECD sample was 1.12 compared with 0.57 for the non- 
OECD sample. Further analysis (based on dividing the dataset according to the relative 
value of various variables) did not alter this finding.
It therefore appears that complementarity-driving forces (such as intra-firm trade, 
marketing synergies etc) have more prominence in developed-developed interactions than 
they do in developed-developing interactions. In both cases, however, the positive 
second-stage coefficient indicates that complementarity-driving forces outweigh 
substitutability-driving forces (such as tariff-jumping FDI). We therefore find no 
evidence to support the concern that outward FDI may be accompanied by an overall
53 Furthermore, stemming from the underlying motivations driving firms to export and make foreign 
investments, we hypothesised that FDI and exports between two developed countries may be less 
complementary than between a developed and developing country. There is some evidence, albeit limited, 
in the literature to support this contention (see for example Carr et. al. (2001) and Lipsey and Weiss 
(1984)).
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reduction in exports from the home country. This should provide comfort to those who 
believe that free trade and free movement of capital are forces working for the benefit of 
all.
However, this does not mean that we should simply dismiss the concerns of those who 
feel threatened by the increasing integration of the world’s economies. Our results do not 
preclude the possibility that outward FDI may be accompanied by a fall in exports within 
some industries and sectors. Even though FDI may encourage exports in aggregate (and 
vice versa), it is possible that some groups may suffer loss of employment due to the 
exports of their industry being replaced by overseas foreign production. It would be 
interesting to examine this further in future work, providing it proves possible to assemble 
a suitable database disaggregated at the industry and sector level. For now, we would 
urge policymakers to be cognizant of the fact that while FDI and exports appear to 
promote one another at the aggregate level, it is quite possible that certain groups of 
people, or even industries, may be disadvantaged. Policies designed to compensate those 
that suffer an economic loss may provide an attractive solution to this problem54.
Although the analysis undertaken here has gone beyond that commonly conducted in the 
literature, there are other further advancements that would be interesting to explore. For 
instance, having laboured the point regarding the importance of minimising the 
unexplained variability remaining following the stage-one regressions, it would be 
valuable to identify some additional explanatory variables that have an influence on
54 Such a policy was included in the NAFTA agreement to try to ensure that those who suffered 
economically as a result of NAFTA received adequate compensation.
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FDI55. Secondly, as developing countries are increasingly becoming net outward 
investors it is imperative that they collect reliable data so that the nature of the 
FDI/exports relationship can be explored from their perspective.
55 The unexplained variability remaining following the stage-one FDI regression was nearly 50%, compared 
with less than 20% for the stage-one exports regression.
7. CONCLUSION
7.1 CONTEXT
We have explored the relationships between foreign direct investment, international trade 
and regional integration agreements in the context of endogenous growth theory. 
Whereas classical and neoclassical growth theory has little to offer in the way of policy 
recommendations, new growth theory is more promising as it seeks to incorporate a range 
of elements to better explain the causes of long-run economic growth.
Of particular interest is the role of FDI in the growth process. Its ability to confer 
technology and know-how from source to host country sets it apart from domestic 
investment, portfolio investment and aid (all of which provide capital to the host 
economy) and offers developing countries, in particular, the opportunity to bridge the 
technology or ideas gap.1
The promise shown by FDI for stimulating economic growth, combined with the 
phenomenon known as globalisation (which has engendered a remarkable increase in 
global investment, trade and integration) raises many questions that warrant further 
investigation. Indeed, the myriad issues raised are too numerous to all be addressed here. 
Instead, we have chosen to tackle a handful of interrelated topics in the hope of making a
1 It is spillovers and externalities from FDI that allow the technology or ideas gap to be broached. 
Spillovers are thought to primarily occur through imitation and competition effects, human capital 
acquisition and export spillovers.
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useful, and focussed, contribution to the fields of foreign direct investment, integration 
and economic growth.
The first question to be addressed was the impact of regional integration agreements on 
flows of foreign direct investment. Integration agreements are at the heart of the debate 
regarding the merits of regionalism versus multilateralism as mechanisms for harnessing 
the benefits to be gained from free trade. Although multilateralism is the favoured 
solution m a theoretical sense, regionalism is probably the more realistic approach . Not 
only has the number of integration agreements increased rapidly in recent years, but their 
structure has also evolved considerably. Whereas early RIAs were typically negotiated 
solely between hegemons, contemporary RIAs often count both hegemons and non­
hegemons as members. It is now also common for RIAs to include investment provisions 
(i.e. policies to promote intra-regional investment) as well as trade provisions in their 
articles of association. It is therefore probable that RIAs will influence the volume and 
pattern of FDI between both developed and developing countries. By altering the 
opportunities available within the region, RIAs will also have an impact on flows of FDI 
between ‘insider’ and ‘outsiders’.
In order to investigate the effects of RIAs on FDI we chose to focus on the two most 
significant integration agreements in effect today, the EU and NAFTA. By explicitly 
examining these agreements we are able to draw useful conclusions that apply to specific
2 In permitting the formation of regional trading agreements under Article XXIV (which would otherwise 
be prohibited), the WTO is implicitly acknowledging that regionalism may provide a preferable route to 
global free trade than multilateralism.
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countries and circumstances3. Furthermore, as the most advanced and ‘deep’ integration 
agreements in existence, the EU and NAFTA are those most likely to have had an impact 
on FDI flows.
In addition to investigating the effects of integration agreements on FDI, we also 
examined their impact on exports. This not only allows us to estimate the effect of the 
EU and NAFTA on trade, but also affords greater understanding (and comparability) of 
our empirical methodology. As it happens, it was also a prerequisite for the empirical 
work we undertook in chapter 5 on the relationship between FDI and exports.
Exploring the relationship between FDI and exports is critical because of its importance 
(or perhaps more importantly its perceived importance) in determining the potential cost 
to the investing country of outward FDI. A common concern is that outward FDI may 
displace exports and hence lead to a loss of jobs, and possibly even deindustrialisation, in 
the home country. This argument rests on the assumption that exports and FDI are 
substitutes; when FDI increases, exports are expected to fall. Unfortunately, the nature of 
the relationship between FDI and exports is indeterminate from theory. We are therefore 
forced to investigate the relationship empirically in the absence of a concrete theoretical 
prediction.
In order to further investigate some of the issues addressed in our empirical analyses of 
chapters 3, 4 and 5, we concluded by undertaking a case study analysis of foreign direct
3 Between them, the members of the EU and NAFTA accounted for 61% of world FDI inflows and 84% of 
outflows in 2003.
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investment in Mexico. Mexico provides an interesting case study because it has 
undergone substantial economic liberalisation since pursuing import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) policies during the 1970s and early-1980s. As it is one of the three 
members of NAFTA, it also affords the opportunity to assess whether our empirical 
results are in accordance with reality.
7.2 METHODOLOGY
For the empirical chapters, the gravity model was selected as the favoured empirical 
framework. Although its most popular, and successful, application is in respect of trade 
flows, in recent years the model has increasingly been applied to investment flows. The 
gravity model assumes that bilateral FDI or exports (whichever is the dependent variable 
of interest) can be explained by home and host country GDPs, home and host country 
populations, and the geographical distance between the two countries. These are the 
‘standard gravity variables’, to which can be added additional explanatory variables if 
thought relevant (e.g. common language, common border etc). In chapters 3 and 4 we 
include integration dummy variables in order to investigate the impact of the EU and 
NAFTA on FDI flows and exports respectively.
We require a slightly more sophisticated approach in order to properly assess the 
relationship between FDI and exports. Much of the extant empirical literature can be 
criticised for failing to take account of the fact that FDI and exports may be spuriously 
correlated by a third independent variable. In order to mitigate this risk, we follow the 
approach favoured by Graham (1995). This involves a two-stage process: in stage one
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the gravity model is used to perform separate regressions for FDI flows and exports4; in 
stage two the residuals from stage one are regressed against one another. A positive 
stage-two coefficient indicates that FDI and exports are complements; a negative 
coefficient implies that they are substitutes.
Our dataset was constructed as a panel with 13 home and 48 host countries for the years 
1992 to 2003 inclusive. With a complete, balanced dataset this would give 8,112 
observations (i x j  x t = 13 x 48 x 13). However, as with all studies in this area of 
economics, the size of the dataset has been restricted due to the availability of data for the 
dependent variables5.
7.3 KEY FINDINGS
Initial OLS results, for the analysis of the impact of RIAs on FDI, indicated that 
integration agreements (proxied by a combined EU and NAFTA intercept dummy) 
increase FDI flows between members by 60%. However, when the effects of the EU and 
NAFTA were separately estimated, only the EU seemed to exert a positive influence on 
intra-regional investment (i.e. the NAFTA dummy was not statistically significant). It 
was also interesting to note that both a common language and common border also
4 Conveniently, these very regressions have been performed as part of the analysis conducted in chapters 3 
and 4.
5 Data for exports is more widely available than FDI data — for the FDI analysis of chapter 3 we have 3,884 
total observations; for the exports analysis of chapter 4 we have 4,898 observations.
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encouraged increased FDI flows. We estimated that a common language increases FDI 
flows by around 270%, and a common border increases FDI by approximately 35%6.
In order to test the sensitivity of the OLS results, a range of additional explanatory 
variables were introduced into the analysis. Although inclusion of some of these 
variables resulted in the disappearance of the EU effect, we concluded that this was due to 
a reduction in the number of available observations rather than inclusion of any of the 
additional variables per se. This finding suggested that the EU effect may be being 
driven primarily by behaviour in the early nineties (notably the implementation and 
completion of the Single European Market (SEM) program). To test this hypothesis, 
regressions were performed on cross-sections of data for each individual year. These 
results indicated that the EU exerted a positive influence on FDI flows between members
n
for the years 1992 to 1996, but this influence seemed to disappear from 1997 onwards . 
This would seem to suggest that it is not integration agreements per se that influence FDI 
flows, but rather the policies and environmental changes that result from such 
agreements. A similar conclusion was reached by Balasubramanyam et. al. (2002).
In addition to affecting member countries, the formation of a RIA is likely to impact non­
member countries. To test for this possibility, we constructed a number of additional 
dummy variables to capture the effect on ‘insider-outsider’ and ‘outsider-insider FDI 
flows. The results indicated that both the EU and NAFTA encouraged additional FDI
6 Although the common language dummy is implausibly high (reflecting the fact that it is probably 
capturing other effects such as similarity in institutions and legal framework, colonial ties and other 
common factors), it is likely that a common language does substantially encourage investment.
7 In accordance with the results for the entire panel, the NAFTA dummy was not statistically significant for 
any individual years.
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inflows from outsiders than would otherwise have been the case. This is not surprising 
given that the enlarged internal markets of both the EU and NAFTA will prove attractive 
to firms from non-member countries. It also resonates with anecdotal evidence of 
member countries (e.g. Ireland, Mexico) enjoying significant increases in inward FDI 
following membership of the RIA. Evidence was also reported that the EU stimulates 
FDI from insiders to outsiders. A similar effect was not detectable for NAFTA however.
Our analysis of the impact of RIAs on FDI has provided results which indicate that the 
EU has acted as a stimulant to intra-regional FDI, but that NAFTA has not. It is also 
clear that RIAs have a marked effect on non-member countries as they encourage greater 
outsider-insider and insider-outsider flows8. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say with 
certainty whether the (lack of a) NAFTA result is an accurate reflection of reality, or 
whether the model simply failed to detect the true effect (owing, perhaps, to the absence 
of outward FDI observations for Canada and Mexico).
In Chapter 4 we again employed the gravity model to perform an analysis of the impact of 
RIAs on exports. Initial OLS results implied that the EU has resulted in increased in 
intra-regional trade of 30% (compared with the case in the absence of the EU), whereas 
NAFTA increased trade by approximately 40%. This suggests that the EU provides a 
slightly greater stimulant to FDI than it does to exports, but NAFTA provides a greater 
boost to exports than it does to investment.
8 As noted, there was no detectable insider-outsider effect due to NAFTA.
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It was also interesting to compare the estimated exports and FDI coefficients for some of 
the other explanatory variables. The absolute magnitude of the distance coefficient was 
greater for the exports than the FDI regression, supporting the belief that geographical 
distance is a greater deterrent to trade than it is to investment. The common border 
dummy was roughly twice the magnitude in the exports regression as it was in the FDI 
regression, providing further evidence that distance is a more important determinant of 
the volume of exports than of FDI. Common language proved a much greater stimulant 
to FDI than to exports, which is not surprising given that a common language is likely to 
be relatively more important in facilitating FDI than it is in facilitating exports.
As in Chapter 3, additional integration dummies were included to capture the possible 
effects on outsiders. The results indicated that exports from outsiders to insiders were 
reduced in the cases of both the EU and NAFTA (although the result for the EU was not 
statistically significant). This may be due to displacement by non-member FDI. In other 
words, the formation of the RIA leads to an expanded internal market which makes it 
more attractive for non-member firms to service by establishing a subsidiary in one of the 
member countries rather than exporting to each country from home.
There is also evidence that the EU has encouraged higher exports from members to non- 
members than would otherwise have been the case. The estimated coefficient indicates 
that exports from an EU member are 34% greater than exports between two outsiders. 
NAFTA, on the other hand, appears to discourage exports from insiders to outsiders. 
This suggests that FDI diversion is taking place, with some intra-regional investment
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opportunities becoming more favourable than external opportunities solely due to the 
prevalence of more favourable investment provisions.
Our analysis of the relationship between FDI and exports found in favour of 
complementarity (i.e. a positive second-stage coefficient), which is consistent with 
Graham (1995) and the majority of extant literature. We therefore find no evidence to 
support the contention that outward FDI harms net domestic employment; on the 
contrary, increased FDI is associated with greater exports which should promote domestic 
employment.
In an extension of the analysis, we found that the relationship between FDI and exports 
appears to be more complementary for developed-developed interactions than it is for 
developed-developing interactions. Although this supports our hypothesis that the nature 
and strength of the relationship will depend on the countries involved and the motivation 
for undertaking investment and trade, it is at odds with our expectation that developed- 
developing interactions will have a stronger relationship than developed-developed 
interactions. It therefore appears that complementarity-driving forces (such as intra-firm 
trade, marketing synergies etc) have more prominence in developed-developed 
interactions than they do in developed-developing interactions.
Although Mexico had enjoyed increasing inward FDI for over four decades, there was a 
dramatic increase in the nineties. Contrary to expectations, the catalyst for this influx 
does not appear to have been the formation of NAFTA. Rather, the increase in FDI 
seems to have been a response to the dramatic policy liberalisation forced upon Mexico in
1985 due to its sovereign debt crisis. This perhaps explains why the analysis of Chapter 3 
did not detect a NAFTA effect on insider FDI flows.
It is clear from the case study however, that membership of NAFTA has had a 
considerable impact on the Mexican economy. By deepening and legitimising Mexico’s 
liberalisation policies, and providing a gateway for accessing the US market, NAFTA has 
made Mexico more attractive to inward FDI from outsiders (particularly European and 
Japanese investors). This is supported by the analysis of Chapter 3.
7.4 IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY ISSUES
Although the initial analysis of chapter 3 reported a positive coefficient for the EU 
integration dummy, further analysis showed that this effect was being driven purely by 
the early years of our sample. Although regional integration agreements should in their 
own right prove attractive to foreign investors (as investors expect them to be 
accompanied by policy liberalisation, larger internal market, and reduced uncertainty), it 
seems apparent that it is the policies that accompany the agreement (and the degree of 
environmental change engendered by those policies) that have the real impact on investor 
behaviour. In other words, a RIA is likely to have a greater influence on flows of FDI to 
a member country when the agreement results in a substantial alteration in the prevailing 
environment. For instance, the Single European Market (SEM) program is likely to have 
had a considerable influence on both FDI and exports within the EU. Although work on 
the SEM continues today, its biggest impact will surely have been during the years of 
implementation (1985 to 1992) and in the years immediately following its official
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completion. Unfortunately we do not have bilateral FDI data prior to 1992 otherwise we 
would have been able to explore the impact of the SEM further.
In the case of Mexico, the policies that had the greatest influence on FDI flows actually 
came some years before the implementation of NAFTA. The true catalyst for the marked 
increases in inward FDI would seem to be the dramatic policy reorientation forced upon 
Mexico in 1985 due to its sovereign debt crisis. This crisis forced Mexico to stop 
pursuing import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) and instead liberalise trade and 
investment policies. The apparent success of this in attracting FDI emphasises how 
important a conducive environment is to attracting investors. It also offers a possible 
explanation for our inability to detect a positive NAFTA (‘insider’) effect on FDI in the 
empirical work of chapter 3: it is not NAFTA that has led to increased FDI, but rather the 
economic liberalisation undertaken by Mexico nearly a decade earlier
NAFTA also seems to have had a pronounced spatial effect on the Mexican economy, the 
attraction of the US market having pulled Mexican manufacturing activity towards the 
US-Mexico border. Policymakers should be cognizant of this effect as it may be 
detrimental to long-run growth and give rise to increasing income inequality. Policies to 
try to attract FDI to the southern regions of Mexico are unlikely to be very successful 
given that a number of factors (e.g. transport costs, agglomeration economies) are likely 
to dictate that foreign investment continues to be located along the US-Mexico border or 
near Mexico City. Future integration among the Southern Hemisphere economies may 
serve to offset this trend, but such effects are difficult to predict. This would be an 
interesting topic for future research.
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Given its proximity to the US and membership of NAFTA, Mexico should not fear that it 
will be unable to attract FDI. It should therefore resist the temptation to ‘artificially’ 
attract FDI (e.g. by offering tax incentives) and instead concentrate on fostering a 
conducive economic environment through investment in education, physical and financial 
infrastructure, and ‘sound’ institutions. This would ensure maximum social return from 
foreign investment, both by maximising absorptive capacity and limiting the ability of 
multinationals to privately capture the benefits of FDI.
These policy recommendations apply equally to all developing countries. Even those that 
do not have a large hegemon for a neighbour should shy away from offering inducements 
to foreign investors. By offering a ‘distortion-free’ environment countries maximise their 
opportunity to both attract and benefit from FDI in the long run.
In chapter 5 we investigated the relationship between FDI and exports. For all samples 
analysed (total dataset and all subsamples) we found evidence of a complementary 
relationship. Therefore, at least at an aggregate level, we find no support for the 
argument that outward FDI leads to a loss of employment in domestic export sectors. 
Policymakers should therefore resist making concessions to special interest groups in this 
regard. However, this does not mean that we should simply dismiss the concerns of those 
who feel threatened by the increasing integration of the world’s economies. Our results 
do not preclude the possibility that outward FDI may be accompanied by a fall in exports 
within some industries and sectors. Even though FDI may encourage exports in 
aggregate (and vice versa), it is possible that some groups may suffer loss of employment
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due to the exports of their industry being replaced by overseas foreign production. We 
would recommend policymakers be cognizant of this possibility. For future integration 
agreements, policies designed to compensate those who are economically disadvantaged 
by the integration agreement might prove desirable (such a policy was included in the 
NAFTA agreement). Countries should be mindful of the effects on both insiders and 
outsiders, and the possibility of marked spatial effects, when negotiating their inclusion 
in an integration agreement.
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH
Although we have addressed a number of questions in this thesis, many more have arisen 
that would be worthy of further attention in future research. For instance, it would be 
useful to extend the analysis of the effects of RIAs on FDI and exports to include 
additional integration agreements to test whether the results we report are unique to the 
EU and NAFTA, or are more widely applicable. Future research should also assess the 
effect of the EU expansion (to include the Accession countries) when appropriate data 
becomes available.
Although we found no evidence to support the assertion that outward FDI (via its 
relationship with exports) harms domestic employment in the investor country, further 
work (and data) is needed in order to adequately analyse the relationship between FDI 
and exports in cases where the ‘home’ country is an LDC. The relationship is also likely 
to vary by industry and sector, and it would be useful to explore this possibility in greater 
depth.
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Given the benefits that inward FDI is believed to confer on the host economy, it is 
surprising that the empirical analysis of section 6.5 found little evidence to support this. 
The potential spatial effects of FDI may offer an explanation for this. It is possible that 
FDI results in substantial agglomeration economies, which could result in the benefits to 
the host economy being restricted to specific geographical locations or sectors. We may 
therefore find a stronger effect of inward FDI on Mexican economic growth if the data 
permitted the regional growth patterns in Mexico to be analysed. The review of Mexico 
also demonstrated the value of case studies, specifically their ability to complement and 
add texture to the results obtained from panel datasets based on international cross-section 
and time-series data. Future research will benefit from the continued combination of 
empirical and case study techniques.
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